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Abstract
This thesis analysed linkages between climate change, economic development and
the incidence of civil conflict from 1981 to 2015. This dissertation consists of four
empirical papers contributing to a better understanding of the complex interrelation
between climate change, economic development and civil conflict. To analyse quan-
titatively these linkages, we use new cross-country panel data from 1981 to 2015.
We include control variables for good governance and democracy as well as a food
production index to identify potential mechanisms of climate change impacts on con-
flict. We test new measurements of changes in rainfall and temperature and compare
the effects of shocks to the growth effects. We estimate the impact of lagged conflicts
on the incidence of civil conflict with the inclusion of a lag-dependent variable in the
econometric estimation. We take into account potential heterogeneity by testing for
different impact mechanisms of climate change on conflict in both studied regions
(sub-Saharan Africa compared to the Middle East and North Africa). Finally, we
test different measurements of climate change (continuous growth rate versus extra
ordinary shocks in climate variables, in addition to annual levels of rainfall). In
addition, we consider the role of economic policies in avoiding new conflicts and
triggering peace if climate shocks cannot be avoided.
Several main conclusions are drawn based on the results of this thesis: (1) Weather
variables are good instruments not only for economic growth rate but also for do-
mestic food production. The main pattern found in this research on the climate
change effects is that temperature contributes to climate impacts more than rainfall
impacts on economic development. The main effect of climate comes from the tem-
perature growth effects and it is not extreme shocks that drive economic declines,
which indicates that the climate rather operates in a non-linear process. (2) Be-
yond the economic growth rate, climate change also impacts civil war via domestic
food production. A 10% reduction in economic growth or domestic food production
leads to 1.2% and 1.59% increase in the probability of civil conflict, respectively.
There appears to be evidence of different impact mechanisms of both indicators on
the incidence of civil conflict, in different regions. (3) A direct impact of climate
is identified on the incidence of civil conflict. Rainfall growth has a direct signif-
icant impact on reducing the likelihood of civil conflict, this finding is robust to
the inclusion of several model specifications. (4) The inclusion of the impact of
reverse conflict is essential in order not to overestimate the impact of climatic and
economic factors on conflict. (5) The level of democracy of a political system and
good governance are important control variables. (6) Proper economic policies that
can accelerate economic growth and food policies that enhance food security seem
to play a significant role towards peace.
However, applying an econometric “state-of-the-art” approach to control for poten-
tial endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and dynamic specification problems, still
results in some limitations, i.e. sensitivity of estimation results with regard to used
measurement concepts of central climate variables. Furthermore, applied economet-
ric approaches are limited to identify causal relationships. Therefore, future research
v
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is needed to address these problems. In this regard, we consider the combination




Diese Arbeit untersucht den Zusammenhang zwischen Klimawandel, wirtschaftlichen
Entwicklung und dem Auftreten von ziviler Konflikte. Die Dissertation umfasst
vier empirische Arbeiten, die zu einem besseren Verständnis der komplexen Zusam-
menhänge zwischen Klimawandel, wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung und zivilen Kon-
flikten beitragen. Um diese Zusammenhänge quantitativ zu analysieren, schätzen
wir innovative ökonometrische Methoden auf der Grundlage einer selbst zusam-
mengestellten erweiterten cross-country Paneldatenbasis, die 41 SSA-Staaten und
18 arabische Staaten des Mittleren Ostens für den Zeitraum von 1981 bis 2015 um-
fasst. Im Vergleich zu der bisherigen Literatur wurden zusätzliche erklärende Vari-
ablen berücksichtigt, um relevante Wirkungsmechanismen der Auswirkungen des
Klimawandels auf zivile Konflikte besser identifizieren zu können. Konkret wurden
Indikatorvariablen für
”
Good Governance“ und der Polity-IV Demokratisierungsin-
dex als zusätzliche politische Kontrollvariable sowie der
”
Domestic Food Production
Index“ als zusätzliche Indikatorvariable für ökonomische Entwicklung berücksichtigt.
Darüber hinaus wurden in der Promotionsarbeit einige methodisch-theoretische Er-
weiterungen eingeführt. Erstens werden alternative Messkonstrukte für die zentralen
erklärenden Klimavariablen, Niederschlag und Temperatur, verwendet. Dies umfasst
die explizite Berücksichtigung von Interaktionseffekten sowie die Unterscheidung
zwischen positiven und negativen Veränderungen. Zentral wurde in der Arbeit auch
erstmals analysiert, inwieweit kontinuierliche Klimaveränderungen, gemessen als
jährliche Wachstumsraten, oder aber extreme Klimaschocks, gemessen als extreme
jährliche Abweichungen im Vergleich zum langfristigen Durchschnitt, Auswirkungen
auf ökonomische Entwicklung und zivile Konflikte ausüben. Zweitens berücksichti-
gen wir die Dynamik ziviler Konflikte, d.h. wir testen den kausalen Zusammenhang,
dass aktuelle zivile Konflikte weitere zivile Konflikte in der Zukunft bedingen, in
dem wir lagged-dependent Variablen in die Schätzungen mitaufnehmen. Drittens
wird explizit die Heterogenität zwischen Ländern bzw. Ländergruppen analysiert.
Konkret testen wir inwieweit verschiedene Wirkungsmechanismen des Klimawan-
dels auf zivile Konflikte in afrikanischen und arabischen Staaten identifiziert werden
können. Weiterhin simulieren wir auf der Grundlage der erzielten Schätzergebnisse,
inwieweit bzw. ob adäquate Wirtschaftspolitik, den durch Klimawandel induzierten
Ausbruch ziviler Konflikte verhindern könnte bzw. inwieweit Wirtschaftspolitik ein
probates Mittel zur Beendigung von zivilen Konflikten darstellt.
Zentrale Schlussfolgerungen der Arbeit sind: (1) Das Hauptmuster der Auswirkun-
gen des Klimawandels auf zivile Konflikte erfolgt indirekt über die wirtschaftliche
Entwicklung. Dabei scheint eher ein kontinuierlicher Klimawandel als Klimaschocks
Ursache von zivilen Konflikten zu sein. (2) Über die wirtschaftliche Wachstum-
srate hinaus wirkt sich der Klimawandel auch über die heimische Nahrungsmit-
telproduktion auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit von zivilen Konflikten aus. Ein Rück-
gang des Wirtschaftswachstums bzw. der inländischen Nahrungsmittelproduktion
um 10% führt zu einer Erhöhung der Wahrscheinlichkeit eines Bürgerkrieges um
1,2% bzw. 1,59%. (3) Die Einbeziehung der Auswirkungen bestehender Konflikte
auf zukünftige Konflikte ist hoch signifikant und relevant. Ein bestehender Kon-
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flikt impliziert eine Wahrscheinlichkeit von 45%, dass dieser Konflikt im nächsten
Jahr fortgeführt wird. (4) Die institutionelle Ausgestaltung des politischen Systems
(Demokratisierung und Good Governance) sind hoch signifikante und wichtige Kon-
trollvariablen. (5) Eine angemessene Wirtschaftspolitik, die das Wirtschaftswachs-
tum beschleunigen kann bzw. die Ernährungssicherheit erhöht, sind effektive Mittel
zur Vermeidung bzw. zur Beendigung von zivilen Konflikten als Folge des Klimawan-
dels. Allerdings zeigen die Analysen auch ganz klar auf, dass Klimaveränderungen
und daraus resultierende ökonomische Schocks nicht die zentralen Erklärungsfak-
toren für den Ausbruch ziviler Konflikte darstellen, so dass gute Wirtschaftspolitik
nur ein bedingtes Mittel zur Herstellung bzw. Wahrung von Frieden ist. (6) Es
scheint Hinweise auf unterschiedliche Wirkungsmechanismen dieser Zusammenhänge
in afrikanischen und arabischen Ändern zu geben.
Die Anwendung von klassischer State-of-the-Art ökonometrischen Ansätzen, die auf
inferenzstatitischen Verfahren beruhen, beinhaltet grundsätzlich einige fundamen-
tale Einschränkungen, die eine robuste Identifikation kausaler Wirkungsmechanis-
men auf der Grundlage von
”
observational data“ relevant einschränken. Entsprechend
sind zukünftige Forschungsaktivtäten notwendig, um diese Limitationen aufzulösen.
In diesem Zusammenhang erscheint die Kombination von ökonometrischen Schätzun-





A much-debated effect of climate change corresponds to the causal relationship be-
tween climate change and political conflicts. There are significant overlaps between
countries that are particularly susceptible to climate-induced disasters and those
with recurring armed conflicts, such as the extended region around the Horn of
Africa and the Sahel zone of West Africa. The fact is that the poor suffer the most
from the impact of climate change (Skoufias, 2012). There is a growing concern that
climate change might slow down or possibly even reverse achieved progress in global
poverty reduction. The concern is rooted in the fact that (i) most poor are concen-
trated in developing countries, highly dependent on the agriculture sector and other
climate-sensitive natural resources (such as freshwater) for income and wellbeing,
which are strongly affected by climate change. Especially when water is scarce as
in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and in the Arab world, climate change leads to large
losses in national production, and thus, negatively affects rural income and food
security (Zhu et al., 2009; Breisinger et al., 2010). Assunção and Feres (2009) have
estimated that agricultural output per hectare in Brazil may decrease by 18 percent
by 2040 because of climate change. (ii) Developing countries often lack sufficient
financial and technical capacities to mitigate increasing climate risks (Hallegatte
et al., 2011). The situation is intensified by the fact that the affected people often
have neither expert knowledge nor capital to adapt to climate changes. To achieve
the objective of eradicating poverty, efforts have frequently been geared towards
agriculture intensification. However, unsustainable intensification of farming prac-
tices can lead to environmental damages such as soil degradation and deforestation
(Garnett et al., 2013). These impacts may in turn lead to a decrease in agricultural
productivity in the long run, in both plant and animal production, thus threatening
food security.
Brinkman and Hendrix (2011) indicate that political violence is more prevalent in
societies with higher levels of chronic food insecurity. Countries experiencing armed
conflicts are often the worst-scoring countries in the Global Hunger Index (Von Greb-
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mer et al., 2015). However, the reality is more complex, and the scarcity of food
is usually only one of many reasons responsible for the outbreak of conflicts. Weak
government institutions, stagnating economic growth, and unequal access to income,
land and natural resources can create an environment for the marginalization of pop-
ulations and a climate of hopelessness, making people more receptive to strategies
of violence.
Overall, there is a complex interrelation between climate change, poor economic
development, and political conflict, which might create a circulus vitiosus, where
climate change induces higher poverty and reduces local food production implying a
higher risk of political conflict and civil war which in turn reduces economic devel-
opments and food security. In this context, it is of particular interest to contribute
first, to a better understanding of this complex interrelation in order to avoid further
conflicts and inefficient economic development in the future. Second, the question
that has not yet been fully addressed in the literature is, what is the role of eco-
nomic policies in avoiding the outbreak of a new war in light of climate change, or
in triggering peace? We quantitatively assess policy options in Chapter 2.
To analyse quantitatively the complex linkages between climate change, economic
development and civil conflict, (1) we use a new cross-country panel data that can
describe climate shocks, economic conditions, and conflict, collected from various
recognized sources providing consistently updated time series. (2) We introduce
new control variables for good governance and democracy as well as a food pro-
duction index to control more potential mechanisms of climate change impacts on
conflict. Food production index is relevant, because climate also impacts domestic
food production beyond income growth, and local food production may be a better
measurement to observe shocks in the income of the rural poor. (3) We test new
measurements of climate change (rainfall and temperature), shocks compared to the
growth effects. (4) The inclusion of a lag-dependent variable in the econometric es-
timation to estimate the impact of reversed conflict as lagged exogenous variable on
the incidence of civil conflict. Furthermore, we take into account potential hetero-
geneity by testing for different impact mechanisms of climate change on conflict in
specific regions (sub-Saharan Africa compared to the Middle East and North Africa).
In chapter 2, we revisit the work of Miguel et al. (2004) in which the climate-conflict
link has been examined using panel data for SSA from 1981 to 1999. We develop
a framework for estimates. First, we extend the cross-country panel data including
Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa, from 1981 to 2015 con-
structing a new cross-country time series from different data sources. Second, we
2
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include additional control variables, i.e. variables on good governance and democ-
racy as well as domestic food production. Third, we extend the econometric esti-
mation including a lag-dependent variable applying GMM to estimate the impact of
previous conflict on the current conflict. We capture the indirect impact of weather
variation (rainfall and temperature) and other external shocks on the incidence of
civil war in country (i) year (t) through the economy applying the IV-approach.
Additionally, in the two-stage regressions, we also examine the independent impact
of climate change on civil conflict, rather than covering its impact only through
the economy. In the literature, econometric studies investigating the relationship
between climate change, economic growth rate and civil conflict have shown mixed
results due to slight changes in model specifications and measurements of climate
shocks, or data sources.
The research questions addressed in this chapter are: To what extent and does cli-
mate change impact economic development (economic growth rate and local food
production), and civil conflict? Can adequate economic policies reduce the proba-
bility of civil war, or at least trigger peace after an outbreak of war?
Moreover, we illustrate the case of Syria to explain results from cross-country panel
data, given the country’s location in a region that is consistently expected to be
among the most affected by climate change (Breisinger et al., 2011). Thus, climate
change may threaten the future development of Syria and place a significant bur-
den on economic development. Since 2011, Syria faces the intractable conflict that
continues in 2020 to complete nine years of intense violence. Therefore, Syria is an
important example to explain the proposed relationships in depth.
In Chapter 3, we aim to reproduce the finding of Miguel et al. (2004), who find a
negative significant relationship between economic shocks and the likelihood of civil
conflict in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) for the period 1981-1999, as a further robustness
check on our new setup of data. Their results have been already reproduced and/or
considered as a reference point for many efforts in civil war economies, e.g.(Ciccone,
2011). We test to what extent this theory is stable using different data, new rainfall
measurement (rainfall levels: the preferred empirical approach of Ciccone (2011)),
and different econometric specifications and methods.
In Chapter 4, we test mechanisms of climate change impacts on the incidence of
civil conflict separately in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) compared to the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) for the period 1981 to 2015. SSA and MENA are both
vulnerable to climate change and have experienced civil wars historically, but the
regions are diverse in agriculture systems, economic structure, political-institutional
3
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and social characteristics, and the resilience of human systems, and thereby in their
adaptive capacity. Thus, climate change impacts and the channels over which they
operate might be different. Therefore, (i) we aim to analyse these relationships sep-
arately in both regions, using our constructed data set and a variety of instruments.
(ii) In addition, we test the impact of rainfall variables from different sources of
data. Climate, economic development and conflict relationships have been already
demonstrated intensively in Africa. However, to the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to prove these relationships quantitatively in the Middle East and North
Africa.
In Chapter 5, we revisit the measurement of climate change. Estimating climate
change impacts through annual percentage change (like by Miguel et al. (2004)) in
climate variables has been criticized, for instance by Ciccone (2011) because rainfall
growth does not provide information about whether a wet year is a year with heavy
rainfall, or just a wetter year than the previous one (mean reversion). We sug-
gest that extra ordinary climate shocks (extreme positive temperature and negative
rainfall shocks) have an impact on civil conflict. Therefore, in this final chapter, we
focus instead on estimation of the effects of climate shocks. For this, first, we identify
shocks at different levels of deviations (1 and 2 standard deviation) from the long-
term mean of climate variables. Second, we define whether the constructed shock
variables deviate in a positive or negative direction from their respective histori-
cal long-term mean. We suppose that positive or negative extreme climate shocks,
lead to higher levels of conflict. Third, we count the number of climate shocks ob-
served over the past. We offer a different perspective on the effects of climate on the
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capita income growth and domestic food production induced by climate variation
significantly increase the probability of civil conflict. A 10% reduction in economic
growth or domestic food production leads to a 1.25% and 1.59% increase in the
likelihood of civil conflict, respectively. Furthermore, we identify a direct link of
climate on the incidence of civil conflict. Additionally, the level of democracy and
good governance are good control variables. Applying our model to the case of
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explains around 30% of the decrease in income growth and 85% of the decline in
food production index, thus contributes to the outbreak of civil war. While during
wartime, we explain with our model about 43-56% of civil conflict incidence. Lagged
conflicts and low economic development contributed to explaining the incidence of
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2.1 Introduction
Climate variability and change affect a country’s economy and households through
multiple channels. For example, an increase in temperature and changing rainfall
patterns affect the agricultural output of irrigated crops. Rising sea level will result
in the loss of land, landscape, and infrastructure. The frequent flooding and extreme
drought will change hydropower generation, and frequent floods will also increase
the demand for public investment in physical infrastructure (Breisinger et al., 2011;
Zenghelis, 2006; Dasgupta et al., 2007; Garnaut, 2008; Yu et al., 2010). Researchers
warn of disastrous consequences for countries where fresh water is scarce and whose
economies depend on local agriculture, such as many in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
Those countries are more vulnerable to a changing climate, leading to large losses
projected in their national output (Thurlow et al., 2009). Likewise, many countries
of the Arab world have additional declines in agricultural yields, resulting in negative
effects in rural incomes and food security (Breisinger et al., 2010).
In this way, in addition to social and political tensions, climate change impacts the
likelihood of conflict in direct and indirect ways. Directly, researchers argue that
deviations from moderate temperatures and precipitation patterns systematically
increase the risk of conflict (Burke et al., 2015; Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012), while
other studies have found that low or declining rainfall increases the risk of communal
conflicts, such as Hindu–Muslim riots in India (Bohlken and Sergenti, 2010; Sarsons,
2011), and leads to leadership change (Burke et al., 2012; Dell et al., 2012).
Furthermore, there is a lot of research devoted to the indirect impact of climate
change when new natural conditions lead to negative consequences on food produc-
tion and economic development, thus increase conflict risks.4 For example, some
studies provide evidence on the effects of temperature and rainfall variations on
economic growth and its relations to conflict. Evidence from the Philippines shows
that rainfall has an effect on agriculture and is related to civil conflict, whereby an
increase in agriculture production dampens conflict intensity (Crost et al., 2018).
Blattman and Miguel (2010) identify, among the most robust findings in the litera-
4Surely, the relationship between economic development (or food insecurity) and conflict is more
complicated. While many studies suppose that food insecurity can be a cause of conflict, there are
also studies suggesting that food insecurity can be strongly established as a consequence of conflict.
It is more appropriate to regard both aspects in the way that economic conditions and conflict risks
are referred to each other in a harmful cycle, a “circulus vitiosus”: in the absence of appropriate
political responses and equal opportunities for all population groups, climate change can induce
economic shocks and increase local environmental problems. That finally implies political conflicts
and civil war. In turn, civil wars amplify environmental and economic development problems,
leading to poverty and hunger.
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ture, that economic shocks induced by climate change are strongly correlated with
civil conflict, where negative rainfall shocks reduce economic growth and thereby
increase conflict risk. Collier et al. (2003) pointed to a correlation between food
insecurity and political conflict, claiming that both are symptoms of low develop-
ment. Food security has been also identified by Maystadt et al. (2014) to be key for
a peaceful transition in the Arab world. Most types of political violence addressed
in a paper by Brinkman and Hendrix (2011) are more prevalent in societies with
higher levels of chronic food insecurity.
The most widely cited study of Miguel et al. (2004) is the cornerstone of existing
literature on civil war economies e.g., by (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Hegre and
Sambanis, 2006; Collier et al., 2009; Miguel and Satyanath, 2011). The results
of Miguel et al. (2004) prove that a positive growth rate of rainfall increases GDP
growth and reduces conflict risks in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Afterwards,
based on this paper, Ciccone (2011) re-examined the correlation between civil conflict
and weather variations using an extended database from Miguel et al. (2004). He
found no robust link between civil conflict and year-to-year rainfall growth or yearly
rainfall levels. However, applying Ciccone’s approach, Miguel and Satyanath (2011)
re-examined the results and found that the findings hold even using rainfall levels
as instruments. The second important point of Miguel and Satyanath (2011) is that
the relationship between rainfall and GDP growth is weaker after 2000, suggesting
that alternative instruments are needed when investigating recent conflicts.
In this context, it is of particular interest to contribute first, to a better understand-
ing of the complex interrelation between economic development (and food insecurity)
and conflict risks. Second, the question that has not yet been fully addressed in the
literature is, what is the role of economic policies in avoiding the outbreak of a new
war in light of climate change, or in triggering peace?
In this chapter, we investigate the impacts of climate variations on conflict risks
both in direct and indirect ways (through economic growth) Miguel et al. (2004),
Ciccone (2011), and Miguel and Satyanath (2011). We estimate models with coun-
try and time fixed effects by means of a two-stage approach. However, compared to
the above-mentioned authors who use mainly panel data for sub-Saharan Africa, we
developed an empirical framework with (i) a new cross-country panel data collected
by ourselves. In this dataset, we combine the conflict data of Themnér et al. (2018)
with other climate, economic, social, political, environmental, and demographic vari-
ables for 59 countries of Africa and the Middle East from 1981 to 2015, collected
from different sources (such as World Bank, FAO of the United Nations, WTO,
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UNESCO, etc.), described in more detail in our Data set and variable description
(Appendix A). (ii) Our Data set includes additional control variables, i.e. variables
on good governance and democracy as well as domestic food production. Food pro-
duction index appears to be a strong instrument for explaining conflict risks. (iii)
We extend the econometric estimation including a lag-dependent variable applying
GMM to estimate the impact of previous conflict on the current conflict. Addition-
ally, in the two-stage regressions, we also examine the independent impact of climate
change on civil conflict, rather than covering its impact only through the economy.
(iv) Compared to previous literature, our research does not focus on the relation-
ship between explanatory variables and civil conflicts in African countries only, since
the linkage between climate and conflict is not a phenomenon unique to Africa but
rather can be explained as a phenomenon of low levels of economic development and
high levels of agricultural dependence (Salehyan and Hendrix, 2011). (v) Moreover,
based on the results from the two-stage approach, our paper explicitly takes Syria
into account as the most important conflict in the last decade, as it has caused the
displacement of more than six million Syrian people.
We highlight the case of Syria, since this is the best instance of a conflict apparently
arising from the interrelations between climate change, economic development, and
political conflict. Syria is a country with relatively high income inequality.5 Regard-
ing food security, Syria is highly dependent on agriculture. Moreover, agriculture is
a source of livelihood and economic growth in rural areas (Solh and Saxena, 2011).
Between 2006 and 2011, Syria experienced a multiyear period of extreme drought
that contributed to agricultural failures (Gleick, 2014), causing worrying tensions in
local food prices. While some studies try to explain a civil conflict in Syria only by
reference to political instability (Karimi and Shafaee, 2018) or increasing interna-
tional food prices (Johnstone and Mazo, 2011), we assume that only a combination
of environmental, social–cultural, and economic factors can possibly give us a com-
plete illustration of the incidence of civil war in Syria. Particularly, by means of
computing marginal and total effects, we provide empirical evidence for the extent
to which each group of factors contributed to probability of civil war in Syria.
In this Chapter, we first give a short overview about the economic, social, and
political conditions in the country in the time before the crisis exploded. Second, we
explain the data and the methodological framework. Last, we present our empirical
results and discuss them.
5For example, the Gini index of inequality for Syria increased from 33.7 in 1997 to 37.4 in 2004.
Inequalities in economic development, education, and the use of resources are strongly aggravated
between urban and rural populations (Bibi and Nabli, 2010).
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2.2 The crisis in Syria
From the 1980s onwards, there was a course of liberalization of the Syrian economy,
and the process was accelerated with the ascent of Bashar al-Assad in 2000. Given
the importance of the agricultural sector in general and the livestock sector espe-
cially, the government focused on the development of the animal sector so that the
contribution of the agricultural sector to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in fixed
price ranged between 24% and 27% in the early 2000s and decreased to 16% dur-
ing the 2005–2010 (Bibi and Nabli, 2010). The situation in this important branch
of the economy had become very serious when the 2006–2010 drought converged
with a shift in government agricultural policy regarding subsidies for irrigation and
fertilizers. The combining of the withdrawal of the subsidies with the low rainfall
apparently reduced production significantly (Middleton et al., 2018). While Syria’s
food security index had been steadily increasing from the index of 2.2 in 1961 to
8.0 in 2007 when the government was promoting irrigated agriculture (Aw-Hassan
et al., 2014), in 2006 the government sold off its grain reserves to take advantage of
high global prices. Thus, no reserves were available when the drought hit in 2007–
2008 so that food security in the country was violated (Akhmedkhodjaeva, 2015).
Furthermore, during the worst three-year drought, there was a large-scale migration
mostly from rural farming areas to urban centers, where young people needed to
enter a depressed job market (Selby et al., 2017; Solh, 2010; Kelley et al., 2015).
According to FAO (2017b), around 7 million food-insecure people were in urgent
need of assistance during war years in Syria.
With roughly 23.5 million citizens in 2010, Syria is a country with many diverse
religious and ethnic backgrounds including Sunnis, Alawites, Christians, Kurds, Ar-
menians, Assyrians, Druze, and Turkmans (Van Dam, 2011). The Sunni majority
(75%) had regrets about privileges that were granted to Alawite elites (Hinnebusch
and Zintl, 2015). Moreover, the problem generated mistrust between diverse popula-
tion groups because this tension could not be faced or dealt with openly (Hinnebusch
and Zintl, 2015).
In addition to the above-mentioned agricultural, religious, and ethnic factors, the
lack of government accountability6 and the dependence on petroleum rent played
important roles in the political and economic crisis in Syria (Hinnebusch, 2012;
Hinnebusch and Zintl, 2015). The budget was highly dependent upon petroleum
6Based on the Voice and Accountability index, Syria was ranked 187 out of 193 states during
1996 to 2014 (World Bank, 2017).
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rent, making the country vulnerable to rent declines. In addition, the spread of
electronic media contributed to political mobilization when there were attempts to
demonstrate against regimes in neighbouring countries (Hinnebusch, 2012; Howard
and Hussain, 2011). A combination of these factors, at least to a certain extent, led
to increased poverty, influencing political conflicts and finally escalating into armed
conflict by June 2011 (Hinnebusch and Zintl, 2015).
2.2.1 Data and description of variables
Data on civil conflict
As in recent studies (Miguel et al., 2004; Miguel and Satyanath, 2011), for our conflict
variables, we adopted the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset7 for countries in
our sample. However, we included many more countries and years than the study
of Miguel et al. (2004). Our sample contains data for 59 countries of the African
continent and the Middle East from 1981 to 2015. While the conflict data include
four types of conflicts (type 1, 2, 3, and 4), we focus on conflicts of type 3 and type
4 covering civil conflicts with and without intervention from other states on one or
both sides, respectively. In this way, the conflicts of type 3 and type 4 indicate
internal and internationalized internal conflict.
According to the data coding of Themnér et al. (2018) and in a similar manner
to Miguel et al. (2004), we generate three dependent conflict variables (any prio,
minor prio, and war prio) by means of comparing the intensity level of conflicts.
Minor conflict (minor prio) implies between 25 and 999 deaths in a given year, war
(war prio) implies at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year, and any con-
flict (any prio) caused at least 25 battle-related deaths in a given year, thus it covers
the two conflict variables (minor conflicts and wars). In this way, based on the type
and the intensity level of the conflict, all country-year observations (for country i and
time t) are coded as ones, otherwise as zero. More details on constructing these vari-
ables are described in Appendix A attached to this research (Data Set Description),
while detailed definitions of the types of conflict are available in the UCDP/PRIO
Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook as described for example in Themnér et al. (2018),
Gleditsch et al. (2002), Harbom et al. (2009), or in the dataset of Miguel et al. (2004).
7We used the Armed Conflict Dataset, version 18.1, available on the website: http://ucdp.
uu.se/downloads/.
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Weather variables
To quanitfy the direct and indirect effects of climate change on the incidence of
conflict, we considered various measures captureing exogenous variation in climate
(rainfall and temperature). The climate variables used in this paper are:
 The annual rainfall level (mm) is computed by adding up all of the monthly
observations in a given year and its respective lags: rainfall, rainfall lag 1,
rainfall lag 2 ;
 A relative change in precipitation in a given year related to the previous year,
and this is the principal measure of many above-mentioned studies:
gr rainfall =(rainfall - rainfall lag 1 )/ rainfall lag 1 ;
 The annual temperature (degrees Celsius) is computed by adding up all of the
monthly observations in a given year divided by the number of months in that
year, and its lags: temp, temp lag 1, temp lag 2.
Furthermore, we are interested in understanding whether rainfall level and rainfall
growth rate are still important measures for conflict risks when regarding the total
water availability in a country. For instance, a high level of precipitation might be a
real problem for countries which frequently suffer from floods destroying infrastruc-
tures, but it might be no problem for countries with dry climate conditions. On the
other hand, the extremely low level of rain availability might be a real challenge for
regions with frequent drought and may pose no problem for regions in which water
has been stored in the reservoirs in the past. Therefore, we computed interaction
effects. We have taken Germany (with 727 mm annual precipitation) as a reference
country with a peaceful situation and a sufficient level of precipitation in the last
decade. We have computed dummy and interaction effects as follows:
 A dummy low rainfall countr is equal to 1 if the annual rainfall level in a
country was lower than in Germany, otherwise 0;
 The interaction effect between the dummy low rainfall countr and the growth
rate of rainfall is inter L gr rainfall=low rainfall countr × gr rainfall ;
 The interaction effect between the dummy low rainfall countr and rainfall level
is inter L rainfall=low rainfall countr × rainfall ;
In the same way, countries with a high mean level of available water have been taken
into account (variables are described in the Appendix A).
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Socio-economic variables
There are several sources which provide GDP per capita, but most of the time series
data (such as the World Development Indicators source) are not complete for our
sample of 59 countries from 1980 to 2015. However, we found that the database
of UNSD (2020) was able to cover gaps over almost all countries and years. This
database provides a complete and consistent set of GDP per capita time series from
1970 onwards of the main National Accounts data aggregated for all UN Member
States and other territories in the world for which National Accounts information is
available.
Overall, constructing our own database, we faced the problem that different sources
use various methodologies for measuring the same indicators. Therefore, in our
database we adopted more as one indicator (for example, GDP per capita) measured
in different ways, e.g., in current and constant prices (see Appendix A).
However, in this paper we present the results based on the following indicators:
 Measure of GDP per capita in constant price (US dollars), and its two lags
from the source UNSD (2020): gdp c con, gdp c con lag 1, gdp c con lag 2 ;
 Relative changes in GDP per capita from the previous year and its lag:
gr gdp c con= (gdp c con - gdp c con lag 1)/gdp c con lag 1 and
gr gdp c con 1= (gdp c con 1 - gdp c con lag 2)/gdp c con lag 2 ;
 Food production index is the aggregate volume of agricultural production for
each year compared to the base period 2004–2006, covering food crops that
are considered edible and that contain nutrients (Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization of the United Nations, 2016): food index ;
 Oil exporter status (% of merchandise exports) from World Bank (2016), and
its lags: oil exp wdi, oil exp wdi lag 1, oil exp wdi lag 2 ;
 Relative changes in oil exporter status from the previous year: gr oil exp wdi=
(oil exp wdi - oil exp wdi lag 1)/(oil exp wdi lag 1);
 Total merchandise trade of a country exports to the world in US dollars
at current prices from The World Trade Organization (2016), and its lags:
trade exports, trade exports lag 1, trade exports lag 2 ;
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 Changes in total merchandise trade of a country exported to the world in US
dollars at current price from previous year:
gr trade exports= (trade exports - trade exports lag 1)/(trade exports lag 1).
 Share of the urban population as a percent: urban pop.
Fractionalization data
For measuring ethnic and religious fractionalization, we use the fractionalization
index provided by Alesina et al. (2003), computed by the formula FRACm = 1 −∑N
i=k S
2
km, where Skm is the share of group k in country m. The variables for
ethnic and religious fractionalization were disaggregated and combined from several
sources (see more details in the Data set), but the primary source was Encyclopaedia
Britannica (2001):
 Ethnic fractionalization: ethnic;
 Religious fractionalization: religion.
Political controls
 Polity IV scores: Type of political regime for each country on a range from
-10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy) (Roser, 2019; Polity IV Project,
2013; Wimmer and Min, 2006): polityiv ;
 Transformed Polity IV scores (polity iv) on a positive range from 1 to 20, and
its two lags: polityiv tr, polityiv tr lag 1, polityiv tr lag 2 ;
 The variable constructed to measure the absolute strength of a political shock
in a country and a year compared to the previous year:
strength gr polityiv =|polityiv tr - polityiv tr lag 1|. It does not matter whether
the shock was toward democracy or backward to autocracy, because we are
interested in the absolute strength of a political shock;
 Voice and accountability indicator as percentile rank among all countries (ranges
from 0=lowest to 100=highest rank), which reflects perceptions of the extent
to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their govern-
ment, as well as freedom of expression, association, and a free media (World
Bank, 2014): accountab.
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Natural conditions
 agri land: Agricultural land (% of land area) refers to the share of land area
that is arable as defined by the FAO, under permanent crops, and under per-
manent pastures. Land abandoned as a result of shifting cultivation is excluded
(World Bank, 2016).
 arable land: Arable land in hectares per person.
 area.km2: Is the total area of a country in km2.
Furthermore, based on the data of FAO (2017a), which are available for five-year
periods from the 1980s for most countries in our sample, we generated the following
variable for water use:
 freshwater is freshwater withdrawal as % of total renewable water resources.
 agri renew is agricultural water withdrawal as % of total renewable water
resources (%).
 water stress is an aggregated indicator of freshwater withdrawal as a propor-
tion of available freshwater resources. This indicator is also known as water
withdrawal intensity.
 wasser total is the annual level of freshwater withdrawal, calculated as an
average over each decade (1980–1989, 1990–1999, 2000–2017), in 109 m3/year.
 water 1km2 is average annual level of freshwater withdrawal (calculated as an
average over each decade) divided by country area as
water 1km2= 106 × wasser total/area.km2, in 103 m3/km2.
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2.3 Empirical framework
In the two-stage approach, we capture direct and indirect effects of weather varia-
tion (rainfall and temperature) as well as other external shocks on the incidence of
civil war. In the first-stage regressions, economic growth rate and food index are
instrumented by weather and other control variables with fixed effects. Then the
effect of first-stage (economic growth rate and food index) with the effect of lag-
dependent variable (since the experience of war in the past increases the likelihood
of entering into new conflicts), weather variables directly, and control variables will
be measured on the incidence of civil conflict. To the best of our knowledge the
only study considered the effect of food production in such a relationship between
climate and conflict in Africa is the one of Buhaug et al. (2015) who revealed a ro-
bust link between weather patterns and food production across sub-Saharan Africa
and indicated that covering indirect and conditional effects of climate variability on
collective political violence via food production shocks is very important.
With the econometric software STATA, we have tested a wide range of methods:
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), a two-stage least squares method by in-
strumental variable estimator (IV-2SLS), as well as probit models. First, to take
lagged conflict explicitly into account, we estimated our model with Dynamic Panel
Data estimators (DPD) based on GMM, because this kind of model allows us to in-
clude one or more lagged dependent variables (Roodman, 2009; Arellano and Bover,
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1995). We applied an estimator of GMM introduced
by Hansen (1982) and implemented by Roodman (2009) in the STATA package
xtabond2. To ensure that the estimator is robust to heteroskedasticity, we used the
option robust on the command xtabond2.
Second, we applied the IV-2SLS-method with package ivreg2. In this method, we
excluded lagged dependent variables from regressions because this method doesn’t
control unobserved heteroskedasticity. We applied this method first of all for iden-
tifying strong instruments for endogenous variables of economic development in the
first stage.
Additionally to these two approaches, we also applied Probit models. However, Pro-
bit models are not able to take into account lagged explanatory variables. Moreover,
using Probit models with endogenous variables may lead to inconsistency and even
bias in the case of fixed effects (Greene, 2002; Arellano González, 2005). Therefore,
in this Chapter we focus on results for the GMM and 2SLS methods.
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Additionally, we computed some statistical tests to ensure that the chosen instru-
ments are strong enough for endogenous variables gr gdp and food index. First, we
applied the IV-2SLS method and used the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) Chi-squared
and F -statistics that test underidentification and weak identification of endogenous
variables. The null hypotheses were rejected. The SW Chi-squared statistic8 equals
172.66 (p-value=0.000) for GDP growth and 293.09 (p-value=0.000) for the food in-
dex. SW F statistics account for 31.72 and 53.85 for both regressors, respectively—
greater than recommend level of 10. Next, we test for overidentification by Hansen
J-statistic after command ivreg2.9 The joint null hypothesis of the Hansen J-test
that the instruments are valid instruments (i.e., they are uncorrelated with the error
term) could not be rejected with the p-value 0.529. Furthermore, we controlled our
sample with respect to heteroskedasticity with the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg
test: the null hypothesis that the error variance is constant was rejected with
Prob>Chi2=0.000, pointing to heteroskedasticity in our sample. In this context,
since in IV-2SLS the heteroskedasticity problem may make our estimated coefficient
less precise, we focus on the results from GMM estimation eliminating this problem.
However, we will take into account the results from both methods.
2.3.1 Results from the first stage
In the first stage, economic growth rate and food index for country i and year t
are instrumented by a vector of explanatory variables for weather and environment
conditions (X ′it) including fixed effects. Similarly to Miguel et al. (2004), we included
country fixed effects ai to capture time-invariant country characteristics that may
be related to civil conflict, as well as country-specific time trends yeart to capture
additional variation over time:
gr gdpit = ai + bX
′
it + diyeart + eit, (2.1)
food indexit = ai + bX
′
it + diyeart + eit, (2.2)
where the error term e is allowed to be correlated across years for the same country.
When searching for strong instruments, we applied many different variables available
in our dataset. However, a constellation of explanatory variables presented in the
8SW Chi-squared was computed for (L1−K1 + 1) degrees of freedom where L1 is the number
of excluded instruments and K1 is the number of endogenous regressors.
9Remark: the Hansen test was done after country fixed effects were removed from the equation
because otherwise an estimated covariance matrix with dummy variables is not of full rank.
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following discussion provided statistically better results fitted by values of R2 and
the F -test. Moreover, we present only the results of those variables which show
no multicollinearity problem. Furthermore, fixed effects and country specific time
trend are included for all countries and estimations. However, focusing on the Syrian
conflict in this paper, in Table 2.1 we decided to include estimated coefficients only
for four selected countries (Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran), although all countries
were included in the estimation.
Although the food index is positively correlated with economic growth rate (0.12),
but it seems to be affected by the same variables differently. In Table 2.1, in the
OLS regression the given explanatory variables explained the food index better than
economic growth (with R2 equaling 0.87 versus 0.16). Overall, there are only a few
variables that have a significant impact on GDP growth. From the first group of
variables related to economic and agricultural factors, agricultural land and a relative
change in trade exports enhance economic growth significantly by 0.004 and 0.113,
respectively. However, arable land decreases GDP growth rate (-0.284*). This may
be explained by the fact that a high share of crop items being less expensive than
oil or even animal products may have a negative effect on their proportion in the
total value of gross domestic product.
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Table 2.1: First-stage results for economic growth rate and food index
(1) (2)
gr gdp c usd food index
gr trade exports 0.113*** (0.000) -0.016** (0.015)
gr oil exp wdi 0.000001 (0.620) -0.000002 (0.289)
agri land 0.004** (0.044) 0.014*** (0.000)
arable land -0.284* (0.052) 0.481*** (0.000)
urban pop -0.002 (0.490) 0.005** (0.016)
gr temp -0.310** (0.032) -0.227* (0.056)
gr rainfall 0.047 (0.251) -0.012 (0.715)
rainfall -0.000004 (0.933) 0.00003 (0.483)
inter L gr rainfall -0.068 (0.110) 0.003 (0.927)
inter L rainfall 0.0002** (0.026) 0.0001* (0.091)
water stress -0.00002 (0.869) -0.001*** (0.000)
water 1km2 0.0002 (0.877) -0.0004 (0.617)
polityiv tr -0.0004 (0.785) -0.008*** (0.000)
strength gr polityiv -0.007*** (0.001) -0.003 (0.126)
accountab 0.001 (0.397) 0.001 (0.417)
ethnic 0.019 (0.922) -0.303* (0.058)
religion -0.143 (0.557) 0.090 (0.652)
year trend TUR -0.001 (0.822) 0.019*** (0.000)
year trend SYR -0.002 (0.431) 0.020*** (0.000)
year trend IRQ 0.005* (0.073) 0.012*** (0.000)
year trend IRN 0.004 (0.228) 0.028*** (0.000)
dummy country TUR 0.125 (0.244) -0.088 (0.315)
dummy country SYR 0.101 (0.459) -0.518*** (0.000)
dummy country IRQ 0.270 (0.175) 0.611*** (0.000)
dummy country IRN 0.151 (0.141) 0.010 (0.905)




Country and time fixed effects are included for all countries.
p-values in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
19
Chapter 2. If Climate Change Can Trigger Civil Conflict, Can Good Policy Trigger Peace?
Empirical Evidence from Cross-Country Panel Data
By contrast, the food index is negatively affected by a growth rate of trade exports (-
0.016**), pointing out that more industrialized countries exporting industrial goods
and oil give less support for agricultural branches and rely heavily on food imports
(Maystadt et al., 2014). For example, in the Gulf countries, oil production is domi-
nant at the expense of arable land and agricultural production, and simultaneously
the highest share of total exports in Oman and Yemen is fish and fish products need-
ing no arable land. Furthermore, agricultural and arable land raise the food index by
0.014*** and 0.481***, respectively. Furthermore, the share of urban population is
positively related to the food index (0.005**). It seems that a higher share of urban
population forces a higher food supply. This is because in higher urbanised coun-
tries, agricultural branches that are more intensified are able to provide relatively
more food (Satterthwaite et al., 2010).
Regarding the second group of variables referring to environmental conditions, a
change of one percentage point (1 pp) in temperature growth significantly reduces
economic growth by 0.310 pp and food index by 0.227 pp. Considering the temper-
ature increase in the last two decades, this is a huge effect. For example, while in
the 2000s global mean temperature difference was around 0.6◦C above pre-industrial
levels (1850–1900), in 2019 this temperature change was already around 1.1 ∓ 0.1◦C
(World Meteorological Organization, 2019). That means a near doubling of













where ty−1900 is an average temperature change between year y and 1900. We con-
trolled for the average increase in temperature growth in our data. First, we observe
a significant increase of the average temperature over all countries as well as in
Syria. For example, according to our sample the average annual temperature in
Syria was 17.42◦C in the 1980s, 18.02◦C in the 1990s, and 18.6◦C in the 2000s.
Second, we were interested to investigate a change in temperature growth in our
data in order to appreciate the estimation. Similar to the formula above, we took
the mean temperature of the 1980s as a reference level, and we computed a mean
change in temperature growth for the 16 last available years between 2000 and 2015,
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Surely, we have deviating results because we had a shorter time perspective compared
to the period 1980-2000. Nevertheless, the positive change in temperature of 0.51◦C
over 16 years is absolutely comparable with an increase of 0.6◦C over 20 years,
illustrated above. Calculated on average over all countries, we obtained a mean
change in temperature growth of 2.17 pp for 16 years (or 0.14 pp annually). Thus,
according to our computation, a 2.17 pp increase in temperature growth would
induce a reduction in economic growth and food index by 0.67 pp and 0.49 pp,
respectively, over 16 years. In other words, only due to rising temperature, every 16
years income growth would fall by 0.67 pp and the food index would decline by 0.49
pp, all else being equal. For example, if some countries currently have a limited
income growth of 1–1.4% annually, in 32 years these countries will be not
able to achieve any income growth only due to climate change, ceteris
paribus. Additionally, rising food prices due to decreases in harvesting
would mean a catastrophe for ordinary citizens in such countries.
Furthermore, in our estimation neither rainfall level nor its relative change has a
significant impact on GDP growth rate or the food index. However, in countries suf-
fering from rain shortages, more precipitation increases economic growth by 0.0002**
and the food index by 0.0001*. Furthermore, more water stress decreases the food
supply (-0.001***).
Considering the third group of political factors, the level of democracy (Polity IV
estimates) is significantly negatively related to the food index (-0.008***). In this
context, more democratic countries are even less effective in ensuring food pro-
duction, while stronger autocratic regimes cope better with food supply stresses.
Furthermore, democracy level has no significant impact on GDP growth rate. How-
ever, the power of political shocks reduces economic growth significantly (-0.007***),
regardless of a change in direction of the political system in “transition time”.
Last, with respect to social structure, only increasing ethnic fractionalization re-
duces the food index (-0.303*). Furthermore, we included some idiosyncratic effects
for several chosen Middle Eastern countries. For these four selected countries, the
food index appears to have an increasing trend over time compared to 1981. More-
over, the interesting result is that the food index was significantly smaller in Syria
21
Chapter 2. If Climate Change Can Trigger Civil Conflict, Can Good Policy Trigger Peace?
Empirical Evidence from Cross-Country Panel Data
than in other countries (-0.518***): this points to the fact that Syrian government
disregarded the importance of agricultural production and provision of food to the
population. Next, we are interested to understand how food production decreased in
the years before the Syrian conflict—and to what extent we are able to explain this
reduction by reference to temperature growth as the most important explanatory
variable for economic indicators.
Predicted impact of temperature growth on economic indicators in Syria
First, it is interesting that the average annual temperatures in Syria fluctuates. The
mean value of temperature growth rate is 0.316, whereby the interval of the mean
± standard deviation is [-4.015, 4.647]. In the first column of Table 2.2, it can be
seen that in the years before the war there was a temperature growth rate of 1.932
in 2007 and 8.078 in 2010, whereby the second value lies outside of the computed
interval [-4.015, 4.647] and therefore was an extraordinary change of temperature.
Based on our estimation, we are interested to figure out the extent to which a change
in temperature growth can explain the decreased income and food index. Therefore,
in columns 2, 4, and 7 we calculated the difference in observed temperature growth,
income change rate, and food index when comparing to 2007. The maximum differ-
ence in temperature growth rate is 6.147 in 2010, i.e., shortly before the war broke
out. Based on our estimates, in columns 5 and 6 we computed partial predicted im-
pact of temperature growth on economic indicators by multiplying the increments
with respective coefficients.
Table 2.2: Predicted effects of temperature growth in Syria
gr temp, % ∆gr tempy−2007 gr gdp con ∆gr gdpy−2007 β̂k∆gr tempy−2007 FI, % ∆FIy−2007 β̂m∆gr tempy−2007
2007 1.932 17.200 93.600
2008 0.235 -1.697 26.085 8.885 0.526 90.040 -3.560 0.385
2009 -0.065 -1.997 0.464 -16.736 0.619 96.230 2.630 0.453
2010 8.078 6.147 10.739 -6.461 -1.906 91.970 -1.630 -1.395
2011 -10.543 -12.475 12.096 -5.104 3.867 102.840 9.240 2.832
2012 5.070 3.139 -28.868 -46.068 -0.973 93.830 0.230 -0.713
2013 -2.607 -4.538 -40.541 -57.741 1.407 83.430 -10.170 1.030
2014 1.929 -0.003 -11.730 -28.930 0.001 67.790 -25.810 0.001
2015 0.428 -1.504 -15.365 -32.565 0.466 78.800 -14.800 0.341
Thus, shortly before the conflict exploded in 2010, we consider that the 6.15 pp
increase in temperature growth contributed to lower income growth by 1.91 pp,
whereas the total reduction of income growth was 6.46 pp. In other words, the
increase in temperature growth seems to explain around 30% of reducing income
growth. Simultaneously, we observe that the increase in temperature growth by
6.15 pp contributed by decreasing food index by 1.39 pp, where we observe a total
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reduction of food index of 1.63 pp. This means that based on our estimation, the
increase in temperature growth could have contributed to 85% of the decrease in
food index. Surely, we cannot exclude that this result is not shaped by any error
term. However, we believe that these findings are reliable. Moreover, based on
this empirical evidence, we believe that in the Syrian case, climate change and
rapidly rising temperatures essentially contributed to economic instability and food
insecurity, which obviously led to rising social tensions and a war. Moreover, we
suppose that 2010 was a crucial year generating a considerable deterioration of
economic prospects and growing dissatisfaction among the population. To what
extent the climate change and economic situation contributed to war, we will reveal
in the following.
2.3.2 Results from the second stage
As explained above, we provide estimation results for the GMM method (Models 1–
12 in Table 2.3) and the IV-2SLS approach (Models 13–24 in Table 2.4). Each of the
two methods was applied for three dependent variables related to conflict. Moreover,
to control the stability of the estimation, we included explanatory variables step-
by-step in four phases. In this way, we present four models for each independent
variable and each method. However, when interpreting results, our discussion will
mostly focus only on regressions with the dependent variable “any conflict”, since the
impact of explanatory variables on two other dependent variables of conflict is much
weaker, and thereby the statistical fit R2 of those regressions is lower. However, the
results for all dependent variables are very similar, as can be seen from the tables
presented. The second-stage equation estimates the impact of economic growth rate
and domestic food production (gr gdp and food index) predicted in the first stage,
as well as the impact of other controls X ′it added in the regression step-by-step, on
the incidence of civil conflict:
conflict dummyit = αi+β ·gr gdpit+γ ·food indexit+δ ·X ′it+σi ·yeart+εit. (2.6)
As mentioned, we improved our estimations by including climate-relevant, political,
and social controls X ′it in four phases,
10 whereas explanatory variables for economic
development are included in all steps. Country fixed effect and specific time trend
10In this Chapter, we present only significant and stable results controlled by statistical tests for
underidentification of instruments, although many other different variables of our database (such
as oil exporter status, trade exports, etc.) were regressed on civil conflict. Unfortunately, impacts
of other independent variables were insignificant or unstable.
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effects are also included in all regressions. In the first phase, we included change in
rainfall and temperature. In the second step, we added precipitation level and water
availability. Then, we added some additional variables for political system and social
structure. Last, we introduced some variables for interaction effects of rain. As can
be see in Table 2.3, for the GMM method, the results over four described phases
are stable when including additional variables step-by-step in Models 1–4 for any
conflict and in Models 5–8 for dependent variable war, as well as in Models 9–12
for minor conflict. In Table 2.4, for the IV-2SLS approach, the addition of further
explanatory variables also provides relatively stable results in Models 13–16 for any
conflict, in Models 17–20 for war, and in Models 21–24 for minor conflict. Since the
results are relatively robust over all models, we will mainly focus only on certain
specifications.
With respect to the results in model 4, it is very interesting that a 1 pp change in
lagged dependent variables increases the probability of any civil conflict significantly
by around 0.36 percentage points in the year (t− 1) and by 0.09 pp at time (t− 2).
This means that the observed incidence in the past (100% − probability) contributes
up to 36% to a conflict likelihood in the future. In this context, there is a strong path-
dependency of conflicts over time: a conflict in the past causes a higher probability
of an incidence in future.
Furthermore, our estimation establishes a significant negative link between economic
development and conflict incidence and this finding is robust in all model specifica-
tions. Thus, a 1 pp reduction in GDP growth may raise conflict probability by 0.125
pp, while a 1 pp reduction in food production index may increase conflict probability
by 0.159 pp. This strong negative link between economic growth and the incidence
of civil conflict corresponds with the findings of Miguel et al. (2004). Comparing
these outputs with results from Model 16 for the IV-2SLS estimation, we consider
an essential overestimation of regression coefficients. For example, a 1 pp reduction
in economic variables may induce an increase of conflict risks by 0.391 pp (for GDP
growth rate) or even by 0.963 pp (for food index).
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Obviously, the IV-2SLS approach considerably overestimates the effects. The rea-
sons for this overestimation of coefficients in the IV-2SLS approach might be that
the approach ignores the impact of lagged dependent variables as well as disregard-
ing heteroskedasticity, whereas both may be taken into consideration by the GMM
method of Roodman (2009).
Furthermore, temperature growth has no significant impact on any conflict-indicator;
however, a 1 pp positive change in temperature growth enhances the probability of
war by 0.391 pp. Given the average increment in temperature growth of 2.17 pp
for the last 16 years in our data, we can calculate that over 32 years, temperature
growth then can contribute to war probability by 1.7 pp. We see that this effect is
a considerable direct contribution of climate change to conflict risks.
Additionally, a 1 pp increase in rainfall growth reduces the likelihood of any conflict
by around 0.202 pp, and thereby this effect appears to be much stronger for minor
conflict than for war (-0.260*** versus 0.045). It corresponds to the findings of
Miguel et al. (2004), Hendrix and Glaser (2007), and Bohlken and Sergenti (2010)
indicating that a positive increase in rainfall growth decreases conflict risk. However,
we additionally found that in countries with low levels of precipitation, an increase
in rainfall growth enhances the risk of any conflict and minor conflict by 0.196 pp
and 0.274 pp, respectively. In this way, the impact of rainfall growth on conflict risk
differs between countries in our sample and among the countries suffering from rain
shortage. It appears that in countries with a rain shortage, there might be additional
tensions in years with a positive increase in precipitation, as if the countries would
fight for rainfall as a water source—if, for example, traditional planting and harvest
cycles become disrupted. Another hypothesis is that after extreme weather events,
such as strong rainfall and flooding, destruction of natural resources and the usual
livelihood conditions may increase the probability of conflict due to higher pressure
on agriculture and economies.
Further, regarding annual precipitation level, we observe a positive significant im-
pact of rainfall level on any conflict and minor conflict (0.0003***). This means
that the probability of an incidence increases by 0.03 pp when the annual rainfall
level changes by 1 mm, or by 3 pp when the rainfall level changes by 100 mm. Our
results partly confirm the findings of Ciccone (2011) that higher rainfall level at
point (t−2) is related to the rising risks of conflict at point t. Our results show that
a higher rainfall level already at point t is positively related to conflict probability.11
11We excluded the rainfall levels at time points (t− 1) and (t− 2) because of the test for weak
instruments and the high correlation between the different time points.
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However, our results additionally imply that in countries with rainfall shortages, the
impact of rainfall level on conflict risk is the reverse. Thus, the likelihood of conflict
incidence falls by 0.06 pp when increasing rainfall by 1 mm, or by 6 pp when annual
precipitation increases by 100 mm. It appears that a heterogeneity between coun-
tries with respect to their annual level of precipitation may yield different effects on
conflict risk. Obviously, in countries with a strong lack of rainfall, the effects of rain-
fall and rainfall growth do not fit into the entire picture. This phenomenon should
be explained more precisely in the future by other variables or more disaggregated
data.
Regarding other natural conditions, available water decreases the probability of any
conflict (-0.006***). Thus, the additional possibility of withdrawing 1000 m3 of fresh
water per km2 reduces the risk of any conflict by 0.06 pp. This also points to the
fact that people appear to fight for water sources. However, this stands in contrast
to Hendrix and Glaser (2007), who pointed out that freshwater resources per capita
are positively associated with the likelihood of conflict.
Regarding the political factors such as level of democracy and government account-
ability, our results confirm theoretical works indicating that countries with stronger
democratic institutions are better able to negotiate compromises among different
social groups to avert unrest (Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996; Easterly and Levine,
1997). Thus, the increase in Polity IV scores by one unit implies a significant re-
duction in the likelihood of any conflict by 0.5 pp. Similarly, the probability of any
incidence falls by 0.4 pp when enhancing accountability by one point.
Concerning social structure, in contrast to the results of Miguel et al. (2004) and
Fearon and Laitin (2003), who found no significant association of ethnic and reli-
gious diversity with civil conflicts, we noted a significantly positive impact of religious
fractionalization on conflict risk with the GMM estimator (1.305***). Moreover, the
IV-2SLS approach yields a negative impact of ethnic diversity on any conflict and
minor conflict (-0.644*** and -0.580***). However, both fractionalizations appear
not to be strong predictors for conflict risks because of unstable results dependent
upon an estimator and model specification. By contrast, share of urban population
seems to provide a stable positive impact on probability of any conflict and minor
conflict. Thus, a 1 pp increase in share of urban population enhances the proba-
bility of any conflict and minor conflict by 0.7 pp and 1.3 pp, respectively. This
indicates that the higher density of the urban population with limited access to job
opportunities, food, and fresh water additionally increases the likelihood of being
in conflict. That result correlates with findings of other researchers (Nedal et al.,
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2020; De Soysa, 2002; Raleigh and Urdal, 2007) that highly concentrated states with
a greater proportion of urban population are more likely to experience widespread
political violence compared to those with a lower share of urban population.
Total predicted effects of conflict probability in Syria
Next, we are interested in computing the extent to which independent variables
that were changing in Syria in the years before the conflict are able to explain the
likelihood of civil conflict in Syria. Therefore, we see the total effects of civil conflict
probability. We are interested to check how well explanatory variables are able to
predict the conflict since 2011 with reference to the previous non-conflict time in
Syria. We have taken 2006 as a reference year, i.e., five years before the Syrian
civil war broke out. Thus, we compute the total change in predicted probability,
∆PROBit, induced by the increment in the explanatory variable in year t of time
period 2007–2015 as:
∆PROBit =β · (gr gdpit − gr gdpi,2006) + γ · (food indexit − food indexi,2006)+
δ · (X ′it −X ′i,2006) + σi · (yeart − year2006) + (εit − εi,2006).
(2.7)
In Table 2.5, we display the effects. Obviously, some variables (such as water 1km2,
ethnic, religion, urban pop) do not contribute to predicted war likelihood because
they did not vary over time or they changed only slightly.
Thus, when comparing to 2006, declining economic growth in Syria contributes to
a predicted conflict probability only by 0.08 pp in 2011, while the contribution
of the decline in the economic growth rate was at its highest of 6.66 pp in 2013.
Obviously, this positive effect arises from a negative difference in economic growth
rates multiplied by a negative estimated coefficient. When comparing with 2006,
falling economic growth is able to explain war likelihood by 3–7 pp. However, in
2009, income growth considerably contributed to conflict risks by 1.5 pp, as well.
Furthermore, the food production index explains the likelihood of conflict only by
0.61 pp in 2011. Overall, the food index is able to predict war probability by 2–6 pp
in conflict years and by 1–2 pp in the years before the war. The impact of food index
increased over time with increasing intensity of the conflict and reached 6.20 pp in
2014. Interestingly, in the two last years in the dataset, the food index contributes
to the conflict likelihood even more strongly than the economic growth (6.2 and 4.44
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Table 2.5: Total effects of explanatory variables on the probability of civil conflict,














































































































2007 0.00 0.00 -0.55 2.08 0.15 4.39 -1.10 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.72 -4.26 2.03 3.64 -19.35 15.72
2008 0.00 0.00 -1.66 2.65 0.04 7.13 -3.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.72 -6.92 5.62 4.54 -17.57 13.03
2009 0.00 0.00 1.54 1.66 0.02 -11.31 0.40 0.00 0.00 -0.32 0.00 0.00 0.72 10.98 -0.75 2.93 -15.78 12.85
2010 0.00 0.00 0.25 2.34 0.55 7.39 -2.04 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.43 -7.17 3.79 6.57 -14.00 7.43
2011 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.61 -0.67 -7.70 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.72 7.47 -1.66 0.13 -12.21 112.08
2012 36.12 0.00 5.20 2.05 0.36 -0.44 1.90 0.00 0.93 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 -3.51 43.58 -10.43 66.84
2013 36.12 9.05 6.66 3.71 -0.15 5.67 -0.10 0.00 0.93 0.56 0.00 0.00 -0.72 -5.50 0.18 56.42 -8.64 52.23
2014 36.12 9.05 3.06 6.20 0.15 3.48 -0.81 0.00 0.93 0.50 0.00 0.00 -1.43 -3.38 1.50 55.38 -6.86 51.48
2015 36.12 9.05 3.51 4.44 0.05 1.81 -0.83 0.00 0.93 0.68 0.00 0.00 -1.43 -1.75 1.54 54.13 -5.07 50.94
pp vs. 3.06 and 3.51 pp).
Regarding the total contribution of all rainfall variables (such as gr rainfall, rainfall,
inter L gr rainfall, inter L rainfall) to the probability of civil conflict, we computed
only minor effects of -1.0, -1.63, 0.25, 0.79, and 0.76 pp after the outbreak of the
war. However, in the years before the conflict (2007–2010), low precipitation seems
to have sharpened the situation in Syria, because the contribution of all rainfall
indicators to the probability of conflict is mostly positive (such as 1.07, 2.80, -0.68,
1.97 pp). Nevertheless, regarding the years of conflict, both economic variables
together are much more able to predict the ongoing conflict (by 7–10 pp) than
variables for precipitation.
Furthermore, we recognize an essential effect of temperature growth in the years
before the war. All years after 2006 have a positive effect of (respectively) 0.15, 0.04,
0.02, and 0.55 pp in increments of temperature growth when drawing a comparison
with 2006. The largest increase in temperature growth was in 2010, shortly before
the war began. We suppose that a direct impact of temperature growth on conflict
risk (0.55 pp) is a considerable effect when drawing a comparison, for example, with
the food index effect of 2.34 pp.
Regarding the official years of conflict, we must admit that it is difficult to explain the
outbreak of war in Syria in 2011. Twenty-ten, the year before the conflict erupted,
seems to be even more able to explain the conflict likelihood by the selected variables.
By contrast, it appears to be possible to explain the ongoing conflict in 2012–2015 by
43–56 pp through involving explanatory variables. However, considering this total
effect more closely, it is noticeable that the strongest impact of 36-45 pp arises from
lagged dependent variables, whereas the effect of economic variables accounts for
29
Chapter 2. If Climate Change Can Trigger Civil Conflict, Can Good Policy Trigger Peace?
Empirical Evidence from Cross-Country Panel Data
7–10 pp. All other explanatory variables contribute to the conflict relatively weakly.
With the Figure 2.1, we illustrate the contribution of the model (GMM) components
including control variables, lagged conflicts, fixed effects, and errors, to the probabil-
ity of civil conflict in Syria over time. Numbers from 1 to 35 indicate the time series
from 1981 to 2015. It is clear that the model produces high errors in the outbreak
years of the early conflict in the ’80s and the 2011 conflict. Second, it is obvious
from the estimated impact of the controls included in our model, i.e., the impact of
the economic, climate variables, political, socio-economic, and demographic, show a
trend toward the war that began in 2011 and increased the probability of civil war
(we showed previously that the year 2010 contributed the most to explaining the
probability of conflict before the outbreak in 2011). Third, the impact of controls
rises during wartime from 2011 to 2015, indicating the reverse impact of conflict on
the income and food production in the country. Fourth, we see in our model simply
that war brings war from the impact of lagged dependent variables (blue bars).
Figure 2.1: The total contribution of the model components to the probability of
civil conflict in Syria from 1981 to 2015
The justification of our work and the criticism of others’ studies may be that other
researchers do not exactly compute a total contribution of explanatory variables to
predicted probability as well as respective residuals. Although some studies investi-
gate marginal effects (estimated coefficients) for the onset of conflict—for example,
Fearon and Laitin (2003), Miguel et al. (2004)—they cover neither predicted proba-
bilities nor emerging residuals. Therefore, drawing any conclusions as to the extent
to which their significant variables contribute to the onset of conflict is only hardly
possible. Apparently, explaining conflict onset is much more difficult than antici-
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pated in our study as well as those of other researchers, and it requires including
more country-specific factors. Even significant marginal effects do not guarantee
high explanatory power in each specific case.
Political interventions to reduce the incidence of civil conflicts and trigger
peace
After presenting empirical evidence on the impacts of climate change on economic
development and its contribution to increasing the likelihood of conflict, it is par-
ticularly important to assess economic policies that can reverse economic shocks
and lead to a stable economic development, thus reducing conflict risks. Based on
simulation analysis, we anticipate the amount of income growth versus increased
food production that can be achieved to country’s negative economic growth during
war. For example, Syria had in 2012 an economic growth rate of -0.28 pp, assuming
that through global aid it would have been possible to stabilize the economic growth
rate of Syria by an amount of money equal to 10% of the Syrian GDP in 2011 (the
outbreak-year, i.e., 2011 is a base year), so that, this is a certain amount of money
or 0,1 * GDP base. Using this amount of money as a transfer in the country in year
t (which could be 2012, 2013, or 2015) implies the following growth rate:
W GDP= Transfer/GDP yeart-1= 0,1*GDP base/ (1-w year)GDP base= 0,1/(1-
w year).
w year is the decrease in GDP due to the civil war in year t; e.g., year 2013, then
w 2013 is the decline in GDP in 2013 compared to the base year (2011).
For the same amount of money (10% of GDP base) invested in increasing food
production, it is important to know how much production growth can be achieved
with a 10% of the base-budget, and this leads to an output growth of approximately
5% (but permanently, i.e., investment One-time, then the increase occurs every
year, like technical progress). The smaller the size of agricultural sector of GDP, the
greater this effect. Assuming that the size of the agricultural sector makes up 20%
of GDP; then 0,5 * 0.2 / share
share: is the actual share of the agricultural sector in Syria. Interestingly, investing
in increased food production also has an effect on the growth rate, i.e., the indirect
growth effect. A 10% of GDP base investment corresponds to 3% total growth
(measured on the GDP base), therefore, the impact of indirect growth rate increases
depending on the size of actual GDP, so this is multiplied by 1/ (1- w year) gives
the actual effect.
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Figure 2.2: Relative effects of policy interventions triggering peace
Figure 2.2 shows the simulation results of the relative effects of political interven-
tions (Transfer compared to food policy) in stabilizing economic development, thus
reducing the incidence of civil conflict, and triggering peace. The orange bars indi-
cating policy interventions that accelerate economic growth rate show a higher effect
in the first year than the effect of food policy (green bars) and this effect remains the
same in the following years, while policies that enhance food production (technical
progress) indicate a higher effect in the later years due to the effect of the previous
year (cumulative). Therefore, proper food policies that enhance food security seem
to play a more affordable role towards peace. Accordingly, policy interventions that
are able to increase food security as well as global aid to accelerate economic devel-
opment, have the potential to reduce the risk of conflict and triggering peace.
However, it is particularly important to take appropriate measures at the right time,
especially when war breaks out, otherwise, the costs of returning back to peace will
increase over time because when a war breaks out it is no longer related to the
negative effects of only climate change on economic growth rate. Therefore, in order
to achieve the same amount of income growth during a war, a greater amount of
money will be required compared to the pre-war situation.
The findings of this study are relevant to other countries in the region that face
comparable environmental challenges and can inform policies for mitigating and
alleviating future conflicts.
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2.4 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the linkages between climate change, economic indicators, and
conflict probability based on a new panel database. This data sample includes many
socio-economic, political, and environmental variables for 59 countries of Africa and
the Middle East from 1981 to 2015, collected from different prominent resources.
We contributed to current research in the following ways:
First, we investigated an indirect impact of climate change on war probability
through its effect on economic development. In addition to other environmental and
socio-political characteristics, weather indicators seem to be suitable instrumental
variables not only for economic growth but also for domestic food production index.
For example, a 1 pp change in temperature growth can significantly decrease income
growth (by 0.31 pp) and food index (by 0.23 pp), respectively. This is a huge effect.
For example, while in the 2000s the global mean temperature difference was around
0.6◦C above pre-industrial levels (1850–1900), in 2019 this temperature change was
already around 1.1 ∓ 0.1◦C (World Meteorological Organization, 2019): that means
a near doubling of temperature growth, or a 100% increase during only 20 years.
Regarding countries in our dataset, we found a 185% increase of temperature growth
during the last 16 years of the sample when comparing with the ’80s. We calculated
a mean change in temperature growth of 2.17 pp during the last 16 years. By means
of estimated coefficients, it can be seen that a reduction in economic growth is 0.67
pp due to temperature increase during 16 years, whereas reduction in food index is
0.49 pp. This means that if some countries currently have an income growth
rate of 1–1.4% annually, within only 32 years these countries will be not
able to achieve any income growth only due to climate change, ceteris
paribus.
Second, we found that climate change directly affects the likelihood of civil war.
According to our estimation, a 1 pp change in temperature growth can cause an
increase in war probability of 0.391 pp. Taking the average increment in tempera-
ture growth of 2.17 pp for the 16 years, we calculated that for 32 years, temperature
growth alone can contribute to war probability by 1.7 pp. Regarding the impact of
precipitation on conflict likelihood, our findings imply that a 1 pp increase in rainfall
growth reduces the mean likelihood of any civil conflict by 0.2 pp. However, in coun-
tries with high rainfall shortage, the result is the opposite, i.e., an increase in rainfall
growth enhances any conflict risk by around 0.2 pp. Overall, our results indicate
that the effect of both rainfall variables on conflict likelihood may be significantly
different according to countries’ dependence on usual precipitation level.
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Third, we confirmed the most robust finding of Miguel et al. (2004): that economic
situations induced by climate variability can significantly raise the risk of conflict.
Additionally to GDP growth, the food production index appears to be a further
appropriate economic variable for explaining conflict probability. Considering all
countries, a 10% reduction in economic growth or domestic food production leads to
1,2% and 1,59% increase in the probability of civil conflict, respectively. Economic
development seems to play an essential role for preventing new conflicts.
Fourth, ignoring lagged dependent variables leads to overestimation of marginal ef-
fects. Our results, based on comparing two different approaches, point to the fact
that other studies usually overestimate the impact of economic and weather vari-
ables on conflict probability because effects of lagged dependent variable were not
taken into account. According to our results, being in conflict in the past increase
the likelihood of further conflicts by 36–45 pp and automatically decreases the signif-
icant effects of other explanatory variables. The simple logic behind our motivation
for involving lagged dependent variable is that human losses cause psychological
obstacles and barriers to peace-building.
Next, our results show that increases in temperature growth have a great impact on
a country’s economic situation. For Syria, based on our estimation, we found out
that the strong increase in temperature growth explains 30% of shrinking income
growth as well as 85% of decreasing food index in 2010. Moreover, we suppose that
2010 was a crucial year generating a high probability for war. The high increase in
temperature growth in 2010 strongly contributed to economic instability and food
insecurity, both obviously led to rising social tensions.
We explained the Syrian conflict by our estimates. The effects of explanatory vari-
ables in 2010 point to the rising probability of conflict. While the onset of conflict
in 2011 could not be explained well with the explanatory variables, the ongoing
conflict in 2012–2015 could be empirically predicted by explanatory variables to the
tune of 43–56%. Obviously, the strongest factor explaining the ongoing conflict is
the occurrence of war in the last two years: it accounts for up to 45% of conflict
likelihood. The second important factor contributing to conflict risks arises from
both economic variables. We empirically showed that an unstable economic situ-
ation, decreasing income, and food insecurity essentially contributed to the Syrian
conflict. Thus, GDP change and food index together seem to have contributed to
conflict in Syria by 7–10%. Moreover, both economic variables are much more able
to predict the ongoing conflict than variables for climate change.
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Moreover, we would like to point to the fact that obtaining a significant impact
of explanatory variables on dependent conflict variables is easier than receiving a
highly predicted probability itself. The investigation of causes of conflict requires
much more than only receiving significant coefficients. To understand each current
incidence and empirical estimation, it is much more interesting and helpful to reveal
total effects and predicted probabilities. Explaining each current incidence requires
the inclusion of more country-specific factors. Notice that while growth indicators
calculated as year-by-year change give researchers only a short perspective for analy-
sis, serious consequences of climate change are much more noticeable by considering
a long-term perspective. Therefore, for empirical investigation, it is recommended
to calculate indicators of temperature growth and rainfall growth based on a period
of time longer than one year. Last, the investigation of the onset of conflict re-
quires more precise attention in the future. Proper economic policies that Stabilize
the negative GDP growth and enhance food production index seem to play a more
affordable role toward peace. The finding of this Chapter are relevant to other coun-
tries in the region that face comparable environmental challenges and can inform
policies for mitigating and alleviating future conflicts.
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We replicated the findings of Miguel and his co-authors, who find a significant neg-
ative relationship between economic shocks and the likelihood of civil conflict in
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) for the period 1981- 1999, using rainfall growth as an
instrumental variable for the economic growth rate. The replication of this study
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using new cross-country panel data, with different measurements, and econometric
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3.1 Introduction
We reproduce results of a study published by Miguel, Satyath, and Sergenti (MSS,
2004; the first letters of authors’ names) in the JPE, the article is cited by around
2400 research papers on civil conflict in Africa at the time of writing this replication
study (February 2020). They empirically proved that economic growth is negatively
related to civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) during the period 1981- 1999 us-
ing rainfall variations (annual rainfall growth) as an instrumental variable for income
growth, where countries’ economies largely rely on rainfed agriculture. However,
their results have been already reproduced and/or considered as a reference point
for many efforts in civil war economies, e.g.(Ciccone, 2011). Moreover, to address
the problem of endogeneity, MSS argued that the approach of Fearon and Laitin
(2003) by lagging explanatory variables implicitly assumes that economic actors
do not anticipate the incidence of civil war and adjust economic activity (e.g., in-
vestment) accordingly. Therefore, the instrumental variable approach addresses the
attenuation bias that may result from mismeasured explanatory variables, which, if
not addressed, would bias coefficient estimates on these terms toward zero.
In this replication study, after reproducing results of MSS (2004), first, as a fur-
ther investigation on results and data, we examine their established link between
rainfall and economic growth using a new cross-sectional time-series data (named
SH-dataset), unlike most of the previous efforts that depend on the same dataset of
MSS for SSA studying same or other aspects. In addition, we include the impact
of temperature growth on economic growth. Moreover, we examine the impact of
country rainfall level as a measurement for rainfall variations, this is the preferred
empirical approach of Ciccone (2011), who reached different results than Miguel
et al. (2004) in his comment on MSS’ paper. Therefore, we attempt to show results
of both rainfall measurements with our data. Second, we estimate the impact of
induced economic shocks by climate change from the first-stage on the incidence
of civil conflict. Third, the direct link between climate change and civil conflict
incidence is estimated.
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3.2 Data and measurement
The SH-dataset we use to establish the link between climate and economic growth
rate, and the incidence of civil conflict, covers the same sample of Miguel et al.
(2004): 41 countries in sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1981- 1999 3. This data
set contains information on conflict, climate, and economic growth rate. We focus
on the conflict incidence (subsumes conflict outbreak and conflict continuation) as
an indicator variable of a conflict (any-prio over two other indicators) defined in
a comparable way as by MSS (more description is in the Appendix A3), conflict
data comes from the UCDP/ PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, a conflict version 18.1.
For the annual rainfall (millimetre) and average temperature (Celsius degree), we
use the historical climate data provided by World Bank Climate Change Knowledge
Portal (2018) 4, whereas MSS focused on results of rainfall data from the Global
Precipitation Climatology Project (GPCP) database over two other global weather
sources5, it is indicated by Miguel et al. (2004) this is the only data set that at
the same time includes both gauge and satellite data, corrects for systematic errors
in gauge measures, and rejects gauge measures thought to be unreliable (Rudolf,
2000) (The results using other rainfall data as instrument for economic growth on
civil conflict are different). For more details see available data replication files of
MSS 6. To measure economic shocks, we take annual economic growth rate as an
indicator from the National Accounts Estimates of Main Aggregates-United Nations
Statistics Division (UNSD, 2020), which provides a complete and consistent set of
time series of GDP per capita expressed in constant price-US dollars, from 1970
onwards. A detailed description on variables and data is in Appendix A3. We follow
MSS-2004 in deriving growth of relevant variables; (V arit − V ari,t−1)/(V ari,t−1),
denoted Gr V arit.
3Note: MSS indicated that Eritrea and Equatorial Guinea were dropped from the analysis due
to lack of data, and For Djibouti, Liberia, and Somalia, GDP data are missing since 1992. For
Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, GDP data are missing for 1999. Namibia became
independent in 1990. Although the sources of our data provides a complete time series but we
present and include same number of observations as by MSS in the estimations, to be comparable.
4Data assessed and retrieved from http://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org.
5The GPCP data set is: a combination of actual weather station rainfall gauge measures, as
well as satellite information on the density of cold cloud cover (which is closely related to actual
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3.3 Climate conditions and economic growth rate,
first-stage estimation
The rainfall and temperature instruments (annual rainfall in mm, year-to-year rain-
fall variation, and year-to-year temperature variation) are expected to identify exoge-
nous variation in economic growth rate that related to agriculture (equation (3.1)).
We included country fixed effects to capture time-invariant country characteristics
that may also be driving civil conflict, and country-specific time trends to capture
additional variation over time, in all presented models. The error term is allowed
to be correlated across years for the same country in all regressions. The estimated
equitation of the first-stage with a vector X ′it is:
GrGDPit = a1i +X
′b1 + d1iyeart + e1it (3.1)
We introduce regression analyses for SSA from 1981-1999 in Table3.1, reproducing
the results of MSS’ data set (regression 4) compared to analyses of SH-dataset (re-
gression 1 same model specification as by MSS) both climate indicators; rainfall
and temperature (regression 2) and rainfall levels instead of rainfall growth in re-
gression 3 (as reported by Ciccone (2011)). The main finding of MSS’ data is that
a significant positive relationship exists between economic growth rate and rainfall
growth in both current and previous year. Whereas the use of the new dataset re-
sulted in a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient estimates only on lagged
rainfall growth. This positive relationship between rainfall and economic growth
rate remains to the inclusion of temperature growth (regression 2), which has no
significant impact on economic growth during this period of time in SSA. In the
case of using rainfall levels as a measure of rainfall variation, they have no signifi-
cant impact on economic growth rate as well (regression 3). However, by replacing
our rainfall data (the World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal 2018) with
their data (Table3.4), regression shows highly significant coefficient on lagged rain-
fall when it regressed on the GDP growth rate from our dataset (0.0826101, p-value
0.006), both rainfall data are correlated at 0.6413.
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3.4 Economic growth rate and the incidence of
civil conflict, second-stage results
Miguel et al. (2004) preferred the IV-2SLS method. The impact of induced economic
shocks by weather variation in the first-stage on the incidence of civil conflict is
estimated in the second-stage (equation (3.2)):
Conflictit = a2i+X
′
itb2 + g2,0GrGDPit + g2,1GrGDPi,t−1 + d2iyeart + e2it (3.2)
We present results of IV 2SLS and OLS methods for both data sets in Table3.2,
MSS’s results have been successfully reproduced, where the IV-2SLS shows a big
impact of lagged economic growth on conflict (each unit decline in lagged economic
growth rates increases the probability of civil conflict by over two percentage points),
while the OLS method (regression 3) yields much smaller coefficients on current
GDP growth rate. Regarding the impact of lagged economic growth on conflict,
it is even positive although insignificant. Applying same model’ specifications as
by MSS using SH-dataset, the OLS regression captures same coefficient signs as
by MSS (regression 1 in Table3.2), but in contrast, the preferred model IV 2SLS
by MSS captures positive coefficient’ signs insignificant on both current and lagged
economic growth rate (regression 2 in Table3.2). Despite the greater statistical fit
of our model, economic growth rate cannot explain conflict, it is rather explained
by country fixed effect and country specific time trend. Although a great number
of empirical studies find that economic shocks affect the probability of conflict, e.g.,
(Miguel et al., 2004; Dube and Vargas, 2013), however, some have doubt on this
view (Djankov and Reynal-Querol, 2010; Koubi et al., 2012).
3.5 Rainfall and conflict results
Now, we turn to the link between rainfall and civil conflict incidence in SSA during
the period 1981- 1999 for both data sets (MSS, SH-dataset)7. This link has been
already examined using MSS’ data by Ciccone (2011), results are reported in Table
3.3 regression 3 and 4. Column (1 and 3) report least-squares, while column (2, 4)
report system-GMM results of SH-dataset and MSS’ data, respectively. Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) was introduced by Hansen (1982) and implemented by
7Conflict variable (lagged conflict) in both data sets has 41 missing in observations because first
observation for each country in the first year of our time series 1981 (comes from 1980) is missed.
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Roodman (2009) in the STATA-package ”xtabond2”. GMM methods results show
a negative significant link between civil conflict and current rainfall growth (SH-
dataset), while according to MSS data this negative significant link between rainfall
and conflict is found for the lagged rainfall growth. The impact of adverse conflict
on the current conflict (LDV) is positive insignificant (SH-dataset) highly significant
(MSS’ data).
3.6 Conclusion
The main finding of MSS (2004) is that instrumented economic growth rate has a
significantly negative effect on the incidence of conflict in SSA during 1981- 1999.
They indicate that a 1 percentage point drop in lagged economic growth rate in-
creases the incidence of civil conflict by 2.55 percentage point. The replication of
this study is successfully implemented. To what extent this finding applies to the
use of different sources of data? In the first stage with our new data, lagged rain-
fall growth is positively related to the economic growth rate (regression 1, 2) but
insignificant, whereas temperature shows expected negative signs but no significant
effect on the GDP in both model specifications (regression 2, 3). Examining rainfall
levels as instruments for GDP instead of using rainfall growth in regression (3) show
also positive insignificant coefficients on the current and lagged rainfall levels with
the income growth. For the link between economic growth rate and the incidence of
civil conflict, the OLS yields expected negative coefficient on the current economic
growth rate although insignificant (this result is consistent with MSS). Moreover,
there is a direct negative impact of rainfall on the incidence of civil conflict (consis-
tent with results using MSS data set).
Overall, our empirical results lead us to the conclusion that theory on the rela-
tionship between economic growth rate and the likelihood of civil conflict is rather
sensitive to the difference in econometric specifications, and to the changes in data
sources that use different methods of making the data available.
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Table 3.1: Rainfall and economic growth (First-stage). Dependent variable: Eco-
nomic growth rate, t for SSA, period 1981- 1999
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SH SH SH MSS
GR rainfall -0.0159 (0.483) -0.0164 (0.488) 0.0486** (0.007)
GR rainfall lag 1 0.000301 (0.908) 0.000299 (0.908) 0.0280* (0.055)
GR temp -0.0211 (0.944) 0.0192 (0.950)
log rainfall 0.0158 (0.664)
log rainfall lag 1 0.0487 (0.172)
Constant 0.0594 (0.589) 0.0595 (0.589) -0.291 (0.199) -0.0782*** (0.000)
Observations 743 743 743 743
R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.13
F 0.490 0.483 0.503 .
f ixed effect and specific time trends are included in all regressions
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01
Table 3.2: Economic growth and civil conflict. Dependent variable: Civil conflict
≥ 25 deaths. For SSA, period 1981- 1999
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SH MSS
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
GR gdp c con -0.0248 (0.699) 5.815 (0.565) -0.211 (0.197) -1.132 (0.425)
GR gdp c con lag 1 0.0578 (0.373) 1.348 (0.694) 0.0668 (0.685) -2.546** (0.026)
Constant -0.00311 (0.645) -0.542 (0.588) -1.770*** (0.000) -1.921*** (0.000)
Observations 743 743 743 743
R2 0.74 . 0.71 .
I nstrumental Variables for economic growth rate in regression 2 and 4 are growth in rainfall year t, and t-1.
For the replication, we had to use a newer version (Ver. 3.0.06) of the ivreg2 command.
p-values in parentheses * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.3: Rainfall and civil conflict. Dependent variable: Civil conflict ≥ 25 deaths,
period 1981- 1999
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SH MSS
LS GMM LS GMM
GR rainfall -0.0579** (0.027) -0.0532** (0.036) -0.0238 (0.555) -0.0172 (0.693)
GR rainfall lag 1 -0.000389 (0.487) -0.000266 (0.588) -0.122** (0.011) -0.123** (0.013)
Lagged dependent var 0.0937 (0.323) 0.282*** (0.000)
Constant 0.576*** (0.000) 1.309*** (0.000) 0.510*** (0.000) 1.091*** (0.000)




* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01
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Table 3.4: Rainfall and economic growth t: replacing data on variables in the re-
gression (OLS) between both MSS and SH data sets for SSA, period 1981- 1999
.
MSS-dataset SH-dataset
Economic growth Economic growth
GR rainfall(SH) 0.0111 (0.293)
GR rainfall lag1(SH) 0.000328 (0.786)
Gr-rainfall(MSS) 0.0243 (0.414)
Gr-rainfall lag1(MSS) 0.0826*** (0.006)




F ixed effect and specific time trends are included in all regressions
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01
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Appendix A3
Variable Description
Civil conflict data and derivation of variables
We use for conflict variables the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, a conflict
version 18.1., developed by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University in Sweden and the
International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO)8.
An armed conflict is defined by the PRIO/Uppsala as a contested incompatibility
that concerns government and/or territory over which the use of armed force between
two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, has resulted in at
least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.
We focus on civil wars, in the PRIO/Uppsala conflict data, four types of conflict are
classified (type 1,2,3, and 4), type3 and type4 cover civil conflict without and with
intervention from other states on one or both sides 9, respectively.
The values that each of type3 and type4 of civil conflict can take, as follows:
TYPE3:
This type of conflict is the PRIO/Uppsala’s indicator of Internal Conflict. It can
take on four distinct values: 0: No Internal Conflict, 1: Internal Minor Armed Con-
flict, 2: Internal Intermediate Armed Conflict, 3: Internal War.
TYPE4:
Whereas this type of conflict is the PRIO/Uppsala’s indicator of Internationalized
Internal Conflict. It can take on four distinct values: 0: No Internationalized Internal
Conflict, 1: Internationalized Internal Minor Armed Conflict, 2: Internationalized
Internal Intermediate Armed Conflict, 3: Internationalized Internal War10.
While the intensity level of a conflict in a given year distinguishes minor armed
conflicts from wars based on the battle-related deaths11, as following:
1. Minor conflicts (Intensity level 1): resulted in between 25 and 999 battle-
related deaths in a given year.
2. War (Intensity level 2): resulted in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a
given year.
8The UCDP/PRIO armed conflict for download http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/.
9Side A, is always the government side in intrastate conflicts, side B: is the country or opposition
organization(s) (The PRIO/Uppsala conflict data, 18.1. 2017).
10This is very well documented in the mss manual as well, p.16 (MSS data set, 2004), the source
is the PRIO/Uppsala conflict data.
11UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, version 4 2009, updated by: Harbom et al.
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According to the data coding of Themnér et al. (2018) and in a similar manner to
Miguel et al. (2004), we constructed three dependent conflict variables (any conflict,
minor, and war), all country-year observations are coded as ones based on the type
(3 and 4) of conflict and the intensity level of conflict as follows:
1. war prio: a war equals 1 when the type of conflict in year t is 3 or 4 and has
an intensity level of 2 (at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year).
war prio lag 1: lagged one year.
war prio lag 2: lagged two years.
2. minor prio: a minor conflict equals 1 when the type of conflict in year t is 3
or 4 and has an intensity level of 1 (at least 25 battle-related deaths per year
and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict).
minor prio lag 1: minor conflict lagged one year.
minor prio lag 2: minor conflict lagged two years.
3. any prio: any conflict equals 1 when minor conflict or war equals 1. Other-
wise, are coded as zeros.
any prio lag 1: any conflict lagged one year.
any prio lag 2: any conflict lagged two years.
Weather variables
We use the historical climate data provided at World Bank Climate Change Knowl-
edge Portal (2018)12. We observe growth in weather variables from the previous
year following Miguel et al. (2004): gr rainfall= rainfall−rainfall lag1
rainfall lag1
Rainfall variables
 rainfall: The annual rainfall (millimetre) is computed by adding up all of the
monthly observations in a given year.
 rainfall lag 1: lagged one year.
 rainfall lag 2: lagged two years.
 gr rainfall: rainfall growth = (rainfall - rainfall lag1)/(rainfall lag1).
 gr rainfall lag 1: growth rainfall lagged one year:
(rainfall lag 1 - rainfall lag 2)/(rainfall lag 2).
 log rainfall: log of rainfall levels in country i and year t.
 log rainfall lag 1: lagged one year.
12http://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org.
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 log rainfall lag 2: lagged two years.
Temperature variables
 temp: The annual temperature (Celsius degree) are computed by adding up
all of the monthly observations in a given year divided by the number of months
in that year.
 temp lag 1: temperature lagged one year.
 temp lag 2: temperature lagged two years.
 gr temp: temperature growth = (temp - temp lag 1)/(temp lag 1).
Economic variables
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, i.e. the total amount of
goods and services produced in the economy, divided by its population. Data on
this variable comes from the main National Accounts aggregates of all UN Members
States (UNSD, 2020), which provides a complete and consistent set of GDP per
capita time series, from 1970 onwards of the main National Accounts Aggregates of
all UN Members States and other territories in the world for which National Ac-
counts information is available, GDP per capita estimates expressed either in current
or constant price-US dollars: http://data.un.org/.
The derived variables are as follows:
 gdp c con: GDP per capita estimates in constant price-US dollars.
 gdp c con lag 1: GDP per capita estimates lagged one year.
 gdp c con lag 2: GDP per capita estimates lagged two years.
 gr gdp c con:
GDP growth rate= (gdp c con - gdp c con lag 1)/ (gdp c con lag 1)
 gr gdp c con lag 1:
GDP lagged growth rate: (gdp c con lag 1 - gdp c con lag 2)/ (gdp c con lag 2)
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Climate change and civil conflict
in SSA and MENA: The same
phenomena, but different
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Abstract
In this Chapter, the mechanisms of climate change impacts on the incidence of civil
conflict are tested separately in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) compared to the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) for the period 1981 to 2015. We draw several
conclusions: (i) Climate has a significant impact on economic development, through
economic growth rate in the MENA, and food production in SSA. (ii) Economic
growth rate and food production index are significant indicators for social stability
reduce the risk of civil conflict, in SSA and MENA, respectively. (iii) A direct
impact of climate change on civil conflict is identified. (iv) Conflict in the previous
year increases the probability of civil conflict in SSA by 0.30 pp, and in the MENA by
0.50 pp. Moreover, as the type of political system and accountability are important
control variables in SSA, water availability reduces the risks of conflict in the MENA
region. There appears to be evidence of different mechanisms in different regions.
However, the identification of stable mechanisms needs to be precisely addressed in
future work.
Keywords: Climate impact mechanisms, conflict, economic development, MENA,
SSA
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4.1 Introduction
Climate change is a global phenomenon, but its impacts are unequally distributed
across regions of the world (Darwin, 1995) due to the diversity of agriculture sys-
tems, the resilience of human systems, and environmental sustainability. Climate
change, in the absence of appropriate policy responses, can exacerbate already ex-
isted political crises and ultimately lead to civil wars in some territories. Most of the
severe negative impacts appear in regions that are (i) highly vulnerable to climate
change because they rely on rainfed agricultural systems that provide a livelihood
for a large percentage of these regions’ populations (Serdeczny et al., 2017). (ii)
Where it suffers from water scarcity as in the Middle East and North Africa’s re-
gion, where is likely to experience additional declines in agricultural yields, resulting
in negative effects on rural incomes and food security (Zhu et al., 2009; Breisinger
et al., 2010). Consequently, economic consequences may lead to conflicts that are
unlikely to occur in developed countries. Africa has been already identified as one
of the regions of the world most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (Niang
et al., 2017). At the same time, the major focus for civil wars in recent years has
been in sub-Saharan Africa, where 29 of 43 countries suffered from civil conflict dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s (Miguel et al., 2004). Likewise, the Middle East and North
Africa region is expected to become hotter and drier in the future due to climate
change next to its growing dependence on international markets for key staple food
products3 (OECD-FAO, 2018). In the dataset, which we use for estimations in this
Chapter, 12 of the 18 countries (66%) in the MENA region experienced between
1981 and 2015 civil conflicts.
In this Chapter, we demonstrate empirically climate change effects on the economies
of countries from different regions of the developing world, and its relationship to
civil conflict over the past four decades. We applied the same approach and similar
model specifications as in the chapter two of this research, using cross-country panel
data. Economic growth rate and domestic food production are instrumented by
rainfall and temperature, in addition to other control variables, i.e. variables on good
governance and democracy as well as on demographic and environmental indicators.
Climate, economic development, and conflict relationship has been already demon-
strated intensively in Africa. For instance, positive relationship has been proved
between rainfall and income growth, and its significant relation to the rise of civil
conflict probability in Sub-Sharan Africa for the period 1981- 1999 (Miguel et al.,
3OECD/FAO 2018: The Middle East and North Africa: Prospects and Challenges
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2004). This robust association has been also found between rainfall and higher
food production, but only a weak and inconsistent link between agricultural pro-
duction and civil conflict in the second step of the causal model by Buhaug et al.
(2015) in SSA. Couttenier and Soubeyran (2014) has also proved the impact of ex-
treme drought on the risk of conflict during the period 1977- 2005 in SSA, that the
risk of war increases by more than 42% but only 2.5% of this effect is channelled
through economic growth. On the other hand, Barrios et al. (2010) proved that
rainfall has been a significant determinant for economic growth in Africa, but not
for other developing countries. However, there is another part of the literature that
reached different conclusions, like Ciccone (2011) when he extended the data from
Miguel and his co-authors in 2004, concluded that there is no robust link between
transitory income shocks and civil wars, but reveals strong spill-over effects (Ahrens,
2015), among others who have reached different conclusions (e.g.,(Burke et al., 2009;
Buhaug, 2010; Koubi et al., 2012)). Not surprisingly, that such mixed or inconsistent
results have been observed, even for a single geographic region, due to differences in
climate shock measurement, applied approaches, and model specifications. However,
this sequence of relations in the MENA region has not been studied as intensively
as in Africa. Where for example, Gleick (2014) has pointed out that there is a
long history of conflict over water because of the natural water scarcity, the early
development of irrigated agriculture, and complex religious and ethnic diversity.
The socio-economic development and environmental characteristics of the
MENA and SSA
The MENA:
The MENA region consists of a heterogeneous group of countries ranging from the
high-income oil-exporting countries in the Gulf to middle income and lower-middle-
income countries as well as least developed countries such as Yemen (OECD-FAO,
2018). The agricultural sector still has a significant share in the economies of most
countries in the MENA region as a source of food and income especially for non-oil
producing countries and is an important vehicle for economic growth (Siam, 2009).
Therefore, the dominant policy in the region concerning development has been the
modernization of the agricultural sector in terms of the production (modern irriga-
tion systems and agricultural technology) of cereals and livestock initially and later
in the development of fruits, vegetables, and cash crops from irrigated or partially
irrigated land (Dixon et al., 2001). This could be a reason that smallholders could
not benefit from public support and have left them small, technologically backward,
and poor (OECD-FAO, 2018). According to Siam (2009) the demand for food im-
ports has markedly increased because the region is characterized by a food shortage
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in most food commodities, thereby seriously aggravated the shortage of foreign ex-
change in the majority of the MENA countries, particularly the non-oil producing
countries. About the proportion of arable land from the total land area in the region,
it is limited, estimated at 53 million hectares in the year 2005, with per capita arable
land of only 0.17 hectares, compared to 0.22 hectares at the global level. In addition
to that agriculture uses 89% of the scarce water in the MENA region compared to
70% at the world level, it has been pointed out by Huang et al. (2016) that it is the
driest region in the world according to the annual precipitation of 166 mm, and since
the 1970s has became even dryer (Cook et al., 2015). The drought peaked during
the period 2006 and 2009 (Al-Ansari, 2013), during this period e.g., Syria and Iraq
in the region received 10 percent less precipitation compared to the four years prior
to 2006 (Chenoweth et al., 2011). This is also evident from our dataset, Syria and
Iraq received less precipitation during this period, 18 and 23 percent, respectively.
Regarding the effect of temperature, in the region, it was at about 4°C above av-
erage in the 1960s (Carrington, 2015). The well-being indicator; Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) of the region reached 734 billion dollars in 2006, which constituted
1.5% of the world GDP. Its population in the same year was (311 million), i.e. 4.8%
of the world’s population, growing by 2.4% annually during the period 1990- 2006,
compared to 1.4% of the world population (Siam, 2009).
The SSA:
The continent of Africa is commonly divided into five regions, four of which are
in sub-Saharan Africa. The ethnicity is one of the key drivers of diversity in SSA,
therefore, it is important to take it into account in socio-economic studies (Appiah
et al., 2018). According to Olamosu and Wynne (2015), the gross domestic product
of Nigeria and South Africa accounts for about three-quarters of the SSA’s GDP.
The contribution of the agricultural sector to the GDP ranges from less than 3%
in Botswana and South Africa to more than 50% in Chad, represents 15% of GDP
on average. This high contribution underlines the limited diversification of most
economies in the region (OECD-FAO, 2016). However, the significant growth in
SSA’ agricultural output is driven by area expansion and intensification of crop-
ping systems, as opposed to large-scale improvement in productivity (Brink and
Eva, 2009), but the failure to keep pace with the demand resulting from population
growth and income has led to an increase in demand for the import of commodi-
ties such as wheat, rice, and poultry (OECD-FAO, 2016), compared to agricultural
modernization in the MENA. For SSA according to Iliffe (2017) during 2000- 2007
significant GDP growth of 3.9 is registered. The population growth rate of SSA in
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2006 was 2.7% (World Bank, 2016).
In the following sections, we present empirical results of economic and social re-
sponses to the impact of climate change over time in two vulnerable regions of the
developing world that differ in their economic, social, political and environmental
characteristics.
4.2 Data and methods
For the estimations of this part, we use our new collected cross-country panel data
including sub-Saharan Africa (41 countries) and the Middle East and North Africa
(18 countries), for SSA’s countries, we have adopted same sample (countries and
years) of Miguel et al. (2004)4 and extend it for the period from 1981 to 2015. This
new setup of data contains information on climate, economic indicators, and civil
conflict, as well as political factors, and social fragmentation with other country
characteristics information. We focus on the conflict incidence (subsumes outbreak
of a conflict and continuation of a conflict) as an indicator of conflict that results in
at least 25 battle-related deaths in a given year.
Conflict data comes from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset-V18.1.5 Eco-
nomic shocks are measured by (1) annual economic growth rate; we use a complete
and consistent time series expressed in constant price-US dollar provided by National
Account Estimates of Main Aggregate-United Nations statistics division (UNSD,
2020). (2) Food index from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Na-
tions (2016).
For climate change, we have data on temperature from the World Bank Climate
Change Knowledge Portal (2018), and precipitation data from Global Precipitation
Climatology Project (GPCP) database version 2.3 (Adler et al., 2016).6 The advan-
tage of the GPCP rainfall data that it includes at the same time both gauge and
satellite data, corrects for systematic errors in gauge measures (Miguel et al., 2004).
While data on Polity IV scores, which indicates the level of democracy/ autocracy of
4We kept the same sample of MMS (2004) when we revisited their work using different mea-
surement strategies and sources of data in a previous chapter of this research. Therefore, for this
part of the study, we extended their cross-country (SSA), including MENA countries from 1981 to
2015, data on similar variables has been updated with most recent versions of the corresponding
databases.
5Conflict version 18.1, for download; http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/.
6Adler et al., 2016. An Update (Version 2.3) of the GPCP Monthly Analysis. (in Preparation).
Huffman, G.J., R.F. Adler, P. Arkin, A. Chang, R. Ferraro, A. Gruber, J. Janowiak, A. McNab,
B. Rudolf, U. Schneider, 1997: The Global Precipitation Climatology Project (GPCP) Combined
Precipitation Dataset. Bull. Amer. Meteor. Soc., 78(1), 5-20.
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a political system in-country (i) time (t) comes from Roser (2019) based on Wimmer
and Min (2006). Based on Polity IV scores, we constructed an indicator ”changes in
the political system” without distinguishing whether a political transition undergo-
ing dictatorship or under democracy, this is thought to reflect the political stability
of a country at a given time. Besides, we examine the effect of quality of governance
(accountability) (World Bank, 2014).
Data on water indicators (FAO, 2017). The index of ethnic and religious diversity
from Alesina et al. (2003). A detailed description of the variables that are used to
perform the estimates in this chapter is provided in Appendix A4.
Estimates of the impacts of climate change as mentioned are undertaken separately
for SSA and MENA from 1981- 2015, applying instrumental variable approach. The
model is first estimated applying Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) (equations (4.1) and
(4.2)) using weather (temperature and rainfall) as instruments for economic growth
rate and food production. We included several additional controls for comparison
purposes, particularly those related to conflicts such as political and social controls.
Country fixed effects and country-specific time trends are included in all regressions
to capture time-invariant country characteristics and additional variation, respec-
tively. Standard errors are clustered at the country level to allow for a potential
correlation between observations for any given country at different times. The rela-
tionship between variables included in the analysis and the significance level could
be overstated without clustering standard errors.
Gr gdpit = ai + bX
′
it + diyeart + eit, (4.1)
food indexit = ai + bX
′
it + diyeart + eit, (4.2)
The term e is a disturbance term, and these disturbances are allowed to be cor-
related across years for the same country in all regressions. Country fixed effects
aji are included in all regressions to capture time-invariant country characteristics
that may be related to civil conflict, and also country-specific time trends yeart to
capture additional variation over time.
Then in the second stage, we estimate the impact of quantified economic outcomes
from the first stage (climate indirect), and the direct impact of climate on civil
conflict incidences7 as in equation (4.3). We apply the Generalized Method of Mo-
ments (GMM) model introduced by Hansen (1982) with lagged dependent variable
(LDV). We test our samples concerning heteroskedasticity by Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
7The incidence of civil war: defined by Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) as the probability of
observing either a new war onset or the continuation of an ongoing war or both (p. 307).
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Weisberg test; the null hypothesis that the error variance is constant was rejected
with Prob > chi2 = 0:000 for both samples.
Conflictit = αi + β · gr gdpit + γ · food indexit + δ ·X ′it + σi · yeart + εit. (4.3)
We have applied IV OLS estimation implemented in STATA to choose instruments
for endogenous variables: GDP growth rate and Food Index. The Sanderson-
Windmeijer (SW) chi-squared and F-statistics test under-identification and weak
identification of both endogenous variables, respectively. The null hypotheses were
rejected ( Table 4.1); SW Chi-squared with (L1- K1+1) degrees of freedom, where
L1 is the number of excluded instruments and K1 is the number of endogenous re-
gressors: for SSA’s sample, SW chi-sq equals 134.16 with p-value 0.000 for GDP
growth and 71.56 with p-value 0.000 for Food Index, and SW-F statistics account
24.34 and 12.98 for both regressors, respectively (greater than 10). For MENA, SW
chi-sq equals 45.41 with p-value 0.000 and 183.73 with p-value 0.000, for GDP growth
and Food Index, respectively. While SW-F statistics values are 7.90 and 31.98, for
GDP growth and Food Index, respectively. Accordingly, the chosen instruments are
considered strong.
Furthermore, Hansen J statistic test for over-identification restrictions after ivreg2.8
The joint null hypothesis of the Hansen J test is that the instruments are valid for
both samples (Table 4.2), i.e. they are uncorrelated with the error term, the null
hypothesis is rejected with p-value 0.000.
4.3 Main results
4.3.1 Climate impacts on economic growth and food pro-
duction: first-stage estimations
Based on the estimates for all sample countries in chapter 2 of this research, the
effect of climate variability on the economic growth rate and food production is
mainly the effect of temperature growth. A 1 pp change in annual temperature
growth significantly reduces economic growth and food index by 0.31 pp and 0.23
pp, respectively. The increase in temperature during the 16 years after the year 2000
of our time series compared to the average temperature in the eighties is estimated
8Hansen-test is done after country fixed effects are removed because an estimated covariance
matrix with dummy variables is not of full rank.
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at 2.17 pp. This implies a reduction in economic growth and food index by 0.67 pp
and 0.49 pp, respectively, during the period after 2000 only due to the temperature
change. Applying the estimates to separate regions in this chapter indicates the
source of predictive power for the significance we observed for the variables of interest
in our model of the first paper.
The OLS regression (Table 4.1) using the new source of rainfall data (the GPCP)
that includes at the same time both gauge and satellite data, separately for SSA
and MENA in this chapter shows: (i) A positive correlation between precipitation
and both economic indicators (economic growth rate and food production) but only
significant for economic growth rate at a confidence level of 0.10 in the MENA sample
with a coefficient estimate of 3.7%. (ii) Annual growth temperature is negatively
related to both economic indicators, it is highly significant only for food production
in SSA (coef. 33.2%) and economic growth rate in the MENA region (49.2%).
Additionally, in the first stage model for SSA, we observe for economic growth
rate some other statistically significant coefficients; positive on total trade exports,
and negative on political transition indicator in-country (i) time (t). Using our
data, it shows that the significant climate determinants for economic growth rate
are water variables in the SSA region. Whereas for the food production index in
SSA we also observe some common significant coefficients; positive on the share of
agricultural land and the arable land, and accountability. In the MENA region,
other than the positive impact of growth rainfall and the negative impact of growth
temperature on GDP per capita, this indicator is affected positively significantly by
growth trade exports and the share of agricultural land, but it is affected negatively
highly significant by the share of arable land and transition in the political system.
While the food index is negatively significantly affected by water stress and political
indicators in particular, and positively by the share of urban population. Although
theoretically, one would expect that good governess should affect economic indicators
positively. It is indicated in a study by Emara and Jhonsa (2014) about governance
and economic growth, that most MENA countries in the year 2009 have achieved a
relatively high but fragile standard of living for their citizens, that is not based on
firm governance.
Overall, it is obvious that: (i) There is a positive link as exists in the literature for
SSA e.g, by Miguel et al. (2004) between economic growth rate and growth rainfall
and negative with annual growth temperature, significant in the MENA region with
our new data and model specification. (ii) There is a high negative impact for
the share of cultivated area “arable land” and a positive impact for the share of
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urban population on economic growth rate and food production, respectively, in the
MENA region. (iii) Changes in a political system (instability) has a negative impact
on economic growth rate in both regions.
Table 4.1: First-stage results, SSA and MENA from 1981-2015. Dependent variables







gr oil exp wdi 0.000001 -0.000002 0.000006 -0.000009
(0.680) (0.276) (0.791) (0.683)
gr trade exports 0.136*** -0.0192** 0.0912*** -0.0142
(0.000) (0.039) (0.000) (0.154)
agri land 0.00286 0.0194*** 0.00683** 0.00659**
(0.290) (0.000) (0.043) (0.040)
arable land -0.214 0.408*** -1.034** -0.107
(0.189) (0.001) (0.040) (0.822)
water stress 0.00951** -0.00399 -0.00005 -0.00079***
(0.014) (0.158) (0.599) (0.000)
strength gr polityiv -0.00519** -0.00105 -0.00952** -0.00104
(0.029) (0.547) (0.037) (0.811)
gr gpcp neu 0.00329 0.00815 0.0371 * 0.00573
(0.919) (0.732) (0.079) (0.775)
gr temp -0.206 -0.332** -0.492** -0.232
(0.370) (0.049) (0.006) (0.169)
water 1km2 -0.0090** 0.0006 0.000615 -0.000617
(0.016) (0.825) (0.595) (0.575)
rainfall levels 0.00004 -0.00023*** -0.00001 0.00004
(0.544) (0.000) (0.870) (0.483)
polityiv sh tr -0.00032 -0.00872*** -0.00405 -0.00703**
(0.837) (0.000) (0.256) (0.039)
accountab 0.00016 0.00278*** 0.00246 -0.00363**
(0.876) (0.000) (0.104) (0.012)
urban pop -0.00358 0.00299 0.00403 0.0113**
(0.264) (0.205) (0.338) (0.005)
Constant 0.0224 -0.705*** -0.256 -0.452
(0.939) (0.001) (0.505) (0.216)
Observations 1324 1324 612 612
R2 0.15 0.88 0.23 0.85
F 2.327 99.62 3.438 66.36
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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4.3.2 Economic shocks, direct climate impacts, and inci-
dence of civil conflicts, second stage estimations
The results of this stage are introduced in Table 4.2 for SSA and MENA. First,
not surprisingly, that civil conflict is more likely when there was a conflict in the
previous year in both regions, increase of around 0.498 pp and 0.302 pp in the prob-
ability of current conflicts in the MENA and SSA, respectively. Second, regarding
the impact of economic shocks on the civil conflict probability, it does not seem
to function through the same economic indicators in both regions, although both
indicators show negative coefficient signs on the incidence of civil conflict. i.e. in
the MENA region climate change increases the probability of civil conflict signifi-
cantly through reduction in food production index, and in SSA the effect appears
through economic growth rate. Third, for the direct impact of climate variables on
civil conflict incidence, our model yields negative coefficient signs on growth rainfall
in both regions, significant in MENA (ceof. -0.061*). Other than that, for MENA
countries fresh groundwater withdrawal reduces civil conflict incidence statistically
significant. While in SSA, political indicators show statistically significant impact
reducing conflict probability.
Overall, we find that (i) positive economic growth rate and domestic food production
reduce the likelihood of civil conflict, in SSA and the MENA region, respectively. (ii)
Annual growth rainfall directly reduces the probability of civil conflict significantly
in the MENA region. (iii) Previous conflicts increase the possibility of civil conflicts
in both regions, have a greater impact in the MENA region. (iv) As the type of
political system and accountability are important to reduce the risks of conflict in
SSA, water availability reduces the risks of conflict in the MENA.
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Table 4.2: Second stage results (GMM) for SSA and MENA from 1981-2015. De-
pendent variable: Civil conflict ≥25 deaths/ year
Exp. Variables SSA MENA
L.any prio 0.302*** 0.498***
(0.000) (0.000)
L2.any prio 0.105* 0.0156
(0.073) (0.797)
gr gdp c con -0.150** -0.0295
(0.030) (0.790)
food index -0.0928 -0.205**
(0.213) (0.005)
gr gpcp neu -0.0203 -0.0609*
(0.705) (0.093)
gr temp 0.174 0.125
(0.654) (0.731)
water 1km2 0.00142 -0.00657***
(0.774) (0.001)
rainfall levels 0.00009 0.00027*
(0.390) (0.075)









F ixed effects and specific time trends are included in all regressions
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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4.4 Discussion and conclusion
Estimates using new cross-country panel data during 1981- 2015 for SSA and the
MENA separately, show that climate change operates on economic indicators differ-
ently in both regions. First, rainfall has a positive impact on both economic growth
rate and food production, with a statistically significant impact on the GDP per
capita in the MENA region. However, this runs counter to the finding of Barrios
et al. (2010) that precipitation is important for income growth in Africa but not
for other developing countries. Quantitatively, a one unite rise of annual rainfall
growth leads to a 3.7 percent rise in economic growth rate in MENA, compared to
4.9 percent as reported by Miguel et al. (2004) for SSA during 1981-99.
Second, with respect to the effect of temperature, we emphasize the long known
negative relationship between the increase in temperatures and the economic growth
rate. One change in annual growth temperature reduces the economic growth rate
by 0.49 pp in the MENA and 0.33 pp of domestic food production in SSA’ sam-
ple, compared to 3.22 pp and 1.3 pp as reported by Odusola and Abidoye (2015)
and Dell et al. (2012), respectively, for Africa. Thus, periodic floods or droughts
is quite damaging to the economy i.e. food production in SSA is negatively signif-
icantly affected through annual rainfall levels (coef. 0.023 percent). Also, annual
temperature variation in SSA affects food production negatively significantly at 5%
level (point estimate of 0.332 pp), this is consistent with the finding of a case study
of Kenya that temperature harms crop production and has a greater impact than
rainfall (Ochieng et al., 2016). In general, temperature and rainfall variations are
critical to the GDP growth rate in the MENA region, and temperature growth is
critical to the food production index in sub-Saharan Africa. Water stress indicator
seems to be a significant factor for food production index in MENA. This region has
the lowest freshwater resource endowment in the world, and the demand of water
and food production has been achieved through abstraction of groundwater, water
harvesting and storage, wastewater reuse, desalinization plants and food imports
(Verner, 2012), led to groundwater resource depletion (Waha et al., 2017) due to
the over-extraction of available water, which is an important input into agricultural
production. The effect of other natural resources such as the share of oil exports
of total merchandise is positively correlated with the economic growth rate but in-
significantly (the same relationship has been found by Miguel et al. (2004)), this
results indicates that both regions do not rely heavily on oil exports significantly or
affected by World oil prices, but a robust significant positive impact of total mer-
chandise trade of a country exports to the world on the economic growth rate in
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both region has been found.
Regarding the impact of the level of democracy/ autocracy on economic indicators,
it affects both economic indicators negative but only statistically significant on food
index. Descriptive statistics table (Appendix A4) indicate that the average of Polity
IV estimates of most of the political systems in our samples laying between autocra-
cies and anocracies. In our estimation, this is evident from the significant negative
impact of the transition in political systems on domestic food production in both
regions. In the literature, a positive significant impact of the Polity IV indicator
has been found on the economic growth rate (Masaki and Van de Walle, 2014) that
a one-point increase in the POLITY score is expected to produce a 0.10 percent
increase in economic growth rate. While Miguel et al. (2004) for SSA in their model
specification for economic growth rate did not observe any significant coefficient on
Polity IV lagged one year.
Now turning to the impact of economic shocks induced by climate variability and the
direct impact of climate variation on the incidence of civil conflict in both regions, we
confirm the main result of Miguel et al. (2004) that the reduction in per capita income
growth induced by extreme weather events together with other country controls
significantly increases the probability of civil conflict in SSA. In quantitative terms,
a 10% reduction in economic growth rate leads to 1.5% increase in the probability of
civil conflict in SSA. A 10% reduction in food production index leads to 2% increase
in the probability of civil conflict in the MENA. The finding of the insignificant
relationship between food production and civil conflict in SSA corresponds to the
result of Buhaug et al. (2015), which we find rather statistically significant in the
MENA region. Helman et al. (2020) has illustrated that the relationship between
agricultural dependence and violence is stronger about four fold in the Middle East,
although the share of agricultural area in Africa is greater than in the Middle East,
14% and %11, respectively, in their study. This is also evident from the descriptive
statistics table (Appendix A4) attached to this Chapter. Furthermore, a negative
direct impact of climate variability exist between growth rainfall and risk of conflict
in the MENA, thus, it is important to assess both direct and indirect impacts of
climate change on the civil conflict when studying climate change. Chen et al.
(2016) has proved that the decrease in current rainfall compared to the previous
year increases the possibility of civil conflict. Moreover, our results proved that
conflict begets conflict in both regions, but lagged dependent variable has a greater
impact in the MENA region.
The clear evidence of the impact of climate change is that higher temperature con-
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tributed more to climate change than reduced precipitation, especially in the MENA
region. Second, results indicate that food production and economic growth rate are
stabilizing factors against conflict, food production in MENA, and economic growth
rate in SSA.
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Annual rainfall (mm) is com-
puted by adding up all the









Total yearly rainfall (mm) for
country i on a resolution of
2.5° latitude/longitude degree
nodes in the given country (see








Rainfall growth Gr rain= (rainfallt - rainfallt-
1 )/ (rainfallt-1 )
3.Temperature
(Celsius degree)
Annual averages are computed
by adding up all of monthly ob-
servations in a given year di-












1.Polity IV score Type of political regime for
each country on a range from -
10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full
democracy). Regimes that fall
into the middle of this spec-
trum are called anocracies. We
transformed Polity IV scores,
to be instead on a range from
1 to 20, for easiest interpreta-













Indicates changes in Polity IV
scores in yeart compared to
yeart-1 either toward democ-
racy or backward to autocracy
”strength gr polityiv”.
3.Accountability Ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100
(highest) rank, reflects percep-
tions of the extent to which a
country’s citizens can partici-
pate in selecting their govern-
ment, as well freedom of ex-








The annual level of freshwa-
ter withdrawal, calculated
averagely over each decade
divided by country area
as: water 1km2= 106 *









2.Water stress% Aggregated indicator (SDG
6.4.2.) freshwater withdrawal




The share of land area that
is arable as defined by the
FAO, under permanent crops
and pastures. Land abandoned








1.Ethnicity fractionalizations index com-
puted using the same formula
applied to different underlying











where Skm is the share of group




















Trade exports Total merchandise trade of a
country exports to the world in




















2.Food index The aggregate volume of agri-
cultural production for each
year compared to the base
period 2004-2006, covers food
crops that are considered edi-
ble and that contain nutrients.
Coffee and tea are excluded
because, although edible, they








Any conflict resulted at least
25 battel related death per year





9 All country-year observations are coded as ones based on the type (3 and 4) and the intensity



























































Variables Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Economic indicators
Annual GDP 1399 1028.14 1402.77 82 10716 630 9970.43 13785.36 172 88565
GDP growth rate 1399 0.027 0.152 -0.645 1.78 630 0.037 0.146 -0.66 0.91








1399 903.57 562.13 49.27 2795.72 630 234.54 207.56 13.03 967.53
Rainfall (GPCP-
V2.3)
1399 879.878 718.573 9.029 2715.39 630 539.74 372.10 60.97 1727.37
Temperature 1399 24.615 3.355 12.21 29.75 630 21.797 4.449 9.651 29.033
Growth Rainfall
(CCKP)
1399 0.02 0.221 -0.659 1.69 630 0.085 0.52 -0.808 4.064
Growth rainfall
(GPCP-V2.3)
1358 0.012 0.136 -0.611 1.369 612 0.039 0.318 -0.626 2.387
Growth Temperature 1399 0.001 0.018 -0.126 0.107 630 0.002 0.031 -0.164 0.133
Other Country Characteristics
water per 1km2 1399 5.182 8.506 0.031 60.01 630 54.64 72.96 1.53 352.06
water stress 1399 13.89 31.33 0 131.31 630 392.035 644.795 14.89 2347
arable land 1365 0.282 0.202 0.001 1.585 630 0.145 0.141 0.001 0.57
agri land 1365 47.71 19.18 7.94 82.67 630 32.03 25.51 2.45 80.85

























































Variables Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Changes in PolityIV/
both directions
1398 0.525 1.81 0 15 630 0.275 1.261 0 12
Accountability 1399 29.61 17.45 0.99 74 630 24.63 15.13 0 71.92
Ethnic 1399 0.702 0.194 0.058 0.93 630 0.398 0.218 0 0.746
Religion 1399 0.552 0.231 0.003 0.86 630 0.26 0.25 0.00 0.79
Urban pop. 1399 33.42 16.15 5 88 630 69.45 19.149 21 100
Growth trade ex-
ports
1399 0.09 0.327 -0.73 3.81 630 0.11 0.54 -0.96 8.39
Growth oil exports 1399 53.45 1583.54 -1 58572.3 630 12.51 246.19 -1 5950.57
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Abstract
This paper provides an analysis of the impact of extraordinary climate shocks on
the incidence of civil conflict using cross-country panel data from Africa and the
Middle East (1981–2015). We find that: (i) The estimated impact of climate shocks
(mainly temperature effect) on economic growth rate and domestic food production
ranges from 3 to 5% compared to the estimated impact of temperature growth 47%.
(ii) We identified a direct impact of climate shocks on the incidence of civil conflict,
where this impact is similar in magnitude to the negative impact of rainfall growth
on conflict (3-4%). (iii) We confirmed the negative link between conflict and both
economic indicators, conflict begets next conflict, the positive impact of good gover-
nance and Polity IV estimates, and the freshwater availability on reducing the risk
of conflict. Concluding that the main effect of climate comes from the temperature
growth effects and it is not extreme shocks that drive economic declines, which in-
dicates that the climate rather operates in a non-linear process.
Keywords: Climate shocks, civil conflict, economic development
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5.1 Introduction
Scientists have provided evidence that climate change negatively affects economies
and people, and significantly contributes to their involvement in disasters and armed
conflict. In a previous part of this research, we have proved existing findings in the
literature (e.g., Miguel et al. (2004)), that climate variation4 has a significant im-
pact on economic performance and the incidence of civil conflict. We have confirmed
empirically (like Dell et al. (2012)) that higher temperatures contribute to climate
variability more than decreased precipitation. Our data shows that a one percentage
point change in the year-to-year temperature averages lead to a 0.31 pp reduction
in economic growth rate and 0.23 pp in food production over the period 1981–2015.
According to the estimated impact of temperature on economic indicators, some
countries that currently have annual income growth of 1 to 1.4%, in the next 32
years, will not be able to achieve any income growth due to temperature changes.
The sustained increase in temperatures shows devastating effects on cross-country
economic performance over time. Dell et al. (2012) observed for each 1 Celsius de-
gree increase in temperature a decline in per capita income of about 8 percent. We
have identified a direct impact of climate through rainfall growth on the risk of civil
conflict. Additionally, we confirmed the most robust finding in the literature that
economic growth rate (Miguel et al., 2004) and domestic food production are neg-
atively related to the incidence of civil conflict. However, estimating the impact of
climate change using annual percentage change of rainfall and temperature following
the method of some highly recognized studies in the literature (the previously men-
tioned study of Miguel et al. (2004)) has been criticized, for instance, by Ciccone
(2011).
Using the annual percentage change of precipitation does not provide sufficient in-
formation about whether a wet year is a year with heavy rainfall, or just a wetter
year than the previous one (mean reversion). To address this valid criticism, in this
paper, we perform a more fine-grained analysis and focus instead on the effects of a
true climate shock, which we identify at different levels of deviations from the long-
term mean of climate variables. Moreover, to better capture the effect of occurred
shocks, we define in which direction constructed shocks deviate from their respec-
tive historical long-term mean. The importance of taking into account precipitation
deviations that may affect in both directions when estimating the impact of climate
shocks is also emphasized by Papaioannou and deHaas (2015).
4The relative change from previous year in rainfall and temperature variables
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We suppose that positive or negative extreme climate shocks, lead to higher levels
of conflict incidence, either directly or through economic reductions. Therefore, in
this paper, our main aim is to estimate the effect of medium and extreme climate
shocks compared to annual relative changes in weather variables from the previous
year in selected model specifications.
In the following section, we introduce data and methods. In section 3, we present
empirical results. Section 4 discusses results and conclusions.
5.2 Data and methods
5.2.1 Data and measurement strategies
For estimates, we use our new cross-country panel data including 59 countries from
Africa and the Middle East for 1981 to 2015, which contains data on conflict, climate,
economic, political, and environmental variables.
1. Climate variables
Data on annual average temperature (Celsius degree) and rainfall levels (mil-
limeter) come from World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal (2018).
We use different measurements for climate change as follows:
To observe relative change from previous year in rainfall and temperature vari-
ables, we follow Miguel et al. (2004):
gr var(it) =var(it)−var lag1
var lag1
.
To construct shock variables, we derive annual climate deviation variables
from their long-term mean in each country over the period 1981-2015 divided
by standard deviation from their respective mean over 35 years, using the fol-
lowing formula:
dev.Xit = (Xi, t− X̄i)/σi
Where X it is the annual rainfall or temperature in country i time t, and X̄i
denotes to the historical long-term mean of each country, and σi is the stan-
dard deviation of each country long-term respective mean. The temperature
deviation data ranges from -3.03 to 3.18, deviation has a mean of 0.03, and a
standard deviation of 0.98. While normalized annual rainfall data ranges from
-2.69 to 3.76 and has a mean of almost zero and a standard deviation of 0.99.
1. To consider that there is a shock in the constructed deviation variables, we
define the direction of deviation (positive or negative) and classify two shock
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thresholds (1 indicates medium shock and 2 extreme shocks). Accordingly, the
value of climate shock variables in-country (i) and time (t): ranging from -2 to
+2, take four values: those greater than 1 and less than -1, greater than 2 and
less than -2 excluding the effect of observations outside these thresholds. The
separation of the effects of positive and negative shocks is thought to further
explain existing relationships.
2. Furthermore, we include the impact of observed shocks over lagged two to
five previous years to better understand the dynamics of shocks on economic
conditions and conflict risk (see the summary table of variables, Appendix A5).
Data on other climate variables: water indicators come from FAO (2017),
which are available for five-year periods from the 1980s for most countries of our
sample. Including water stress indicator which is known as water withdrawal
intensity. water 1km2 is the average annual level of freshwater withdrawal
(calculated averagely over each decade) divided by country area as:
water 1km2= 106 x wasser total/area.km2, in 103 m3/km2.
For more information see the summary of variables in Appendix A5.
2. Economic development indicators
(i) Gross Domestic Product per capita estimates in constant price-US dollar
(UNSD, 2020).5. We estimate the growth effect of GDP per capita observing
changes from previous year (gr gdp c con(it) =gdp c conit−gdp c con lagit
gdp c con lagit
).
(ii) Food production index represents the aggregate volume of agricultural
production for each year compared to the base period 2004-2006, covers food
crops that are considered edible, and contains nutrients. Coffee and tea are
excluded because, although edible, they have no nutritive value, from the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2016).
(iii)Time series of oil exporter status (% of merchandise exports) (World Bank,
2016).
(iv) Total merchandise trade of a country exports to the world in US dollar at
current prices from the The World Trade Organization (2016).
3. Conflict data
For the conflict incidence indicator, which subsumes outbreak of a conflict and
continuation of a conflict that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths each
5UNSD (2020) make a complete and consistent set of GDP per capita time series available, from
1970 onwards. GDP per capita estimates expressed either in current or constant price-US dollars.
http://data.un.org/
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year, we use the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, a conflict version 18.1.
(Themnér et al., 2018).6
4. Political Indicators
We include the impact of political regime type (Polity IV) on the incidence
of civil war. (i) Polity IV scores for each country on a range from -10 (full
autocracy) to +10 (full democracy). Regimes that fall into the middle of this
spectrum are called anocracies. The source is the project of Roser (2019), based
on Polity IV Project (2013) and Wimmer and Min (2006). We transformed
these scores to be instead on a range from 1 to 20 for easier interpretation of
coefficients. (ii) Second, we include the impact of transition or stability in the
political system “strength gr polityiv” by observing changes in absolute terms
from the previous year in Polity IV scores when there is a shift in the regime
either toward democracy or backward to the autocracy (strength gr polityiv=
polityiv sh tr - polityiv sh tr lag 1 ). (iii) Voice and accountability indicator:
percentile rank among all countries (ranges from 0=lowest to 100 =highest),
reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens can participate
in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of
association, and a free media. The source is World Bank (2014).
5. Other country characteristics
Such as agricultural land (% of land area) refer to the share of land area that
is arable as defined by the FAO, under permanent crops and pastures. Land
abandoned as a result of shifting cultivation is excluded. Arable land (hectares
per person) (World Bank, 2016). Population (World Bank, 2018).
5.2.2 Methods
We examine the relationship between climate change (annual climate variations and
shocks, water stress, and water availability) and the risk of civil conflict, either
indirect through economic development applying instrumental variable approach
like by Miguel et al. (2004); Ciccone (2011) or directly. The impact of climate
change in country i and time t on economic growth rate (Miguel et al., 2004) and
on the food index (Buhaug et al., 2015) is first estimated applying Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) equations number (5.1) and (5.2) using rainfall and temperature
6The UCDP/PRIO armed conflict, developed by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)
at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University in Sweden and the Inter-
national Peace Research Institute in Oslo, (PRIO) for download: http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/.
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variables (growth and shock effects) as instruments with other controls related to
economy and conflict. We include in all regressions country-fixed effects to capture
time-invariant country characteristics that may be related to conflict and we include
country-specific time trends to capture additional variation.
The first-stage equations (5.1), (5.2) estimate the relationship between economic
development (economic growth rate and Food Index), and weather conditions with
other controls, with a vector X ′it of instruments as follow:
gr gdpit = ai + bX
′
it + diyeart + eit, (5.1)
food indexit = ai + bX
′
it + diyeart + eit, (5.2)
country fixed effects aji and country-specific time trends yeart, to capture time-
invariant country characteristics and additional variation over time, respectively.
The error term e is allowed to be correlated across years for the same country in all
regressions.
In the second step model, we use Dynamic Panel Data estimators (DPD) based on
GMM estimator to estimate the effect of economic outputs from the first stage on
the incidence of civil conflict together with other climate and political variables.
We consider the impact of lagged conflict as an explanatory variable on the inci-
dence of civil conflict since the impact of any shock on conflict may differ depending
on whether the country is already experiencing conflict. In equation (5.3) we es-
timate our model with DPD based on GMM as introduced by Hansen (1982) and
implemented by Roodman (2009) in the STATA-package xtabond2. This estimator
allows the inclusion of lagged dependent variables (Roodman; 2009; Arellano and
Bover; 1995; Blundell and Bond; 1995). To ensure that the estimator is robust to
heteroskedasticity, we use the option robust on the command xtabond2.
conflictit = αi + β · gr gdpit + γ · food indexit + δ ·X ′it + σi · yeart + εit. (5.3)
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5.3 Empirical Results
In the model specification (presented in Table 5.1) which includes the impact of
positive and negative shock thresholds of climate deviation variables over time, the
first stage OLS (regression 1 and 2) show climate change impacts on economic growth
rate and domestic food production. The effect of rainfall on economic growth rate
is significant only through negative medium shocks (estimated coefficient: 3.9%).
Whereas the effect of temperature, both positive and negative temperature shocks,
is significantly correlated with the GDP growth rate (coefficients 3-5%). However, a
greater impact is observed through growth temperature in year t (coefficient estimate
of 47%). Additionally, our model yields other statistically significant coefficients for
economic growth rate, positive on total trade exports, the share of agricultural land,
and negative on political transition indicator. These correlations are consistent
in the significance level among different econometric specifications. Domestic food
production is affected significantly positively only by the impact of negative medium
shock in temperature (coefficient estimate of 3.5%) and negatively by water stress
with a coefficient of 0.07%.
In the second stage model, we assess the impact of linearly estimated economic out-
comes from the first stage regressions adding various control variables on conflict
(Column 3 of Table 5.1) applying GMM. The findings are straightforward and con-
firm (i) negative relationships between both economic indicators, economic growth
rate and domestic food production index, and conflict. (ii) The previous conflict
begets the next conflicts. (iii) A direct impact of climate on conflict. Besides, the
model yields expected negative and significant signs of control variables; freshwater
withdrawal, Polity IV, and accountability on conflict. These control variables show
consistent and significant signs with the incidence of conflict in all tested econometric
specifications. Out of all included climate variables, growth in rainfall shows a con-
sistent and significantly negative impact on the incidence of civil conflict in all tested
model specifications for this research. Regarding climate shock effects presented in
column 3 of Table 5.1, medium positive rainfall shocks show significant positive ef-
fects on the incidence of civil conflict, whereas medium positive temperature shocks
show negative effects on the incidence of civil conflict.
In a similar model specification (results are reported in table 5.4 in the appendix),
we control for the impact of lagged year-to-year temperature and rainfall variables
to test whether a change in weather this year has an impact on the food production
and economic growth rate next year (as by many, e.g., Miguel et al. (2004); Ciccone
79
Chapter 5. Climate Change, or Climate Shocks: What Really Triggers Civil Conflicts?
Table 5.1: Annual climate shocks impact. Dependent variables: Economic growth
rate, food index in the OLS, and civil conflict ≥ 25 deaths/ year in the GMM
(1) (2) (3)
GR gdp c con food index any prio
GR oil exp wdi 0.00000119 (0.623) -0.00000210 (0.289)
GR trade exports 0.111*** (0.000) -0.0148** (0.027)
agri land 0.00387 * (0.058) 0.0142*** (0.000)
arable land -0.264 * (0.070) 0.465*** (0.000)
water stress -0.0000112 (0.914) -0.000735*** (0.000)
strength gr polityiv -0.00673*** (0.001) -0.00245 (0.147)
GR temp -0.470** (0.004) -0.0618 (0.645) 0.185 (0.489)
GR rainfall -0.0167 (0.121) -0.00621 (0.483) -0.0332** (0.020)
water 1km2 0.0000927 (0.931) -0.000334 (0.704) -0.00613** (0.003)
Polity.IV SH tr -0.000206 (0.879) -0.00838*** (0.000) -0.00553** (0.048)
Accountab 0.000670 (0.422) 0.000584 (0.393) -0.00363** (0.026)
urban pop -0.00175 (0.460) 0.00483** (0.013) 0.00815 (0.142)
rain dev Threshold=1 0.0396*** (0.000) 0.000803 (0.926) 0.0420** (0.032)
rain dev Threshold=2 0.0000782 (0.997) 0.0244 (0.178) -0.000206 (0.996)
rain dev Threshold=3 -0.0110 (0.285) -0.0168** (0.046) 0.0202 (0.297)
rain dev Threshold=4 -0.0230 (0.360) 0.000765 (0.970) -0.0317 (0.550)
temp dev Threshold=1 -0.0138 (0.198) -0.00439 (0.618) -0.0349** (0.049)
temp dev Threshold=2 0.0481 * (0.064) -0.00317 (0.881) -0.0587 (0.205)
temp dev Threshold=3 -0.0256** (0.018) 0.0315*** (0.000) -0.0177 (0.458)
temp dev Threshold=4 -0.0287 (0.192) 0.0360** (0.046) -0.0498 (0.398)
L.any prio 0.364*** (0.000)
L2.any prio 0.0927 * (0.051)
GR gdp c con -0.144** (0.023)
food index -0.158** (0.005)
FE and time effects yes yes yes
Constant -0.173 (0.213) -0.392*** (0.001) 1.084 (0.139)
Observations 1994 1994 1871
Adj R-squared 0.11 0.86
F 2.845 91.13
AIC -2005.221 -2798.827 -5028.188
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001
(2011)), and whether the inclusion of lagged growth effects changes type of already
existing relationships. The model yields a significant impact also for lagged growth
temperature on the GDP growth rate, but the size of the coefficient of growth
temperature in time (t) remains greater, and all other relationships remain consistent
in statistical significance.
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We now turn to study whether the impact of climate shocks is more severe on
economic development and the incidence of civil conflict when in a country the
number of positive or negative climate shocks observed over the past two to five
years in a row (number of shocks in the past) is higher. For this purpose, the
results of the econometric specification that include the effects of the number of
shocks in the previous period on the central variables and the civil conflict in time
t are presented in Table 5.2. The clear evidence is that climate affects economic
development through temperature; the OLS regressions show that each 1 Celsius
degree change in growth temperature reduces 28,8% of economic growth rate and
36% of domestic food production. Even for shock variables, the dominant effect
comes from temperature shocks, where the number of negative temperature shocks
observed over the previous two years shows a significant impact on the economic
growth rate and the food index, 2.9% and 4.9%, respectively. However, the effect
of temperature shocks is again less in magnitude than the growth effect. For the
GMM model 3, we find that results are broadly consistent in statistical significance
with displayed results in Table 5.5, except for the effect of rainfall. The direct
impact of rainfall on the incidence of civil conflict instead depends on the number
of negative rainfall shocks that occurred in the previous two years in country i time
t. We also have tested this model specification including the occurred positive or
negative climate shocks over the previous 5 years period (Table 5.5 in Appendix
A5). All established linkages survived. The consistent conclusion for the impact
of the number of climate shocks is that negative and positive rainfall shocks in
those countries which experienced four, and five years of shocks, respectively, show
negative significant coefficients on the incidence of civil conflict. However, it remains
difficult to explain the sign and the significance of all these effects, because the total
effect is distributed.
Overall, although the estimates of the first paper and the present one are based
on different model specifications, mainly different measures of climate change, the
results are largely compatible with each other. Our empirical analysis links an
increase in temperature and growth in rainfall, with a lower economic growth rate
and incidence of civil conflict, respectively, consistent almost to the inclusion of all
model specifications and in the significance level.
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Table 5.2: Impact of observed climate shocks over previous two years on economic
development in the OLS, and civil conflict ≥ 25 deaths/ year in the GMM
(1) (2) (3)
GR gdp c con food index any prio
GR oil exp wdi 0.00000102 (0.663) -0.00000183 (0.349)
GR trade exports 0.111*** (0.000) -0.0107 (0.110)
agri land 0.00447** (0.030) 0.0152*** (0.000)
arable land -0.240 (0.108) 0.345** (0.006)
water stress -0.0000150 (0.884) -0.000753*** (0.000)
strength gr polityiv -0.00638** (0.002) -0.000473 (0.780)
GR temp -0.288 * (0.061) -0.362** (0.005) 0.0638 (0.806)
GR rainfall -0.00216 (0.838) 0.00191 (0.828) -0.0155 (0.265)
water 1km2 -0.000221 (0.835) -0.000912 (0.300) -0.00577** (0.005)
Polity.IV SH tr -0.00107 (0.441) -0.00985*** (0.000) -0.00519 * (0.059)
Accountab 0.000528 (0.519) 0.000836 (0.220) -0.00374** (0.021)
urban pop -0.00308 (0.241) 0.00621** (0.004) 0.00877 (0.102)
count T neg shock -0.0294** (0.035) 0.0495*** (0.000) -0.00208 (0.943)
count T pos shock 0.0132 (0.358) 0.00112 (0.926) 0.00240 (0.908)
count R neg shock -0.000555 (0.969) 0.0190 (0.110) -0.0492 * (0.059)
count R pos shock 0.00667 (0.642) 0.0126 (0.292) -0.00890 (0.740)
L.any prio 0.367*** (0.000)
L2.any prio 0.0889 * (0.060)
GR gdp c con -0.127** (0.047)
food index -0.160** (0.005)
FE and time effects yes yes yes
Constant 0.265 (0.457) 0.427 (0.150) 0.106 (0.199)
Observations 1871 1871 1871
Adj R-squared 0.11 0.86
F 2.840 87.42
AIC -1986.234 -2674.556 -5036.188
R refer to rainfall and T to temperature. p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001
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5.4 Discussion and conclusion
This study has examined the linkage between climate shocks and the incidence
of conflict using a new cross-country panel data for 59 countries of Africa and the
Middle East from 1981 to 2015. For the estimates, we applied two alternative econo-
metric specifications, which include the effect of: (i) Extreme and medium climate
shocks in both directions: positive and negative deviations. (ii) The number of ob-
served shocks over lagged two years. The findings are: (1) the highly pronounced
positive correlation between growth in rainfall and economic growth rate in the lit-
erature (e.g. by Miguel et al. (2004); Barrios et al. (2010)) is confirmed with our
model through positive rainfall shock “medium shock: one deviation point”. How-
ever, when the shock in rainfall becomes extreme (over two deviation points), that
may lead to severe flooding, it shows an expectedly negative sign with economic
growth rate although insignificant. Quantitatively, the estimated effect of rainfall
shock on the economic growth rate is greater compared to what we observe through
interaction effects in our first paper, 3.9% and 0.02%, respectively. None of the rain-
fall variables, neither the growth nor the shock variables, show a significant impact
on food production. (2) Temperature shocks, both positive and negative, are also
related to the GDP growth rate significantly. However, a greater effect is observed
for the temperature growth (estimated coefficients between 0.47 pp and 0.69 pp in
the model with lags, compared to 0.31 pp in our first paper). The negative deviation
in temperature shows a significant positive effect on the food index. Furthermore,
we see that the negative impact of temperature shock on economic growth rate is
explained by the significant impact of the observed negative temperature shocks in
the previous two years, where this indicator variable shows a similar positive impact
on the food index. Overall, the main effect of climate comes from the temperature
growth and it is not extreme shocks that drive economic declines, which indicates
that the climate rather operates in a non-linear process. The pattern we find in our
first paper remains the same, that temperature growth contributes to the climate
impacts more than rainfall impacts.
3) Regarding the direct effects of climate shocks on the incidence of civil conflict, we
find that: the medium positive rainfall shock increases the incidence of civil conflict
significantly, whereas extreme deviations (two deviation points) have no effect. Our
finding is consistent in part with the result of Papaioannou and deHaas (2015); Burke
et al. (2015) who found that rainfall deviation increases conflict significantly, and
with Papaioannou and deHaas (2015) who indicated that both drought and excessive
rainfall have increased scarcity and created conditions that generated social tension
83
Chapter 5. Climate Change, or Climate Shocks: What Really Triggers Civil Conflicts?
and distress. However, it counters the finding of Fjelde and von Uexkull (2012) that
large negative deviations in rainfall from the long-term mean are related to a higher
risk of conflict. One explanation could be that 55.6% of our sample is considered
as low-rainfall countries, therefore, higher rainfall leads to floods, thus destroying
natural resources or losing livelihoods associated with agriculture, thus increasing
the likelihood of conflict. On the other hand, the impact of positive temperature
shock (medium shock) on the risk of civil conflict is significantly negative. Annual
rainfall growth is related negatively to the incidence of civil conflict similar to the
consistent result of our first paper (Chapter 2) and like in the literature (Hendrix
and Glaser, 2007; Bohlken and Sergenti, 2010). The occurrence of two negative
rain shocks in succession reduces conflict risk significantly, but in this context, the
significant impact of rainfall growth on civil conflict disappears and appears instead
on rainfall shocks. However, it is difficult to find an explanation for each individual
effect that we observed for the indicator variables (shocks) because in any case, they
do not show the overall effect of precipitation and temperature. In the literature
it has been suggested by Tietenberg (2000); Baechler (2013) that an unexpected
decrease in freshwater availability increases competition for access to water and
land and that harvest failure that lead to food shortages increase the likelihood of
civil conflict.
However, the direct effect of continuous and shock climate variables on the incidence
of civil conflict in this paper is quantitatively similar and corresponds to the effect
of rainfall growth on the decrease of the probability of civil conflict in the best fit
model in the first paper (Chapter 2). The marginal impact of climate shocks on
economic indicators and civil conflicts does not exceed 5%.
(4) Furthermore, the established links between economic development, domestic
food production, and the incidence of civil conflict in Chapter 2 remain, almost the
same quantitatively. Where a 10% reduction in economic growth or domestic food
production leads to up to 1.44% and 1.6 increase in the probability of civil con-
flict, respectively. (5) In addition, the model observed negative and significant signs
of control variables; Freshwater withdrawal, Polity IV, and accountability, all con-
tribute to reducing the potential for conflict. While the exogenous variables such as
the transition in a political system, the share of agricultural lands, and the increase
in trade exports are critical factors for the economic growth rate and water stress is
a critical factor for domestic food production.
Overall, precipitation, and temperature shocks are statistically significant but quan-
titatively show smaller effects relative to growth effect, i.e. temperature growth has
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larger impact on economic growth rate, but positive rainfall shock also plays a role.
Thus, the effect of climate on conflict seems to be non-linear. Performing such a
fine-grained analysis benefits the literature in this field, especially as our data ex-
tends over a longer time (1981-2015) and covers two regions that are vulnerable to
climate change in the world. By providing new indicators describing climate change
and achieving a better understanding of the links between climate deviations and
conflict, we bring a different perspective to the effects of climate on economic growth
rate, food production, and conflict in Africa and the Middle East.
85
Chapter 5. Climate Change, or Climate Shocks: What Really Triggers Civil Conflicts?
References
Baechler, G. (2013). Violence through environmental discrimination: Causes, Rwanda
arena, and conflict model, volume 2. Springer Science & Business Media.
Barrios, S., Bertinelli, L., and Strobl, E. (2010). Trends in rainfall and economic growth
in africa: A neglected cause of the african growth tragedy. The Review of Economics
and Statistics, 92(2):350–366.
Bohlken, A. T. and Sergenti, E. J. (2010). Economic growth and ethnic violence: An
empirical investigation of Hindu-Muslim riots in India. Journal of Peace Research,
47(5):589–600.
Buhaug, H., Benjaminsen, T. A., Sjaastad, E., and Theisen, O. M. (2015). Climate vari-
ability, food production shocks, and violent conflict in sub-saharan africa. Environmental
Research Letters, 10(12).
Burke, M., Hsiang, S. M., and Miguel, E. (2015). Climate and conflict.
Ciccone, A. (2011). Economic shocks and civil conflict: A comment. American Economic
Journal: Applied Economics, 3(4):215–27.
Dell, M., Jones, B. F., and Olken, B. A. (2012). Temperature shocks and economic growth:
Evidence from the last half century. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
4(3):66–95.
FAO (2017). AQUASTAT main database, Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/query/index.html.
Fjelde, H. and von Uexkull, N. (2012). Climate triggers: Rainfall anomalies, vulnerability
and communal conflict in sub-saharan africa. Political Geography, 31(7):444–453.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2016). The fao indices of
agricultural production. http://www.fao.org/faostat/en.
Hendrix, C. S. and Glaser, S. M. (2007). Trends and triggers: Climate, climate change
and civil conflict in sub–saharan africa. Political geography, 26(6):695–715.
Miguel, E., Satyanath, S., and Sergenti, E. (2004). Economic shocks and civil conflict: An
instrumental variables approach. Journal of Political Economy, 112(4):725–253.
Papaioannou, K. and deHaas, M. (2015). Climate shocks cash crops and resilience: Evi-
dence from colonial tropical africa. Available at SSRN 2679299.
Polity IV Project (2013). Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013.
https://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
Roser, M. (2019). Democracy. OurWorldinData.org.
The World Trade Organization (2016). Total merchandise trade.
Themnér, L., Wallensteen, P., Heldt, B., Sollenberg, M., Eriksson, M., Högbladh, S., and
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Water/ 1Km2 Average annual level of
freshwater withdrawal (cal-
culated averagely over each
decade) divided by country
area as:water 1km2= 106
x wasser total/area.km2, in
103 m3/km2.
FAO (2017)
Water stress% Freshwater withdrawal as
a proportion of available
freshwater resources. This
indicator is also known as
water withdrawal intensity
and will measure progress
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tain nutrients. Coffee and
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at least 25 battel related






7All country-year observations are coded as ones based on the type (3 and 4) and the intensity
level 1 or 2 of the PRIO Uppsala conflict data (at least 25 battle-related deaths per year), otherwise
zeros.
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Table 5.4: Annal climate shocks impact. Dependent variables: Economic growth
rate, food index in the OLS, and civil conflict ≥ 25 deaths/ year in the GMM
(1) (2) (3)
GR gdp c con food index any prio
GR oil exp wdi 0.00000114 (0.639) -0.00000213 (0.283)
GR trade exports 0.114*** (0.000) -0.0142** (0.033)
agri land 0.00395 * (0.053) 0.0142*** (0.000)
arable land -0.272 * (0.063) 0.469*** (0.000)
water stress -0.0000140 (0.892) -0.000734*** (0.000)
strength gr polityiv -0.00677*** (0.001) -0.00254 (0.132)
GR temp lag 1 -0.0139 (0.922) 0.0203 (0.860) 0.0777 (0.705)
GR rainfall lag 1 0.000624 (0.773) -0.00375** (0.034) 0.00996 (0.340)
water 1km2 -0.0000189 (0.986) -0.000324 (0.712) -0.00608** (0.003)
Polity.IV SH tr -0.000355 (0.794) -0.00838*** (0.000) -0.00547 * (0.051)
Accountab 0.000683 (0.414) 0.000584 (0.392) -0.00367** (0.024)
urban pop -0.00190 (0.422) 0.00487** (0.012) 0.00795 (0.153)
rain dev Threshold=1 0.0368*** (0.000) -0.00117 (0.889) 0.0329 * (0.089)
rain dev Threshold=2 -0.00369 (0.862) 0.0209 (0.227) -0.0189 (0.661)
rain dev Threshold=3 -0.00668 (0.498) -0.0157 * (0.051) 0.0296 (0.101)
rain dev Threshold=4 -0.0186 (0.454) 0.00229 (0.910) -0.0191 (0.709)
temp dev Threshold=1 -0.0227** (0.027) -0.00528 (0.529) -0.0306 * (0.078)
temp dev Threshold=2 0.0305 (0.224) -0.00396 (0.847) -0.0505 (0.245)
temp dev Threshold=3 -0.0173 * (0.100) 0.0334*** (0.000) -0.0199 (0.388)
temp dev Threshold=4 -0.0108 (0.610) 0.0397** (0.022) -0.0547 (0.346)
L.any prio 0.364*** (0.000)
L2.any prio 0.0914 * (0.055)
GR gdp c con -0.143** (0.021)
food index -0.156** (0.006)
FE and time effects yes yes yes
Constant -0.176 (0.205) -0.394*** (0.001) 1.081 (0.145)
Observations 1994 1994 1871
Adj R-squared 0.11 0.85
F 2.759 91.35
AIC -1994.861 -2803.037 -5028.899
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001
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Table 5.5: Climate shocks over a previous 5-year period and economic development
in the OLS, and civil conflict ≥ 25 deaths/ year in the GMM
(1) (2) (3)
GR gdp c con food index any prio
GR oil exp wdi 0.000000637 (0.785) -0.00000128 (0.507)
GR trade exports 0.117*** (0.000) -0.0115 * (0.098)
agri land 0.00441** (0.050) 0.0156*** (0.000)
arable land -0.105 (0.515) 0.275** (0.040)
water stress 0.0000167 (0.878) -0.000767*** (0.000)
strength gr polityiv -0.00709*** (0.001) 0.000904 (0.608)
GR temp -0.283 * (0.063) -0.253** (0.044) 0.0392 (0.884)
GR rainfall -0.00791 (0.459) 0.00393 (0.656) -0.0248** (0.029)
water 1km2 -0.000953 (0.380) -0.00165 * (0.066) -0.00536*** (0.002)
Polity.IV SH tr -0.00189 (0.202) -0.00920*** (0.000) -0.00608** (0.035)
Accountab 0.000230 (0.790) 0.000520 (0.466) -0.00368** (0.045)
urban pop -0.00900** (0.008) 0.00973*** (0.000) 0.0118 * (0.079)
count R pos shock=1 -0.00894 (0.317) -0.000504 (0.946) -0.0268 (0.111)
count R pos shock=2 0.0245** (0.047) 0.00474 (0.641) -0.0734** (0.003)
count R pos shock=3 -0.00757 (0.757) 0.0331 (0.102) 0.0107 (0.840)
count R pos shock=4 -0.0492 (0.547) -0.0587 (0.385) -0.143** (0.013)
count R neg shock=1 0.00527 (0.546) 0.00185 (0.797) 0.0140 (0.391)
count R neg shock=2 0.0149 (0.238) 0.0152 (0.146) -0.0118 (0.652)
count R neg shock=3 0.00940 (0.676) 0.0342 * (0.066) -0.0376 (0.360)
count R neg shock=4 0.0354 (0.479) 0.102** (0.013) 0.0436 (0.287)
count R neg shock=5 -0.0964 (0.505) 0.216 * (0.071) -0.430*** (0.000)
count T pos shock=1 -0.00108 (0.918) 0.0119 (0.170) 0.0130 (0.427)
count T pos shock=2 0.00996 (0.479) 0.0167 (0.151) -0.0229 (0.287)
count T pos shock=3 0.0107 (0.611) 0.0334 * (0.055) -0.0252 (0.634)
count T pos shock=4 0.0403 (0.443) 0.0112 (0.796) -0.0281 (0.699)
count T pos shock=5 0.0294 (0.786) 0.0763 (0.394) -0.0743 * (0.083)
count T neg shock=1 -0.0319** (0.006) 0.0174 * (0.068) 0.0152 (0.544)
count T neg shock=2 -0.0663*** (0.000) 0.0418*** (0.000) 0.0640 * (0.062)
count T neg shock=3 -0.0610*** (0.000) 0.0463*** (0.001) -0.0354 (0.379)
count T neg shock=4 -0.0338 (0.172) 0.0835*** (0.000) 0.00940 (0.873)
count T neg shock=5 -0.155 * (0.081) 0.0824 (0.260) 0.0223 (0.643)
L.any prio 0.336*** (0.000)
L2.any prio 0.0913 * (0.057)
GR gdp c con -0.0756 (0.238)
food index -0.132** (0.018)
FE and time effects yes yes yes
Constant 0.0691 (0.676) -0.456*** (0.001) 0.467*** (0.000)
Observations 1685 1685 1685
Adj R-squared 0.14 0.85
F 2.936 68.42
AIC -1799.925 -2440.702 -4641.53
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001
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Table 5.6: Combining absolute moving climate shock variables over a previous 5-
year period and economic development in the OLS, and civil conflict ≥ 25 deaths/
year in the GMM
(1) (2) (3)
GR gdp c con food index any prio
GR oil exp wdi 0.000000743 (0.751) -0.00000135 (0.484)
GR trade exports 0.118*** (0.000) -0.0119 * (0.085)
agri land 0.00476** (0.032) 0.0159*** (0.000)
arable land -0.174 (0.279) 0.276** (0.038)
water stress 0.0000190 (0.862) -0.000762*** (0.000)
strength gr polityiv -0.00727*** (0.001) 0.000810 (0.644)
GR temp -0.410** (0.006) -0.212 * (0.084) 0.105 (0.685)
GR rainfall -0.00720 (0.489) 0.00616 (0.472) -0.0178 * (0.085)
water 1km2 -0.000910 (0.401) -0.00160 * (0.073) -0.00498** (0.007)
Polity.IV SH tr -0.00216 (0.144) -0.00924*** (0.000) -0.00578 * (0.054)
Accountab 0.000553 (0.519) 0.000440 (0.534) -0.00380** (0.046)
urban pop -0.00950** (0.005) 0.0101*** (0.000) 0.0124 * (0.051)
R count combShok=1 -0.0209 * (0.054) 0.00754 (0.401) 0.00763 (0.705)
R count combShok=2 0.00605 (0.603) 0.00649 (0.499) -0.0313 (0.177)
R count combShok=3 0.0107 (0.446) 0.0179 (0.122) -0.0382 (0.129)
R count combShok=4 -0.00567 (0.821) 0.0425** (0.039) -0.0130 (0.747)
R count combShok=5 -0.00273 (0.964) 0.0712 (0.156) -0.0603 (0.438)
T count combShok=1 -0.0196 * (0.068) 0.0218** (0.014) 0.0121 (0.593)
T count combShok=2 -0.0262** (0.021) 0.0308*** (0.001) 0.0121 (0.583)
T count combShok=3 -0.0290** (0.032) 0.0427*** (0.000) -0.0216 (0.528)
T count combShok=4 -0.0234 (0.276) 0.0727*** (0.000) -0.00685 (0.885)
T count combShok=5 -0.0430 (0.353) 0.0975** (0.011) 0.0104 (0.733)
L.any prio 0.340*** (0.000)
L2.any prio 0.0887 * (0.058)
GR gdp c con -0.0811 (0.199)
food index -0.134* (0.013)
FE and time effects yes yes yes
Constant 0.0133 (0.935) -0.467*** (0.001) 0.502*** (0.000)
Observations 1685 1685 1685
Adj R-squared 0.13 0.85
F 2.951 72.76
AIC -1794.843 -2447.083 -4632.839
p-values in parentheses




This thesis analysed linkages between climate change, economic development and
the incidence of civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North
Africa from 1981 to 2015. In fact, it is essential to provide empirical evidence to
which extent extreme climate events placed a significant burden on the economic
development that contributed to conflict. Thereby, it is possible to estimate the po-
tential to reduce the probability of civil conflict by identifying proper policy options
(e.g. climate-smart agricultural policies).
We draw conclusions based on the analysis of state-of-the-art econometric tech-
niques to deal with endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and dynamics using new
cross-country panel data for the period 1981-2015.
In Chapter 2, we estimate the direct and indirect impact of climate on the proba-
bility of civil conflict for sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa
from 1981 to 2015. We conclude that: First, weather variables are good instruments
not only for economic growth rate but also for domestic food production. Quan-
titatively, 1 pp change in temperature growth reduces 0.31 pp of economic growth
rate and 0.227 pp of food production index. According to the estimated impact of
temperature growth on economic growth rate, some countries that currently have
annual income growth of 1 to 1.4%, within 32 years, will not be able to achieve
any income growth due to temperature changes. Positive rainfall shows a significant
positive impact on both economic indicators in this sample of countries and time.
However, quantitatively the estimated effect of increased temperature is much higher
than rainfall impact on economic performance. Second, the significant impact of
positive economic growth rate and stable food index is confirmed in reducing the
incidence of civil conflict. A 10% reduction in economic growth or domestic food
production leads to 1.2% and 1.59% increase in the probability of civil conflict, re-
spectively. Third, temperature and rainfall directly affect the likelihood of civil
conflict, where a 1 pp change in temperature growth and rainfall growth variables
induce a significant increase of 0.39 pp and a decrease of 0.20 pp in the likelihood of
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civil conflict, respectively. Rainfall growth has a direct significant impact on reduc-
ing the likelihood of civil conflict, this finding is robust to the inclusion of several
model specifications. However, the estimated impact of rainfall varies depending
on whether a country normally receives low or high annual precipitation. Fourth,
ignoring the inclusion of the lagged dependent variables leads to overestimating the
marginal effects (when applying IV 2SLS). Moreover, having a conflict this year
increases the risk of next year’s conflict, and therefore, including the impact of the
previous conflict, which is allowed by the GMM estimator, is essential for estimates
of conflict relationships. We conclude that, the level of democracy of a political
system (Polity IV) and good governance are important control variables.
Applying our model to the case of Syria, we conclude that: (i) The predicted con-
tribution of the low economic growth rate in Syria during the war years to raising
the probability of war ranges from 3-7 pp compared to 2006 (pre-war period). The
reduction in economic growth rate explains only 0.08 pp of the probability of civil
war in the outbreak-year (2011) and 0.25 pp in 2010. (ii) The food production in-
dex explains 0.61 pp of the probability of war in the outbreak-year and 2.34 pp in
the previous year. The impact of food production on the probability of war has
increased over time, it seems to be greater when war gets intensive compared to the
impact of economic growth rate. (iii) The contribution of the direct effect of climate
variables in explaining the probability of war is noticeable through the decrease in
precipitation in the pre-war period. (iv) Lagged conflicts in Syria explain up to 45
pp of the probability of civil war. Overall, the total estimated probability of civil
war in Syria by all explanatory variables together in the year 2010 is 6.57 pp higher
than in 2011 (outbreak year, 0.13 pp). One can conclude that 2010 was crucial year
which raised the probability of civil war in Syria. Quantitatively, climate has con-
tributed significantly to explain around 30% of the reduced economic growth rate
and 85% of the reduced food index in 2010. Accordingly, policies that are able to
increase food security as well as global aid to accelerate economic development, have
the potential to reduce the risk of conflict.
We quantitatively assess policies that can reduce the probability of war and avoid
new conflicts, based on simulation analysis. For instance, during wartime in 2012
Syria had a negative income growth rate, assuming that through global aid it would
have been possible to invest an amount of money equal to 10% of the GDP in the
base year (2011, outbreak-year) as transfers, then this would lead to add a certain
amount of money (10% of GDP in base year, 2011). For the same amount of money
(10% of GDP in base year) invested in increased food production, it would add
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around a 5% on food production of 2012, in addition to the increase that occurs
in the following year’s production like technical progress from the investment in
food production, this effect depends on the share of the agricultural sector in GDP
(the smaller the size of the agricultural sector, the greater the impact). Moreover,
investment in enhancing food production has an indirect effect of a 3% increase
on GDP. Therefore, proper food policies that enhance food security seem to play
a more affordable role towards peace. The findings of this study are relevant to
other countries in the region that face comparable environmental challenges and can
inform policies for mitigating and alleviating future conflicts.
In Chapter 3, the main finding of Miguel et al. (2004) that income growth is strongly
related to the incidence of civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa during the period 1981
to 1999, is revisited using our new data set. We find that: first, there is a positive
relationship between rainfall and economic growth rate although insignificant. This
relationship is robust to the inclusion of temperature growth effect in the regression,
which shows expectedly a negative sign on the economic growth rate. Second, the
relationship between economic growth rate and the likelihood of civil conflict reveals
same negative signs on the coefficients at least in one of the presented models. Third,
for the link between rainfall and civil conflict incidence in SSA using our setup of
data compared to the data of Miguel et al. (2004), we find consistent negative
significant coefficients applying the LS and GMM. Fourth, the impact of adverse
conflict on the current conflict is positive with both data sets but not consistent
in the significance. We confirm the finding of Miguel et al. (2004) that there is a
negative relationship between economic growth and conflict. However, this finding
is not perfectly robust and appears to be sensitive to changes in data sources that
use different methods of making the data available, although we find partly the
same patterns between weather and economic growth rate, and between the income
growth and the likelihood of civil conflict for SSA period 1981– 1999.
In Chapter 4, mechanisms of climate change impacts on the incidence of civil conflict
are tested separately in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) compared to the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) for the period 1981 to 2015. We conclude that: First,
the long-known relationship between weather conditions and economic growth rate,
which is significantly positive with precipitation and negative with temperature, has
been confirmed in the MENA region. However, in sub-Saharan Africa, the effects
of climate (the negative effect of temperature growth) are observed on the food
production index, not on economic growth rate. Second, beyond economic growth
rate climate variability also impacts civil war via domestic food production. Both
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indicators, food production index in MENA and economic growth rate in SSA, are
significant indicators for social stability reducing the risk of civil conflict. Third,
There is a positive effect of political stability on the economic growth rate in both
regions, and the quality of governance (accountability) and freshwater withdrawal
reduce civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA region, respectively.
Overall, in the given estimation, there appears to be evidence of different mechanisms
in different regions. However, the identification of stable mechanisms needs to be
precisely addressed in future work.
In Chapter 5, we estimate the impact of different thresholds of climate shocks on the
probability of civil conflict for sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North
Africa from 1981 to 2015. We conclude that: (1) Rainfall and temperature shocks
are statistically significant but quantitatively show smaller effects relative to growth
effect of climate variables. The marginal impact of climate shocks on economic
indicators and civil conflicts does not exceed 0.05 pp. Overall, the main effect of
climate comes from the temperature growth effects and it is not extreme shocks that
drive economic declines, which indicates that the climate rather operates in a non-
linear process. (2) The pattern we find as well in other parts of this research remains,
that temperature growth contributes to climate impacts more than rainfall impacts
on economic development. Moreover, we find a direct impact of rainfall growth on
the reduction of the probability of civil conflict, in addition to the established links
between economic development, domestic food production and the incidence of civil
conflict. Freshwater withdrawal, the level of democracy, performance of government,
all contribute to reducing the potential for conflict.
This thesis analyses the linkages between climate change, economic development,
and civil conflicts for a sample of African countries and the Middle East and North
Africa. Thereby, I contribute to current research by providing new cross-country
panel data, applying an econometric “state-of-the-art” approach to deal with the
endogeneity, the unobserved heterogeneity, and dynamics. However, this approach
results in some limitations, like the measurement problem of climate change and
econometric identification. Furthermore, it is limited to identify causal relationships.
Therefore, future approaches need to address the reverse causation, for example by
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Data set and variable description
Preface
In order to estimate the impact of climate and induced economic shocks, social
fragmentation, and political status on the incidence of civil conflict in country i year
t, we use new cross-section panel data collected from various recognized sources
providing consistently updated time series, for African and Middle East countries
(total 59) from 1981 to 2015. We relied only on one source to cover all observations
for one variable. However, some variables, especially those related to development
indicators, suffer from missing for some cross-sections, but however, in the end, we
choose the source that contains fewer missing and we use a technique that deals with
missing values (replaced missing values by the mean value of each variable in each
country).




The three letter codes (ISO alpha-3) are internationally recognized codes that
designate every country, from United Nation ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 1.
 country name
Country name: Almost all sub-Saharan Africa countries are the same as in the
study of Miguel et al. (2004)2.
 ccode
The numeric country codes; for countries that match the MSS-sample, we keep
the same codes, for the rest countries of our sample, three numeric codes were
also randomly assigned. This variable is used only to facilitate data binding,
not more.
1Total sample observations are 2029, Namibia starts from 1990 after independence.
2Note: MSS indicated that Eritrea and Equatorial Guinea were dropped from the analysis due
to lack of data, and For Djibouti, Liberia, and Somalia, GDP data are missing since 1992. For
Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, GDP data are missing for 1999. Namibia became
independent in 1990. Although the sources of our data provides a complete time series but we
present and include same number of observations as by MSS in the estimations, to be comparable.
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 year
From 1981 to 2015. Only Namibia starts in 1990, after independence.
A.2 Civil conflict data and derivation of variables
We use for conflict variables the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, a conflict
version 18.1. ((Themnér et al., 2018)), developed by the Uppsala Conflict Data
Program (UCDP) at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala Uni-
versity in Sweden and the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO).3
An armed conflict is defined by the PRIO/Uppsala as a contested incompatibility
that concerns government and/or territory over which the use of armed force be-
tween two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, has resulted
in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.
We focus on civil wars, in the PRIO/Uppsala conflict data four types of conflict are
classified (type 1, 2, 3, and 4), type3 and type4 cover civil conflicts without and
with intervention from other states on one or both sides4, respectively.
The values that each of type3 and type4 of a civil conflict can take are as follows:
TYPE3:
This type of conflict is the PRIO/Uppsala’s indicator of Internal Conflict. It can
take on four distinct values: 0: No Internal Conflict, 1: Internal Minor Armed Con-
flict, 2: Internal Intermediate Armed Conflict, 3: Internal War.
TYPE4:
Whereas this type of conflict is the PRIO/Uppsala’s indicator of Internationalized
Internal Conflict. It can take on four distinct values: 0: No Internationalized Inter-
nal Conflict, 1:Internationalized Internal Minor Armed Conflict, 2:Internationalized
Internal Intermediate Armed Conflict, 3:Internationalized Internal War.5
While the intensity level of a conflict in a given year distinguishes minor armed
conflicts from wars based on the battle-related deaths:6
1. Minor: between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year.
2. War: at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year.
3The UCDP/PRIO armed conflict for download http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/.
4Side A, is always the government side in intrastate conflicts; side B, is the country or opposition
organization(s) (The PRIO/Uppsala conflict data, 18.1. 2017).
5This is very well documented in the mss manual as well, p.16 (MSS data set, 2004), the source
is the PRIO/Uppsala conflict data.
6UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, version 4 2009, updated by: Harbom et al.
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Conflict variables and derived
We construct three dependent conflict variables (any conflict, minor, and war), all
country-year observations are coded as ones based on the type (3 and 4) and the
intensity level of the PRIO/Uppsala conflict data as follows:
1. war prio: War equals 1 when the type of conflict in year t is 3 or 4 and has
an intensity level of 2 (at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year).
war prio lag 1: Lagged one year.
war prio lag 2: Lagged two years.
2. minor prio: Minor conflict equals 1 when the type of conflict in year t is 3
or 4 and has an intensity level of 1 (at least 25 battle-related deaths per year
and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict).
minor prio lag 1: Minor conflict lagged one year.
minor prio lag 2: Minor conflict lagged two years.
3. any prio: Any conflict equals 1 when minor conflict or war equals 1. Other-
wise, are coded as zeros.
any prio lag 1: Any conflict lagged one year.
any prio lag 2: Any conflict lagged two years.
A.3 Weather variables
We employ two rainfall data sets:
1. The historical climate data provided at World Bank Climate Change Knowl-
edge Portal (2018).
We observe changes in rainfall variable from the previous year following (Miguel
et al., 2004): gr rainfall = rainfall−rainfall lag1
rainfall lag1
For the climate (precipitation) measurement strategy in this thesis, we have included
and generated the following variables:
A.3.1 Rainfall variables and derived
 rainfall: The annual rainfall (millimeter) is computed by adding up all of the
monthly observations in a given year.
 rainfall lag 1: Lagged one year.
 rainfall lag 2: Lagged two years.
 gr rainfall: Growth in rainfall: (rainfall - rainfall lag1)/(rainfall lag1).
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 gr rainfall lag 1: Growth rainfall lagged one year:
(rainfall lag 1- rainfall lag 2)/(rainfall lag 2).
 log rainfall: Log of rainfall levels.
 log rainfall lag 1: Lagged one year.
 log rainfall lag 2: Lagged two years.
In order to examine some interaction effects (rainfall) following variables have
been generated:
 dummy gr rain neg: Equals 1 if a change in rainfall variable in country i
year t from the previous year is less than zero (1 if gr rainfall < 0), otherwise
zeros.
 dummy gr rain pos: Equals 1 if a change in rainfall variable in country
i year t from the previous year is greater than zero (1 if gr rainfall > 0),
otherwise zeros.
 dummy rain pos: Equals 1 if rainfall level in country i year t is greater than
the mean of rainfall level variable of the sample (1 if rainfall > 57.98657).
 dummy rain neg: Equals 1 if the value of rainfall level in country i year t is
less than the mean of rainfall levels in the sample (1 if rainfall < 57.98657).
 inter pos pos: Interaction effect between measures of positive growth rainfall
and positive rainfall levels; (dummy gr rain pos ∗ dummy rain pos).
 inter pos neg: Interaction effect between measures of positive growth rainfall
and negative rainfall levels; (dummy gr rain pos ∗ dummy rain neg).
 inter neg pos: Interaction effect between measures of negative growth rain-
fall and positive rainfall levels; (dummy gr rain neg ∗ dummy rain pos).
 inter neg neg: Interaction effect between measures of negative growth rain-
fall and negative rainfall levels; (dummy gr rain neg ∗ dummy rain neg).
Moreover, several variables are generated to consider the effect of precipita-
tion depending on where it falls, and thus, we determined whether our sample
countries had historically low or high precipitation rates compared to the av-
erage precipitation in Europe. (Germany took specifically: 727 mm) to build
interaction effects as follows.
 low rainfall countr: Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the annual rainfall
levels of a country is lower than 727 mm, otherwise zero.
 high rainfall countr: Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the annual rainfall
levels of a country is higher than 727 mm, otherwise zero.
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 inter L gr rainfall: Interaction effect between the dummy variable
”low rainfall countr” and measures of rainfall growth ”gr rainfall” in country
(i) time (t).
 inter h gr rainfall: Interaction effect between the dummy variable
”high rainfall countr” and measures of rainfall growth ”gr rainfall” in country
(i) time (t).
 inter l rainfall: Interaction effect between the dummy variable
”low rainfall countr” and measures of rainfall levels ”rainfall” in country (i)
time (t).
 inter h rainfall: Interaction effect between the dummy variable
”high rainfall countr” and measures of rainfall levels ”rainfall” in country (i)
time (t).
2. The Global Precipitation Climatology Project (GPCP) database ver-
sion 2.3 of monthly rainfall estimates, at 2.5 latitude and longitude degree intervals
and cover the period 1979- 2015 (Adler et al., 2016). The GPCP data rely on a com-
bination of actual weather station rainfall gauge measures and satellite information
on the density of cold cloud cover, which is closely related to actual precipitation.
The units of measurement are in millimeters of rainfall per day and are the average.
The GPCP uses the Huffman (1997) method of data selection and merging, and
how estimates of total yearly rainfall at the country-level have been produced see
the Data set of MSS (2004), and for the calculation of total yearly rainfall/country
measures from recently provided version 2.3 by GPCP, we determined grid nodes
that fell within the national boundaries for our sample countries, otherwise, we as-
signed rainfall measures from the nearest nodes to their borders. For sub-Saharan
Africa’ countries, we used same nodes that were defined by MSS-2004 for rainfall
data (A List of all nodes used in the calculation of rainfall data from the GPCP-V2.3,
in Appendix B).
Derived variables for this data source are as follows
 gpcp neu: Total yearly rainfall for country (i) is the average of the yearly
rainfall estimates in millimeters on a resolution of 2.5° latitude/longitude de-
gree nodes in the given country.
 lag gpcp neu: Lagged one year, with 0 for start of country series.
 gr gpcp neu: Growth in gpcp neu: (gpcp neu - lag gpcp neu)/(lag gpcp neu),
with 0 for start of country series.
A.3.2 Temperatures variables
 temp: The annual temperatures (Celsius degree) are computed by adding
up all of the monthly observations in a given year divided by the number of
months in that year.
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 temp lag 1: Temperature lagged one year.
 temp lag 2: Temperature lagged two years.
 gr temp: Growth in temperature from the previous year:
(temp - temp lag 1)/(temp lag 1).
 gr temp lag 1: Growth temperature lagged one year:
(temp lag 1 - temp lag 2)/ (temp lag 2).
A.3.3 Climate Shocks
First, rainfall and temperature deviation variables are constructed using the follow-
ing formula: dev.Xit = (Xi, t− X̄i)/σi
where Xi, t is the annual rainfall or temperature in country i time t, and X̄i denotes
to the long-term mean (35 years) for each country, and σi is the standard deviation
for each country long-term (35 years) mean. The normalized annual temperature
data ranges between -3.03, 3.18 deviation, has a mean of 0.03 and standard deviation
of 0.98. While normalized annual rainfall data ranges from -2.69, 3.76 has a mean
of almost zero and standard deviation of 0.99.
The defined climate derivation variables in the data set are as follows:
 dev rain Annual rainfall deviation in a given country and year. dev rain =
(rainfall - rain avg)/rain sd
 dev temp Annual temperature deviation in a given country and year. dev temp
= (temp - temp avg)/temp sd
In order to define if deviation in climate variables are positive or negative, we have
generated dummies determining different thresholds (1 and 2) as follows:
 Rainfall deviation thresholds: takes four values; rain dev Threshold = 1 if
dev rain is > than 1,
2 if dev rain > 2,
3 if dev rain < -1,
4 if dev rain < -2, otherwise zero.
 Temperature deviation thresholds: takes four values; temp dev Threshold =
1 if dev temp is > than 1,
2 if dev temp > 2,
3 if dev temp < -1,
4 if dev temp < -2, otherwise zero.
Second, counting observed shocks (positive or negative) over previous 5-year period,
to better understand the dynamics of shock thresholds
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 R pos thresholds: Rainfall positive thresholds = (rain dev Threshold= 1 |
rain dev Threshold= 2)
 R neg thresholds: Rainfall negative thresholds = (rain dev Threshold= 3 |
rain dev Threshold= 4)
 count R pos shock2Y: The number of observed positive rainfall shocks
= (l2.R pos thresholds + l.R pos thresholds)/2
 count R neg shock2Y: The number of observed negative rainfall shocks
= (l2.R neg thresholds + l.R neg thresholds)/2
 T pos thresholds: Temperature positive thresholds
= (temp dev Threshold= 1 | temp dev Threshold= 2)
 T neg thresholds: Temperature negative thresholds
= (temp dev Threshold= 3 | temp dev Threshold= 4)
 count T pos shock2Y: The number of observed positive Temperature shocks
= (l2.T pos thresholds + l.T pos thresholds)/2
 count T neg shock2Y: The number of observed negative Temperature shocks
= (l2.T neg thresholds + l.T neg thresholds)/2
Third, to estimate the absolute impact of (combined) shocks over previous 5 years
period on the interest variables in time t, without differentiating between positive
and negative shocks, we have generated fallowing variables:
 R count combShok=1: Indicates the number of observed rainfall shocks (ex-
perienced 1 year shock) over previous five years period.
 R count combShok=2: Indicates the number of observed rainfall shocks (2
shocks) over previous five years period.
 R count combShok=3: Indicates the number of observed rainfall shocks (3
shocks) over previous five years period.
 R count combShok=4: Indicates the number of observed rainfall shocks (4
shock shocks) over previous five years period.
 R count combShok=5: Indicates the number of observed rainfall shocks (5
shocks). It was exposed to climatic shocks in 5 consecutive years period.
 R count combShok=1: Indicates the number of observed rainfall shocks (ex-
perienced 1 year shock) over previous five years period.
 T count combShok=2: Indicates the number of observed temperature shocks
(2 shocks) over previous five years period.
 T count combShok=3: Indicates the number of observed temperature shocks
(3 shocks) over previous five years period.
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 T count combShok=4: Indicates the number of observed temperature shocks
(4 shocks) over previous five years period.
 T count combShok=5: Indicates the number of observed temperature shocks
(5 shocks) over previous five years period.
Finally, moving average measurement that smoothes a data series by consolidating
the yearly data points into a longer period of time, which is a mean of five years
from t to t − 4. Odusola and Abidoye (2015) has examined the impact of moving
averages of climate variables and economic growth rate in Africa:
 MA rainfall: smoothed average of rainfall variable in country i year t based
on averages of the previous five years, including the given current year.
 MA gr rainfall: smoothed average of growth rainfall in country i year t
based on averages of t to t− 4 five years.
 MA temp: smoothed average of annual temperature in country i year t based
on averages of the previous five years, including the given current year (t to
t− 4).
 MA gr temp: smoothed average of annual temperature averages in country i
year t based on averages of the previous five years, including the given current
year (t to t− 4).
A.4 Socio-Economic variables
A.4.1 Gross Domestic Product per capita
For the major economic variable GDP per capita, i.e. the total amount of goods and
services produced in the economy, divided by its population, there is no complete
time series for our sample (59 countries) from 1980 to 2015 such as the World De-
velopment Indicators source. However, we have estimated with data on this variable
from two different sources; (i) James et al. (2012) has developed a comprehensive
time series of GDP per capita for 210 countries from 1950 to 2015, which covers the
time period and countries exist in our study. In their time series GDP per capita
estimates expressed in either constant US dollar terms or international dollar terms
(corrected for purchasing power parity) from seven sources to derive in the end two
new GDP per capita series (the base year 2005).
(i) From James et al. (2012) study, we include GDP per capita indicator (In inter-
national (ID) and constant (USD) dollar), its derived variables as follows:
 gdp c id: GDP per capita in international dollar terms (ID).
 gdp c id lag 1: GDP per capita (ID) lagged one year.
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 gdp c id lag 2: GDP per capita (ID) lagged two years.
 gr gdp c id: To observe changes in GDP per capita (ID) from the previous
year: (gdp c id - gdp c id lag 1)/ (gdp c id lag 1).
 gr gdp c id lag 1: GDP growth (ID) lagged one year: (gdp c id lag 1 -
gdp c id lag 2)/ (gdp c id lag 2).
...................................................
 gdp c usd: GDP per capita in constant US dollar terms (USD).
 gdp c usd lag 1: GDP per capita (USD) lagged one year.
 gdp c usd lag 2: GDP per capita (USD) lagged two years.
 gr gdp c usd: To observe changes in GDP per capita (USD) from the previ-
ous year: (gdp c usd - gdp c usd lag 1)/ (gdp c usd lag 1).
 gr gdp c usd lag 1: GDP growth (USD) lagged one year: (gdp c usd lag lag 1
- gdp c usd lag 2)/ (gdp c usd lag 2).
 basis gdp id 1981: GDP per capita in international dollar terms at the be-
ginning of period analysis, 1981 (1991 for Namibia).
 basis gdp usd 1981: GDP per capita in constant US dollar terms at the
beginning of period analysis, 1981 (1991 for Namibia).
(ii) The second source is the database of UNSD (2020), which provides a complete
and consistent set of GDP per capita time series from 1970 onwards, from the main
National Accounts aggregates of all UN Members States and other territories in
the world for which National Accounts information is available, GDP per capita es-
timates expressed either in current or constant price-US dollar: http://data.un.org./
Derived variables are as follows
 gdp c cur: GDP per capita estimates expressed in current price-US dollars.
 gdp c cur lag 1: GDP per capita estimates expressed in current price-US
dollars lagged one year.
 gdp c cur lag 2: GDP per capita estimates expressed in current price-US
dollars lagged two years.
 gr gdp c cur: Changes in GDP per capita estimates expressed in current
price-US dollars from previous year:
(gdp c cur - gdp c cur lag 1) / (gdp c cur lag 1).
 gr gdp c cur lag 1: GDP growth in current price-US dollars lagged one
year:(gdp c cur lag 1 - gdp c cur lag 2)/ gdp c cur lag 2).
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 gdp c con: GDP per capita estimates in constant price-US dollars.
 gdp c con lag 1: GDP per capita estimates in constant price-US dollars
lagged one year.
 gdp c con lag 2: GDP per capita estimates in constant price-US dollars
lagged two years.
 gr gdp c con: Changes in GDP per capita estimates expressed in constant
price-US dollars from previous year:
(gdp c con - gdp c con lag 1)/ (gdp c con lag 1).
 gr gdp c con lag 1: GDP growth estimates in constant price-US dollars
lagged one year: (gdp c con lag 1 - gdp c con lag 2)/ (gdp c con lag 2).
A.4.2 Food production index variable
food index: The aggregate volume of agricultural production for each year com-
pared to the base period 2004-2006, covers food crops that are considered edible and
that contain nutrients. Coffee and tea are excluded because, although edible, they
have no nutritive value, from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (2016).
A.4.3 Oil exporter status variables
 oil exp wdi: Oil exporter status (% of merchandise exports) using time series
cover our sample countries from the World Bank (2016).
 oil exp wdi lag 1: Oil exporter status lagged one year.
 oil exp wdi lag 2: Oil exporter status lagged two years.
 gr oil exp wdi: Changes in oil exporter status from the previous year:
(oil exp wdi - oil exp wdi lag 1)/ (oil exp wdi lag 1).
 gr oil exp wdi lag 1: Growth of oil exporter lagged one year:
(oil exp wdi lag 1 - oil exp wdi lag 2)/ (oil exp wdi lag 2).
A.4.4 Total merchandise trade variable
 trade exports: Total merchandise trade of a country exports to the world
in US dollar at current prices using time series from the The World Trade
Organization (2016).
 trade exports lag 1: Total merchandise trade of a country exports to the
world in US dollar at current prices lagged one year.
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 trade exports lag 2: Total merchandise trade of a country exports to the
world in US dollar at current prices lagged two years.
 gr trade exports: Changes in total merchandise trade of a country exports
to the world in US dollar at current price from previous year: (trade exports
- trade exports lag 1)/ (trade exports lag 1).
 gr trade exports lag 1: Growth in total merchandise trade lagged one year:
(trade exports lag 1- trade exports lag 2)/ (trade exports lag 2).
A.4.5 Demographic indicators
Population
 population sh: Total indicator in thousands counts all residents regardless
of legal status or citizenship. The source of this data is the World Bank
(2018).
 population sh lag 1: Total population lagged one year.
 population sh lag 2: Total population lagged two years.
 Urban pop: Expressed as a percentage of the total population.
Education and unemployment
 educ attainment: The percentage of educational attainment at least com-
pleted primary (ISCED 1 or higher), population > 25 years for both sexes,
from UNESCO Institute for Statitistics (2008).7
 unempl inter edu: Unemployment with intermediate education (% of total
labour force with basic education) from World Bank (2016)
A.4.6 Fractionalization variables
For measuring ethnic and religious fractionalization, we use fractionalization’s in-





km, where Skm is the share of group k in country m.
 ethnic sh: For the ethnic variable data on various ethnic groups that were
disaggregated, combined from several sources, however, the primary source
is Encyclopaedia Britannica (2001), in addition to the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA, 2000; Levinson, 1998), and the Minority Rights Groups Inter-
national (Thornberry et al., 1997).
7The UNESCO Institute for Statistics. http://data.uis.unesco.org/
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 ethnic sh lag 1: Ethnic data lagged one year.
 ethnic sh lag 2: Ethnic data lagged two years.
 religion sh: Religious data is based exclusively on data from Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 2001.
 religion sh lag 1: Religious data lagged one year.
 religion sh lag 2: Religious data lagged two years.
A.4.7 Political variables
 polityiv sh: Type of political regime for each country on a range from -10
(full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy). Regimes that fall into the middle of
this spectrum are called anocracies. The source is the project of Roser (2019),
based on Polity IV Project (2013) and Wimmer and Min (2006).
 polityiv sh tr: We transformed Polity IV scores (polityiv sh) to be instead
on a range from 1 to 20, for easier interpretation of coefficients.
 polityiv sh tr lag 1: Transformed Polity IV scores (polityiv sh tr) (range
from 1 to 20) lagged one year.
 polityiv sh tr lag 1: Transformed Polity IV scores (polityiv sh tr) (range
from 1 to 20) lagged two years.
 strength gr polityiv: We constructed this variable to observe the abso-
lute strength of the political crisis in a given country and year compared to
the previous year. It indicates changes from the previous year in absolute
terms of Polity IV scores either toward democracy or backward to autocracy.
strength gr polityiv=|polityiv sh tr -polityiv sh tr lag 1 |
A.4.8 Voice and Accountability indicator
 accountab: Percentile rank among all countries (ranges from 0=lowest to
100 =highest rank), reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country’s
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well freedom
of expression, association, and a free media. The source is World Bank (2014)
covering time from 1960 to present.
A.5 Natural conditions:
 agri land: Agricultural land (% of land area) refers to the share of land
area that is arable as defined by the FAO, under permanent crops, and under
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permanent pastures. Land abandoned as a result of shifting cultivation is
excluded. The source is World Bank (2016).
 arable land: Arable land (hectares per person).
 mountains sh and log mountains sh: the proportion of mountainous ter-
rain and its logarithmic value. We kept most mountainous terrain data of
Miguel et al. (2004), but we complete our new data base (i.e. the rest of coun-
tries and years) by data of Fearon and Laitin (2003), who formed their data
with respect to the geographer Gerrard (2014).
 area.km2: The total area of a country in km2.
 Latitude: GeoDist provides useful data incorporates country-specific geo-
graphical variables, including geographical coordinates of their capital cities
(CEPII, 2020).
We have included information of the water use variable from FAO (2017), which
is classified into sub-variables (i) pressure on water resources for following sub-sub-
variables:
 freshwater: Freshwater withdrawal (MDG 7.5.) as % of total renewable water
resources.
 agri renew: Agricultural water withdrawal as % of total renewable water
resources (%).
 water stress: Aggregated indicator (SDG 6.4.2.) freshwater withdrawal as a
proportion of available freshwater resources. This indicator is also known as
water withdrawal intensity.
 wasser total: Annual level of freshwater withdrawal, calculated averagely
over each decade (roundly 1980-1989, 1990-1999, 2000-2017), in 109 m3/year.
 water 1km2: The average annual level of freshwater withdrawal (calculated
averagely over each decade) divided by country area
water 1km2= 106 x wasser total/area.km2, in 103 m3/km2.
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Longitude and latitude points for
rainfall data-GPCP V2.3
Longitude and latitude points used in the calculation of the GPCP’ data
version 2.3 yearly rainfall estimates. For sub-Saharan Africa’ sample we
used same points presented by Miguel et al. (2004).1
Country Node Latitude Point Longitude Point
1.Angola 1 -16.25 S 13.75 E
2 -13.75 S 13.75 E
3 -8.75 S 13.75 E
4 -6.25 S 13.75 E
5 -16.25 S 16.25 E
6 -13.75 S 16.25 E
7 -11.25 S 16.25 E
8 -8.75 S 16.25 E
9 -6.25 S 16.25 E
10 -16.25 S 18.75 E
11 -13.75 S 18.75 E
12 -11.25 S 18.75 E
13 -8.75 S 18.75 E
14 -16.25 S 21.25 E
15 -13.75 S 21.25 E
16 -11.25 S 21.25 E
17 -8.75 S 21.25 E
18 -11.25 S 23.75 E
2.Benin 1 11.25 N 1.25 E
3.Botswana 1 -26.25 S 21.25 E
2 -23.75 S 21.25 E
3 -21.25 S 21.25 E
4 -18.75 S 21.25 E
5 -23.75 S 23.75 E
6 -21.25 S 23.75 E
1For SSA’ sample, it is mentioned by MSS (2004): No degree grid node fell within the na-
tional boundaries for five small African countries— Burundi, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau,
and Rwanda—so in these cases they assigned rainfall measures from the node nearest to their bor-
ders. We do so for MENA’ sample, countries where no degree grid node fell within their boundaries
are: Lebanon, Bahrain, Kuwait, Israel, and Qatar
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7 -18.75 S 23.75 E
8 -23.75 S 26.25 E
9 -21.25 S 26.25 E
4.Burkina Faso 1 11.25 N 3.75 W
2 11.25 N 1.25 W
3 13.75 N 1.25 W
5.Burundi 1 -3.75 S 28.75 E
2 -3.75 S 31.25 E
6. Cameroon 1 3.75 N 11.25 E
2 6.25 N 11.25 E
3 3.75 N 13.75 E
4 6.25 N 13.75 E
5 8.75 N 13.75 E
7.Central African Republic 1 3.75 N 16.25 E
2 6.25 N 16.25 E
3 6.25 N 18.75 E
4 6.25 N 21.25 E
5 8.75 N 21.25 E
6 6.25 N 23.75 E
7 6.25 N 26.25 E
8.Chad 1 13.75 N 13.75 E
2 8.75 N 16.25 E
3 11.25 N 16.25 E
4 13.75 N 16.25 E
5 16.25 N 16.25 E
6 18.75 N 16.25 E
7 21.25 N 16.25 E
8 8.75 N 18.75 E
9 11.25 N 18.75 E
10 13.75 N 18.75 E
11 16.25 N 18.75 E
12 18.75 N 18.75 E
13 21.25 N 18.75 E
14 11.25 N 21.25 E
15 13.75 N 21.25 E
16 16.25 N 21.25 E
17 18.75 N 21.25 E
18 16.25 N 23.75 E
19 18.75 N 23.75 E
9.Congo, Brazzaville 1 -3.75 S 11.25 E
2 -3.75 S 13.75 E
3 -1.25 S 16.25 E
4 1.25 N 16.25 E
10.Congo, Kinshasa 1 -3.75 S 16.25 E
2 -6.25 S 18.75 E
3 -3.75 S 18.75 E
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4 -1.25 S 18.75 E
5 1.25 N 18.75 E
6 3.75 N 18.75 E
7 -6.25 S 21.25 E
8 -3.75 S 21.25 E
9 -1.25 S 21.25 E
10 1.25 N 21.25 E
11 3.75 N 21.25 E
12 -8.75 S 23.75 E
13 -6.25 S 23.75 E
14 -3.75 S 23.75 E
15 -1.25 S 23.75 E
16 1.25 N 23.75 E
17 3.75 N 23.75 E
18 -11.25 S 26.25 E
19 -8.75 S 26.25 E
20 -6.25 S 26.25 E
21 -3.75 S 26.25 E
22 -1.25 S 26.25 E
23 1.25 N 26.25 E
24 3.75 N 26.25 E
25 -8.75 S 28.75 E
26 -6.25 S 28.75 E
10.Congo, Kinshasa (cont 27 -3.75 S 28.75 E
28 -1.25 S 28.75 E
29 1.25 N 28.75 E
30 3.75 N 28.75 E
11.Cote d’Ivoire 1 6.25 N 6.25 W
2 8.75 N 6.25 W
3 6.25 N 3.75 W
4 8.75 N 3.75 W
12.Djibouti 1 11.25 N 41.25 E
2 11.25 N 43.75 E
13.Equatorial Guinea 1 3.75 N 8.75 E
2 1.25 N 11.25 E
14.Eritrea 1 16.25 N 38.75 E
2 13.75 N 41.25 E
15.Ethiopia, post 1993 1 6.25 N 36.25 E
2 8.75 N 36.25 E
3 11.25 N 36.25 E
4 3.75 N 38.75 E
5 6.25 N 38.75 E
6 8.75 N 38.75 E
7 11.25 N 38.75 E
8 13.75 N 38.75 E
9 6.25 N 41.25 E
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10 8.75 N 41.25 E
11 11.25 N 41.25 E
12 6.25 N 43.75 E
13 8.75 N 43.75 E
15. Ethiopia, pre 1993 1 16.25 N 38.75 E
2 13.75 N 41.25 E
3 6.25 N 36.25 E
4 8.75 N 36.25 E
5 11.25 N 36.25 E
6 3.75 N 38.75 E
7 6.25 N 38.75 E
8 8.75 N 38.75 E
9 11.25 N 38.75 E
10 13.75 N 38.75 E
11 6.25 N 41.25 E
12 8.75 N 41.25 E
13 11.25 N 41.25 E
14 6.25 N 43.75 E
15 8.75 N 43.75 E
16.Gabon 1 -1.25 S 11.25 E
2 -1.25 S 13.75 E
3 1.25 N 13.75 E
17.Gambia 1 13.75 N 16.25 W
2 13.75 N 13.75 W
18. Ghana 1 6.25 N 1.25 W
2 8.75 N 1.25 W
19. Guinea 1 11.25 N 13.75 W
2 11.25 N 11.25 W
3 8.75 N 8.75 W
4 11.25 N 8.75 W
20. Guinea-Bissau 1 11.25 N 16.25 W
21. Kenya 1 -1.25 S 36.25 E
2 1.25 N 36.25 E
3 3.75 N 36.25 E
4 -3.75 S 38.75 E
5 -1.25 S 38.75 E
6 1.25 N 38.75 E
7 -1.25 S 41.25 E
8 3.75 N 41.25 E
22.Lesotho 1 -28.75 S 28.75 E
23.Liberia 1 6.25 N 351.25 E
24.Madagascar 1 -23.75 S 43.75 E
2 -23.75 S 46.25 E
3 -21.25 S 46.25 E
4 -18.75 S 46.25 E
5 -16.25 S 46.25 E
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6 -18.75 S 48.75 E
7 -16.25 S 48.75 E
8 -13.75 S 48.75 E
25.Malawi 1 -13.75 S 33.75 E
2 -11.25 S 33.75 E
26.Mali 1 16.25 N 1.25 E
2 18.75 N 1.25 E
3 16.25 N 3.75 E
4 18.75 N 3.75 E
5 13.75 N 11.25 W
6 13.75 N 8.75 W
7 11.25 N 6.25 W
8 13.75 N 6.25 W
9 23.75 N 6.25 W
10 13.75 N 3.75 W
11 16.25 N 3.75 W
12 18.75 N 3.75 W
13 21.25 N 3.75 W
14 23.75 N 3.75 W
15 16.25 N 1.25 W
16 18.75 N 1.25 W
17 21.25 N 1.25 W
27.Mauritania 1 21.25 N 16.25 W
2 16.25 N 13.75 W
3 18.75 N 13.75 W
4 21.25 N 13.75 W
5 16.25 N 11.25 W
6 18.75 N 11.25 W
7 21.25 N 11.25 W
27.Mauritania (cont 8 N 23.7 51.25 W
9 16.25 N 8.75 W
10 18.75 N 8.75 W
11 21.25 N 8.75 W
12 23.75 N 8.75 W
13 16.25 N 6.25 W
14 18.75 N 6.25 W
15 21.25 N 6.25 W
28.Mozambique 1 -23.75 S 33.75 E
2 -21.25 S 33.75 E
3 -18.75 S 33.75 E
4 -16.25 S 33.75 E
5 -18.75 S 36.25 E
6 -16.25 S 36.25 E
7 -13.75 S 36.25 E
8 -16.25 S 38.75 E
9 -13.75 S 38.75 E
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10 -11.25 S 38.75 E
29.Namibia 1 -21.25 S 13.75 E
2 -18.75 S 13.75 E
3 -26.25 S 16.25 E
4 -23.75 S 16.25 E
5 -21.25 S 16.25 E
6 -18.75 S 16.25 E
7 -28.75 S 18.75 E
8 -26.25 S 18.75 E
9 -23.75 S 18.75 E
10 -21.25 S 18.75 E
11 -18.75 S 18.75 E
30.Niger 1 13.75 N 1.25 E
2 13.75 N 3.75 E
3 13.75 N 6.25 E
4 16.25 N 6.25 E
5 18.75 N 6.25 E
6 13.75 N 8.75 E
7 16.25 N 8.75 E
8 18.75 N 8.75 E
9 21.25 N 8.75 E
10 13.75 N 11.25 E
11 16.25 N 11.25 E
12 18.75 N 11.25 E
13 21.25 N 11.25 E
14 16.25 N 13.75 E
15 18.75 N 13.75 E
16 21.25 N 13.75 E
31.Nigeria 1 8.75 N 3.75 E
2 11.25 N 3.75 E
3 6.25 N 6.25 E
4 8.75 N 6.25 E
31.Nigeria (cont 5 11.25 N 6.25 E
6 6.25 N 8.75 E
7 8.75 N 8.75 E
8 11.25 N 8.75 E
9 8.75 N 11.25 E
10 11.25 N 11.25 E
11 11.25 N 13.75 E
32.Rwanda 1 -1.25 S 28.75 E
2 -1.25 S 31.25 E
33.Senegal 1 13.75 N 16.25 W
2 16.25 N 16.25 W
3 13.75 N 13.75 W
34.Sierra Leone 1 8.75 N 11.25 W
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35.Somalia 1 1.25 N 41.25 E
2 1.25 N 43.75 E
3 3.75 N 43.75 E
4 3.75 N 46.25 E
5 6.25 N 46.25 E
6 8.75 N 46.25 E
7 6.25 N 48.75 E
8 8.75 N 48.75 E
9 11.25 N 48.75 E
36. South Africa 1 -33.75 S 18.75 E
2 -31.25 S 18.75 E
3 -33.75 S 21.25 E
4 -31.25 S 21.25 E
5 -28.75 S 21.25 E
6 -33.75 S 23.75 E
7 -31.25 S 23.75 E
8 -28.75 S 23.75 E
9 -26.25 S 23.75 E
10 -33.75 S 26.25 E
11 -31.25 S 26.25 E
12 -28.75 S 26.25 E
13 -26.25 S 26.25 E
14 -31.25 S 28.75 E
15 -26.25 S 28.75 E
16 -23.75 S 28.75 E
17 -28.75 S 31.25 E
18 -23.75 S 31.25 E
37.Sudan 1 8.75 N 23.75 E
2 11.25 N 23.75 E
3 13.75 N 23.75 E
4 8.75 N 26.25 E
5 11.25 N 26.25 E
6 13.75 N 26.25 E
7 16.25 N 26.25 E
8 18.75 N 26.25 E
9 21.25 N 26.25 E
37.Sudan (cont 10 6.25 N 28.75 E
11 8.75 N 28.75 E
12 11.25 N 28.75 E
13 13.75 N 28.75 E
14 16.25 N 28.75 E
15 18.75 N 28.75 E
16 21.25 N 28.75 E
17 6.25 N 31.25 E
18 8.75 N 31.25 E
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19 11.25 N 31.25 E
20 13.75 N 31.25 E
21 16.25 N 31.25 E
22 18.75 N 31.25 E
23 21.25 N 31.25 E
24 6.25 N 33.75 E
25 8.75 N 33.75 E
26 11.25 N 33.75 E
27 13.75 N 33.75 E
28 16.25 N 33.75 E
29 18.75 N 33.75 E
30 21.25 N 33.75 E
31 13.75 N 36.25 E
32 16.25 N 36.25 E
33 18.75 N 36.25 E
34 21.25 N 36.25 E
38.Swaziland 1 -26.25 S 31.25 E
39.Tanzania 1 -6.25 S 31.25 E
2 -3.75 S 31.25 E
3 -1.25 S 31.25 E
4 -8.75 S 33.75 E
5 -6.25 S 33.75 E
6 -3.75 S 33.75 E
7 -1.25 S 33.75 E
8 -11.25 S 36.25 E
9 -8.75 S 36.25 E
10 -6.25 S 36.25 E
11 -3.75 S 36.25 E
12 -8.75 S 38.75 E
13 -6.25 S 38.75 E
40.Togo 1 6.25 N 1.25 E
2 8.75 N 1.25 E
41.Uganda 1 1.25 N 31.25 E
2 3.75 N 31.25 E
3 1.25 N 33.75 E
4 -1.25 S 31.25 E
6 -1.25 S 29.75 E
5 3.75 N 33.75 E
42.Zambia 1 -16.25 S 23.75 E
2 -13.75 S 23.75 E
3 -16.25 S 26.25 E
4 -13.75 S 26.25 E
42.Zambia (cont 5 -16.25 S 28.75 E
6 -13.75 S 28.75 E
7 -11.25 S 28.75 E
8 -13.75 S 31.25 E
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9 -11.25 S 31.25 E
10 -8.75 S 31.25 E
43.Zimbabwe 1 -18.75 S 26.25 E
2 -21.25 S 28.75 E
3 -18.75 S 28.75 E
4 -21.25 S 31.25 E
5 -18.75 S 31.25 E
6 -16.25 S 31.25 E
MENA’ countries
44.Tunisia 1 33.75 N 8.75 E
2 36.25 N 8.75 E
45.Morocco 1 26.25 N 8.75 W
2 26.25 N 11.25 W
3 28.75 N 8.75 W
4 31.25 N 6.25 W
5 31.25 N 8.75 W
6 33.75 N 3.75 W
7 33.75 N 6.25 W
46.Algeria 1 21.25 N 1.25 E
2 21.25 N 3.75 E
3 21.25 N 6.25 E
4 23.75 N 1.25 E
5 23.75 N 3.75 E
6 23.75 N 6.25 E
7 23.75 N 8.75 E
8 23.75 N 11.25 E
9 23.75 N 1.25 W
10 26.25 N 1.25 E
11 26.25 N 3.75 E
12 26.25 N 6.25 E
13 26.25 N 8.75 E
14 26.25 N 1.25 W
15 26.25 N 3.75 W
16 26.25 N 6.25 W
17 28.75 N 1.25 W
18 28.75 N 1.25 E
19 28.75 N 3.75 E
20 28.75 N 6.25 E
21 28.75 N 6.25 W
22 28.75 N 8.75 E
23 28.75 N 3.75 W
24 31.25 N 1.25 W
25 31.25 N 1.25 E
26 31.25 N 3.75 E
27 31.25 N 3.75 W
28 31.25 N 6.25 E
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29 31.25 N 8.75 E
30 33.75 N 1.25 W
31 33.75 N 1.25 E
32 33.75 N 3.75 E
33 33.75 N 6.25 E
34 36.25 N 1.25 E
35 36.25 N 3.75 E
36 36.25 N 6.25 E
47.Yemen 1 13.75 N 43.75 E
2 13.75 N 46.25 E
3 16.25 N 43.75 E
4 16.25 N 46.25 E
5 16.25 N 48.75 E
6 16.25 N 51.25 E
7 18.75 N 51.25 E
48.Oman 1 18.75 N 53.75 E
2 18.75 N 56.25 E
3 21.25 N 58.75 E
4 21.25 N 56.25 E
5 23.75 N 56.25 E
6 26.25 N 56.25 E
49.Bahrain 1 26.25 N 51.25 E
50.United Arab Emirates 1 23.75 N 53.75 E
51.Kuwait 1 28.75 N 48.75 E
52.Qatar 1 26.25 N 51.25 E
53.Saudi Arabia 1 21.25 N 51.25 E
2 21.25 N 48.75 E
3 21.25 N 46.25 E
4 21.25 N 43.75 E
5 21.25 N 41.25 E
6 21.25 N 53.75 E
7 23.75 N 38.75 E
8 23.75 N 41.25 E
9 23.75 N 43.75 E
10 23.75 N 46.25 E
11 23.75 N 48.75 E
12 23.75 N 51.25 E
13 26.25 N 43.75 E
14 26.25 N 41.25 E
15 26.25 N 38.75 E
16 26.25 N 48.75 E
17 26.25 N 46.25 E
18 28.75 N 36.25 E
19 28.75 N 38.75 E
20 28.75 N 41.25 E
21 28.75 N 46.25 E
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22 28.75 N 43.75 E
23 31.25 N 38.75 E
24 31.25 N 41.25 E
54.Israel 1 31.25 N 33.75 E
55.Jordan 1 31.25 N 36.25 E
56.Egypt 1 26.25 N 26.25 E
2 26.25 N 33.75 E
3 31.25 N 31.25 E
4 28.75 N 31.25 E
5 26.25 N 31.25 E
6 23.75 N 31.25 E
7 23.75 N 33.75 E
8 28.75 N 33.75 E
9 23.75 N 28.75 E
10 23.75 N 26.25 E
11 26.25 N 28.75 E
12 28.75 N 28.75 E
13 28.75 N 26.25 E
14 31.25 N 26.25 E
15 31.25 N 33.75 E
57.Lebanon 1 33.75 N 36.25 E
58.Turkey 1 36.25 N 33.75 E
2 36.25 N 36.25 E
3 38.75 N 43.75 E
4 38.75 N 28.75 E
5 38.75 N 31.25 E
6 38.75 N 33.75 E
7 38.75 N 36.25 E
8 38.75 N 38.75 E
9 38.75 N 41.25 E
10 41.25 N 41.25 E
11 41.25 N 36.25 E
12 41.25 N 33.75 E
13 41.25 N 28.75 E
59.Syria 1 33.75 N 36.25 E
2 33.75 N 38.75 E
3 36.25 N 38.75 E
4 36.25 N 41.25 E
60.Iraq 1 31.25 N 43.75 E
2 31.25 N 46.25 E
3 33.75 N 41.25 E
4 33.75 N 43.75 E
5 36.25 N 43.75 E
61.Iran 1 26.25 N 58.75 E
2 26.25 N 61.25 E
3 28.75 N 51.25 E
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4 28.75 N 53.75 E
5 28.75 N 56.25 E
6 28.75 N 58.75 E
7 28.75 N 61.25 E
8 31.25 N 48.75 E
9 31.25 N 51.25 E
10 31.25 N 53.75 E
11 31.25 N 56.25 E
12 31.25 N 58.75 E
13 31.25 N 61.25 E
14 33.75 N 46.25 E
15 33.75 N 48.75 E
16 33.75 N 51.25 E
17 33.75 N 53.75 E
18 33.75 N 56.25 E
19 33.75 N 58.75 E
20 36.25 N 46.25 E
21 36.25 N 48.75 E
22 36.25 N 51.25 E
23 36.25 N 53.75 E
24 36.25 N 56.25 E
25 36.25 N 58.75 E
26 38.75 N 46.25 E
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